


THE 4th

COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

OLYMPIAD 2018



BULGARIA



**EUROPEAN SECURITY
AND DEFENCE COLLEGE
& IMPLEMENTATION
GROUP**



**VASIL LEVSKI
NATIONAL MILITARY
UNIVERSITY
VELIKO TARNOVO**



4th COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY OLYMPIAD

Residential phase,

21 - 25 May 2018 at

Vasil Levski NMU, Veliko Tarnovo,

under the auspices of the Bulgarian Presidency

of the Council of the European Union and

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Brussels, Belgium



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HISTORY OF THE CSDP OLYMPIAD

The **1st CSDP OLYMPIAD** was organised in the context of Cyprus contribution to the European Initiative for the Exchange of Young Officers Inspired by Erasmus Program. The main goal of the CSDP OLYMPIAD was to give the cadets the basic knowledge about CSDP, providing them with the incentive to study accordingly, in order to write a paper on CSDP, and to compete with cadets from other Member States in a CSDP knowledge Competition.

The 1st CSDP Olympiad was held in Cyprus from 3 to 5 October 2012. It was attended by 11 countries. Following the 1st Olympiad's success, a decision was made to hold the competition every two years.

The awarded students, per category, are as follows:

- a) The Single Competition Winner and 1st CSDP Olympiad Winner – Thomas Van Hoecke (The Belgian Military Academy),
- b) Best Paper Winner – Andrea Patrignani (Scuola di Applicazione e Istituto Studi Militari dell'Esercito, Italy),
- c) Best Cover Winner – Stefan Haubner & Martin Engleitner (The Theresan Military Academy, Austria).



Participants in the 1st CSDP OLYMPIAD 2012

The **2nd CSDP OLYMPIAD** was attended by 35 Military Academy students from 13 countries who, during the first cycle of the competition, submitted papers on selected topics related to Common Security and Defence Policy. During the final phase, hosted in Athens (Greece), at the Military Academy premises, 29 students from 11 countries (Greece, Cyprus, Austria, Italy, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Belgium, Spain, France and Germany) qualified. The CSDP Olympiad was organised by the Hellenic National Defence General Staff and took place from 7 to 9 May 2014.

The awarded students, per category, were as follows:

- a) The Single Competition Winner and 2nd Olympiad winner - Paolo Faneli (Italy),
- b) Best Paper Winner - Gonzalo Vallespin Terry (Spain),
- c) Best Cover Winner - Manuel Kurbantfinski (Austria).



Participants in the 2nd CSDP OLYMPIAD 2014

The 3rd CSDP OLYMPIAD was attended by 48 Military Academy students from 15 EU member states who, during the first cycle of the competition, submitted papers on selected topics related to Common Security and Defence Policy. During the final phase, hosted in Liptovský Mikuláš (Slovakia) at the Armed Forces Academy of General M.R.Štefánik,

41 students from 15 countries (Austria, Cyprus, Greece, Estonia, Italy, Ireland, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia, Belgium, Spain, France and Germany) qualified.

The CSDP Olympiad was organised by the Armed Forces Academy of General M.R.Štefánik and took place from 4 to 7 October 2016.

The awarded students, per category, were as follows:

a) The Single Competition Winner and 3rd Olympiad winner - Joaquín Alfaro Pérez, Spain

b) Best Paper Winner: John Michael NEVIN, Ireland

c) Best Cover Winner: Sebastian Enache IONUT, Romania.



Participants in the 3rd CSDP OLYMPIAD



HISTORY OF THE VASIL LEVSKI NMU, VELIKO TARNOVO

Vasil Levski National Military University is the heir of the rich traditions in the field of military education and a successor of the first military school in Bulgaria. This was established on 26 November 1878, before Bulgaria had its government, before convening of the Constituent Assembly and before the adoption of the Tarnovo Constitution.

With the 23 April 1924 Edict of King Boris III the military school was recognized as an institution of higher specialized education. At that time there were only four schools of higher education in Bulgaria – the Sofia University, the Free University for political and economic studies, the Arts Academy and the National Music Academy.

The mission of Vasil Levski National Military University is to contribute to its graduates' moral, mental and physical strength and growth, to imbue them with the ideals of patriotism, duty and honour, to form them as personalities and leaders capable of developing and implementing scientific knowledge, of managing social and special structures in peacetime and in crises, and of taking part in national and multinational projects aiming at maintenance of security, peacekeeping, and prosperity of the society.

Main Tasks of "Vasil Levski" National Military University:


- Training of cadets towards Bachelor's Degree;
- Training of civilian students towards Bachelor's and Master's Degrees
- Training towards acquisition of Doctor's degrees;
- Training of officers in post graduate courses;
- Carrying out scientific and applied research;
- Publishing, cultural and sports activities.

NMU has also been assigned by the MoD to perform additional tasks to the interest of the country's defense:

- NCO training and target qualification courses;
- Training of career personnel for the needs of the Armed Forces.

Vasil Levski NMU holds an institutional accreditation awarded by the National Assessment and Accreditation Agency for a period of 6 years with assessment rating "Very Good".

All professional fields in which the university provides degrees have been accredited and so have 15 of the university scientific specialties.



OPENING CEREMONY SPEECHES

Speech of the Deputy-Minister of the Bulgarian Presidency of the EU Council 2018, Mr. Oleg Petkov



4th Olympiad on the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU, event
of the Ministry of Defence on the calendar of the Bulgarian Presidency,
Vasil Levski NMU, Veliko Tarnovo, 22 May 2018

Dear Brigadier General Doctor Plamen Bogdanov,

Dear Lecturers,

Dear Cadets,

Dear Ladies and gentlemen,

It is a pleasure for me to open the 4th Olympiad on the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU, an event of the Ministry of Defense on the Calendar of the Bulgarian Presidency of the Council of the EU, organized by the Vasil Levski National University, Veliko Tarnovo.

I would like, on behalf of Minister Liliana Pavlova and on my behalf to greet you and wish that the results of the Olympiad are successful and that

the knowledge of the Bulgarian cadets on the common security and defence policy of the EU is on a par with the knowledge of the contestants from the other EU Member states.

For nearly five months, Bulgaria has been playing a very important role - presiding over the Council of the European Union. The whole period has been filled with many important initiatives and is a unique chance for our country to raise key issues on the European agenda.

Our main goal is to work towards reaching consensus, compromise, or understanding between Member States on the adoption of resolutions and the drafting of legislative acts. The Bulgarian Presidency seeks to achieve real results, adhering to the principles of transparency and accountability. We encourage partnerships at all levels based on an integrated approach and co-operation.

A special emphasis is placed on youth and security, given the complex nature of the challenges the European Union is facing.

Our every action as a rotating EU president is to be seen through the prism of unity and solidarity between the Member States. The motto of the Bulgarian Presidency is "United we stand strong". This is the motto of the National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria and today, more than ever, we need to be united, strong and stable, to defend common values, to guarantee the common well-being, security and democracy in Europe.

The Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU is one of the issues we have been working on persistently. I would even say that over the past few months, more has been achieved than in the last 10 years. Three major initiatives have been launched in connection with the EU's Common Strategy of 2016. The work on Permanent Structured Co-operation, widely known as PESCO, has reached its practical implementation phase. In March 2018, opportunities for launching the first PESCO projects were made

available. The European Defence Fund can only be activated after the work on the Regulation on the European Defense Industrial Development Programme has been completed

As you can see, the Bulgarian Presidency is working for lasting and sustainable solutions under the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy, effective action, a balanced approach between short and long-term measures. Without security and stability, European values are difficult to achieve. That is why the enormous burden of our efforts lies precisely on security and the development of defense policy.

Another focus of your activities is on young people. We have a responsibility to them for the direction we lead our Union in. They are our joint investment in the future, we need to provide them opportunities for education and development. As you may have heard, in the EU draft budget for the period 2021-2027 as of 2 May 2018, the Erasmus + program budget has been increased twice.

Today, in the age of information and communication technologies, it is more than obligatory that these technologies are widely introduced at all levels of the education system, the national security and defense system included.

Dear Cadets,

I address you because you are the future of Bulgaria and of Europe. You have chosen your career path and it depends entirely on you to uphold the principles of stability, security and safety, to continue your education and to pursue lifelong learning, because that is the only way that leads to forming individuals of character and dignity.

I wish success to the 4th Olympiad and I hope this forum will achieve its goals, especially in the context of the Bulgarian Presidency!

Thank you!

Speech of the Chairman of the Implementation Group **Colonel Assoc. Prof. Harald Gell, PhD, MSc, MSD, MBA**



***Dear Rector-Commandant Brigadier General Bogdanov,
Head of ESDC,
Director of the Olympiad,
Officers, Cadets, Ladies and Gentlemen,***

Victor Hugo – a French novelist – said some 150 year ago:

“Not anything is more powerful than an idea, whose time has arrived”.

When one Officer from Cyprus – Maj Symeon Zambas – had the idea to create and organise the 1st CSDP Olympiad in Cyprus in 2012, the time had definitely arrived.

Since then – in a sequence of 2 years – because of his idea we can look back to very successful CSDP Olympiads, which took place always in those countries which held the Presidency of the Council of the European Union.

The CSDP Olympiad is one – out of 37 so-called “Common Modules”.

- All of them have a total amount of 108 ECTS.
- All of them are agreed by the 28 European Union member States.
- And all of them have the overall goal of promoting a European Security and Defence Culture.

In the Module Description of the “Common Module CSDP Olympiad” is written – that participating Cadets and Students are to reach the following competence: “Act and cooperate with confidence in a CSDP working environment”.

This is exactly what we need for our future elites.

Scientific researches proofed evidence that Cadets’ and Students’ exchanges – such as the CSDP Olympiad – which is even just a short-term exchange – increase their European intercultural competences.

When they will hold important positions in the future and act as truly European leaders they may say – that their courses of action had the origin in Veliko Tarnovo in 2018.

I would like to express my gratitude to the Vasil Levski National Military University for organising the event – and to all the personnel who prepared the 4th CSDP Olympiad.

Special thanks goes to Colonel NEVENA ATANASOVA-KRASTEVA – who acted as the “working muscle” of the Olympiad. I personally appreciated the collaboration and cooperation with you. Thank you and your Staff very much indeed.

Addressing the Cadets – I would be glad if you just remember a quotation of Adam Fischer – an orchestra-director – who said in Vienna in 2017 just before intoning the European anthem:

“It is wonderful – that within the European Union the 3rd generation has not experienced war. Who endangers the unity of Europe – does not know what he is doing.”

I wish you all the best for the 4th CSDP Olympiad and may the best win!

**Speech of the Head of the
European Security and Defence College
Lieutenant Colonel Dirk Dubois**



Dear General, Rector of the Vasil Levski National Military University,

Dear Mr Deputy Mayor of the city of Veliko Tarnovo,

Esteemed Chair of the Implementation Group,

Dear colleagues and participants of the 4th CSDP Olympiad,

First of all, I would like to thank the Bulgarian Presidency of the Council of the European Union and the Vasil Levski National Military University for organising this event.

10 years ago, then under the French Presidency, a very challenging idea was launched to increase the number of student exchanges between the military academies of the EU Member States to at least the same level as for the civilian universities. The idea was that the exchanges should not only be done for pleasure or for sportive events. On the contrary, to better prepare the young officers for their future jobs, they should enter into contact with their colleagues from other countries, with whom they will

soon after graduating probably deploy to some mission or operation outside of the EU.

Today, looking back at those ten years, I can but note the Initiative has exceeded expectations and I'm that you will hear about it in a few moments from the IG Chair.

This 4th edition of the Olympiad has offered the participating cadets the opportunity to learn more about the EU, how it functions and what CSDP/CFSP is all about. More importantly, it has offered the possibility to express their acquired knowledge and their own opinion in a written work.

In the coming days, you will compete with each other, individually and in group, to see who wrote the best paper and who knows most about the topics you studied.

I hope to see a fair, honest and interesting competition and to see the best man or woman win at the end of the week.

Good luck!

Speech of
The Minister of Defence of Republic of Bulgaria
Mr. Krasimir Karakachanov



To the participants in the 4th Olympiad on the Common
Security and Defence Policy of the European Union

Dear Brigadier General Bogdanov,

Dear officers,

*Dear cadets – finalists in the 4th Olympiad on the Common
Security and Defence Policy of the European Union,*

Welcome to my home country - Bulgaria and its old capital Veliko Tarnovo - a city of incredible beauty and romance and with impressive history and culture that is an important part of the common history and culture of Europe!

It is a pleasure and an honor to welcome the participants in this pan-European event, hosted by our National Military University during the Bulgarian presidency of the European Union.

This intellectual competition for cadets from the European Union countries is organized for the fourth time under the auspices of the Implementation Group of the European Initiative for exchange of young officers inspired by the Erasmus Programme, often referred to as 'the Military Erasmus' and the European Security and Defense College.

The hosting of this forum is a great honor and prestige for the Vasil Levski National Military University, but it is completely deserved and legitimate. The National Military University has been a very active participant in this joint European initiative since its inception. The Military Erasmus website is based and maintained on a server of our University. The contribution of Bulgaria and the National Military University to the initiative was appreciated and emphasized on in 2009 by the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Mr Javier Solana.

The role of the University in the Military Erasmus initiative is quite natural because it is only one aspect of its extremely active and extensive European exchange. This is the first military university in Europe to be part of the Erasmus program of the European Union. Today, within Erasmus +, it has been actively cooperating with over 50 European civilian and military higher education institutions.

I pay special attention to the university hosting the Olympiad and its openness towards and extensive involvement in European initiatives, not only because these correspond to the ideas and policy of the Bulgarian Ministry of Defence, but above all because they convey the very spirit of Military Erasmus initiative, of the European Security and Defense College, and the Olympiad on the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union in particular.

The exchange of trainees and the cooperation between the military academia of the EU member states is not an end in itself. It is an important

aspect of the European Security and Defence Policy to improve the interoperability and the ability of European armed forces to work together within a common European defence and security policy framework.

At the same time, this exchange leads to the formation and consolidation of a unified European military culture and a way of thinking on security and defence issues. This is extremely important because it is not the common institutions but the common values, cultures and economies that form the true and lasting foundation of European unity and the continent's common path towards the future.

It is quite natural that when the focus lies far ahead in the future, the investment in this future must be in the youth - the cadets, the young officers- tomorrow's generation of military leaders and strategists who will be building the security of a united Europe after 15 or 20 years.

I'm confident this Olympiad will be another successful step that will make a small contribution in this direction. I believe that when you leave this place, you, the participants from 15 different nations, you will take away in your hearts and thoughts not only the lasting memory of an incredibly beautiful and hospitable city and beautiful Bulgaria, but also personal friendships and a sense of belonging to a community - a community on the road to our shared future.

I wish you the best of success!

Good luck!

Sofia, 22 May 2018

Speech of the Deputy – Mayor of the Municipality of Veliko Tarnovo

Professor Georgi Kamarashev, PhD



*Dear Brigadier General,
Officers and Sergeants,
Officer cadets and NCO cadets,
Lecturers and Students,
Ladies and Gentlemen,*

It is a real honor and a great pleasure for me to deliver this address to you on behalf of the Mayor of the Municipality of Veliko Tarnovo Mr. Daniel Panov.

The fact that we are both graduates of the Vasil Levski National Military University fills us both with pride and gratitude. Pride because we served faithfully in the ranks of the Bulgarian Army and, as officers, we have endeavored to preserve the name, honor and dignity of the Bulgarian military; gratitude to our commanders and professors for the fact that they have to a great extent made us the men that we are today.

I am delighted with the fact that the National Military University hosts this prestigious event of the Ministry of Defense from the calendar of the Bulgarian Presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2018.

14 years ago Bulgaria became a full member of NATO and that radically changed our national defense and security doctrine.

We, Bulgarians, returned to the military and political structure that was and is responsible for protecting not only the European countries and societies, but is called upon to protect our common values!

For both NATO and the European Union, apart from being a military and a political alliance, apart from being a common market for 500 million people, or customs and trade treaties have been, are and hopefully will remain the communities of shared values that we have both the honor and the responsibility to protect and defend.

The dynamics, interconnectivity, and the complexity of the modern world have undisputedly shown that security is not a natural state to be taken for granted. This has proven that, in order to ensure our security, identity and integrity, we have to make much more effort, allocate much more resources, and focus on education in this area much more than we had to 10 years ago.

Without going further into the matter, I want, on behalf of all citizens of Veliko Tarnovo and of the local authorities, to assure you that we are all proud and happy to hold this event.

Proud, because we have the opportunity to kindly offer you our proverbial hospitality and to show you the signs and symbols of our pride and glory.

Happy, because we are all glad to see how political declarations and written strategies for a common European defense and security are turning into applicable policies.

As I wish success to this wonderful event, I wish successful presentation to all participants and I hope that despite the intensive work program you will have the opportunity to feel the unique atmosphere of our incredible city.

Good luck!

Speech of the Rector of the Vasil Levski NMU

Brigadier General Plamen Bogdanov, PhD



Dear Guests and Participants,

The Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is an integral part of the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This policy is not backed by legal instruments - directives, regulations, and the like. It is expressed in joint actions, common positions, opinions and declarations, as well as European Council conclusions. Hence, the need for harmony and consensus. Harmony, achieved despite the difference and variety of languages and the possible inefficiency of communication symbolized by the construction of the biblical Tower of Babel. Harmony that requires speaking in a single organizational language. Consensus that leads to joint action for achieving the strategic goals. The stakes are high: the preservation of Europe - our common home as well as of European values at a time of global change. We must preserve our common home, not just because this is where we live, but also because the Old Continent was the cradle of modern Civilization.

The collective thinking in question about is formed from an early age, and is fostered throughout people's lives. That is where family, school, and society play their respective parts. In order for this complex social process to bring results, it is necessary to maintain not only an appropriate intellectual environment but also social relations built in connecting with this higher strategic goal. In this social and functional context, higher education institutions have a leading role. These institutions prepare graduates who, at the conscious and subconscious level, sustain and convey the mental and behavioral patterns, knowledge and skills acquired in the educational process. This is why events such as the current Fourth Olympiad on the Common Security and Defense Policy of the European Union are of the utmost importance.

The Bulgarian Presidency of the Council of the European Union during the first half of 2018 seeks to achieve tangible results in this policy, adhering to the principles of transparency and pragmatism. That is why this forum was planned to be held in Veliko Tarnovo and at the Vasil Levski National Military University in particular. The place was not chosen at random. The city was the capital of the Second Bulgarian Kingdom, while the University is the successor of the Military School founded in 1878 and is essentially the first state institution of modern Bulgaria. It is the place where the spirit of statehood and our intrinsic European identity combine in a truly unique way. This is the attitude with which we have accepted both the challenge and the great honor of hosting this forum.

For the period from May 21 to May 25, our future - cadets from the military universities and academies of 15 European countries will be demonstrating their knowledge of, sound argumentation about and expectations in the field of security and defence. They will do this together, in the spirit of cooperation and with the awareness of the responsibility

shouldered by military personnel throughout history and the evolution of society.

Dear young colleagues!

As change is inevitable, so one generation is inevitably succeeded by another. The current Olympiad is OUR contribution to ensuring continuity as a generation and as a community. We, the more experienced in this endeavor, will help you. We strongly believe in the effectiveness of this approach. We wish you that the challenges you have in providing our common security and defense are fewer, more predictable and easier to overcome than those we have to deal with today!

I wish you good luck!

I announce the official beginning of the final stage of the Fourth Olympiad on the Common Security and Defense Policy of the European Union, an event from the Calendar of the Bulgarian Presidency of the Council of the European Union and the European Security and Defence College!

Good luck!

THE BEST ESSAYS

**Officer Cadet Matthias Kern
Theresian Military Academy
Wiener Neustadt, Austria**



THE ROLE OF CSDP IN BORDER PROTECTION

**Created for the CSDP Olympiad 2018
in Veliko Tarnovo – Bulgaria**

1. Abstract

World War II was the climax of European nations battling each other for centuries. Through the process of European integration war has disappeared in participating nations. A long term of peace and prosperity has given Europe the capacity for a leading role in international security affairs.

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) sets the framework of all actions taken by the European Union (EU) in conflict and crisis areas. The migrant crisis of 2015 has shown that a single state is not able to handle the pressure of irregular migration on its own. A lessons-learned

process, initiated by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission (HR/VP), has shown that a central coordination of European border protection capabilities is desperately needed.

Therefore, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCG) was reinforced and now has more capabilities to support the Member States with their external border management.

Within this essay the author answers the following questions:

- What is the role of CSDP in border protection?
- What is the Common Security and Defence Policy?
- How does the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) effect the protection of the EU external borders?
- What is the Schengen Area?
- What is FRONTEX and what is it responsible for?

2. Preface

As an Officer Cadet of the Theresan Military Academy, the author gets confronted with the structures and procedures of the European Union very often. Furthermore, the author is a student of the law faculty at the University of Graz, with the specialisation on constitutional law.

When the migrant crisis reached Austria in 2015 the author was a Military Police NCO and deployed on Austrian border crossing points. Seeing the helplessness of inner European States in handling this unprecedented flow of irregular migrants raised the author's awareness on how important proper protection of the EU external borders is.

To intensify the knowledge on the structures of the CSDP and how the protection of our borders is organised, this topic was chosen.

Furthermore, the author would like to use this opportunity to thank Col Assoc. Prof. Dr. Harald Gell and Mag. Christian Thuller for their support in authoring this essay.

3. Introduction

More than one million irregular migrants from all over the world, mainly from Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan crossed EU's external border in 2015 alone. The Central Mediterranean Route was the main focus at the beginning, but in summer 2015 the main migrant flow shifted to the Western Balkans Route.

The migration crisis is highly mediatised and has become of increasing concern to the EU citizens. The main reason for that is the bloody path of terror attacks all over Europe.

Therefore, the migration issue has become a priority on the agenda of many European politicians and is affecting elections on the whole continent.

The establishment of regional co-operative partnerships like the Central European Defence Cooperation (CEDC) has led to a cessation on the Western Balkans Route.¹

To act more together as one Union, the EU should mobilise all means and capabilities, civilian and military ones, by implementing an integrated approach in protection the EU's external borders. This integrated approach also includes CSDP efforts.²

When the precursor of the EU, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), was founded in 1952, the citizens of Europe had the burning desire for peace and prosperity. Four decades and many modifications on institutional level, later the establishment of the Schengen Area set a new milestone for the European integration.³

With the creation of the post HR/VP, through the Treaty of Lisbon, the CSDP has got a face and became one of the EU's top priorities.

The crisis at the EU borders in 2015 was followed by a lessons-learned process. The outcome of this process directly affected some parts of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS), presented by the HR/VP Federica Mogherini in June 2016.

In the author's opinion the crucial strengthening of FRONTEX sent a clear signal: The EU and all Member States are willing to protect their external borders by all means.

4. Current State of Research

In this chapter the author's aim is to describe the current state of other studies, especially in the fields of European Border protection. During the research for this essay the author has found a lot of information provided by EU's official bodies. To give the reader a wider view on this topic the most important and currently in-effect treaties and agreements are shown and explained.

The author tries to analyse the development and the structures of border protection measures of the EU to avoid a try of re-inventing the wheel.

¹ Cf.: Biscop S. & Rehr J. (2016) Migration – How CSDP can support. Vienna. Armed Forces Printing Center. P. 15.

² Cf.: Ibid.

³ Cf.: Homepage of the European Union. Page EU History. URL.: https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history_en. [29-11-17].

4.1 The Maastricht Treaty

The Maastricht Treaty established the CFSP as a part of the three pillars.⁴

4.2 The Lisbon Treaty 1991

The implementation of the post High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) has brought a new era to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). From that on the HR was responsible for the CFSP.⁵

4.3 The EU Global Strategy 2016

The EUGS set the framework for a stronger partnership between the Member States in security and defence matters.




Figure 1: The main actions of the EU's defence and security package.⁶

The EUGS also included defence and security package. The three main actions can be seen on the above graphic.

*"The EU Global Strategy sets out the EU's core interests and principles for engaging in the wider world and gives the Union a collective sense of direction."*⁷

The effect of the EUGS on EU's border protection will be discussed in chapter 8.

4.4 Permanent Structured Cooperation 2017

A stronger cooperation of the participating states coordinated by the HR/VP, the EU Military Staff (EUMS), the European Defence Agency (EDA), the European External Action Service (EEAS), and the European Military Committee (EUMC) in the fields of defence forces is the aim of PESCO.

⁴ Cf.: Homepage of the European Union. Page EU History. URL.: https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history_en. [29-11-17].

⁵ Cf.: Homepage of the Treaty of Lisbon. Page General. URL.: <http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty.html>. [29-11-17]

⁶ Figure created by the author.

⁷ Homepage of the European Union. Page global strategy 2016. URL.: <http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/global-strategy-foreign-and-security-policy-european-union>. [29-11-17].

“PESCO is a Treaty-based framework and process to deepen defence cooperation amongst EU Member States who are capable and willing to do so. The aim is to jointly develop defence capabilities and make them available for EU military operations. This will thus enhance the EU’s capacity as an international security partner, also contributing to protection of Europeans and maximise the effectiveness of defence spending.”⁸

Out of the 28 EU Member States only five do not take part in PESCO. Those are Denmark, Ireland, Malta, Portugal, and still EU Member State United Kingdom. The implementation of joint armament projects, a general enhancement in the defence budgetary, a better cooperation in cyber defence, and the joint providing of logistic elements for the Battle Groups can be seen as the most important measures of PESCO.⁹

5. Research Gap

EU’s official bodies have published many factsheets, scientific communications and articles regarding to the topic of this essay.

The EUGS is a new framework for the EU’s dedication to build a safer and more secure environment for the European citizens. The effect of the new defined interests, principles, and priorities on the EU’s border protection measures have not been analysed before.

Another very important sphere of research is the influence of the CSDP on the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCG), which has been according to a proper research of the author has not been done before in the format of an essay.

6. Research Questions

The main question of this essay was given: **What is the role of CSDP in border protection?**

Before the main question can be answered, the author intends to answer 4 sub-questions. The answers of the sub-questions are necessary for a better understanding of the topic.

Question 1: What is the Common Security and Defence Policy?

Question 2: How does the EUGS affect the protection of the EU external borders?

Question 3: What is the Schengen Area?

Question 4: What is FRONTEX and what is it responsible for?

⁸ Homepage of the European External Action Service. Page PESCO Factsheet. URL.: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/pesco_factsheet_14-11-2017_.pdf. [28-11-17].

⁹ Cf.: Ibid.

7. Methodology

In order to achieve the best possible result, the author uses a wide range of sources in compiling the required information for this essay. These sources are ranging from EU factsheets, articles, books, academic journals to officially published internet based information.

The main point of this essay is to answer the questions of the previous chapter. To make it clearer to understand the topic the author decided to divide the main question. The methodical approach of this essay is the author-based interpretation, also known as hermeneutics.




Figure 2: Flowchart of the hermeneutical approach to answer the main question.¹⁰

8. Research and Results of Research

Answering the main question – “*What is the role of CSDP in border protection?*” – is the aim of this chapter. The main question has been separated into 4 sub-questions in chapter 6. These questions are answered in chronological order. The outcome of the first question – “*What is the Common Security and Defence Policy?*” – is the most important knowledge

¹⁰ Figure created by the author.

that any reader needs to understand the topic. The starting point of the research is a brief history of Europe's way to the Common Security and Defence Policy.

8.1 The History of the Common Security and Defence Policy

World War II was the climax of European nations battling each other for centuries. Through the process of European integration war has disappeared among those nations participating in this process. A long term of peace and prosperity has given Europe the capacity for a leading role in international security affairs. The European Community forced a harmonisation of the member states foreign policies in the 1960s.¹¹

The Davignon Report presented the Concept of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1970.¹² Six-monthly meetings of the Foreign Affairs ministers as well as quarterly meetings for the political directors were installed through this process. The aim behind EPC was to facilitate a process of consolidation among the member states.

The Maastricht Treaty of 1993, which created the institutional framework of the European Union, bases on the concept of the EPC. The bilateral meeting in Saint-Malo between France and the UK is seen by many as a breakthrough on the way to the European Security and Defence Policy.¹³ The capabilities for fulfilling the Petersberg tasks were defined in numerous European council summit meetings.

The Petersberg tasks consist of humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and peacemaking.¹⁴ The European Security Strategy was presented at the end of 2003, outlining challenges and threats facing Europe. Earlier this year the first European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) mission was launched.

The strategy of 2003 remained in place until 2016, when the new EU Global Strategy was presented. The entry into force of the Lisbon treaty renamed the ESDP into Common Security and Defence Policy on 1 December 2009. The post High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was established. With the Lisbon Treaty also, the EU pillar structure disappeared. Further, the Petersberg tasks were extended. The Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union contain now the extended Petersberg tasks as well as the installation of the mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU) and the solidarity clause (Article 222 TFEU).¹⁵

¹¹ Cf.: Rehr, J. (2017). Handbook CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. Vienna. Armed Forces Printing Centre. Volume 1. 3rd edition. P. 16.

¹² Cf.: Ibid.

¹³ Cf.: Ibid.

¹⁴ Cf.: Ibid.

¹⁵ Cf.: Ibid.

“With the implementation of the EU Global Strategy of 2016, new momentum was given to the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy.”¹⁶

In the opinion of the author, the priorities of the EU have changed in favour of security and defence.

8.2 The EU Global Strategy

In this chapter the author analyses parts of the EUGS, which can affect the protection of European borders.

The HR/VP Federica Mogherini presented the Global Strategy as the new framework of the European Union’s plans on security and defence in June 2016. The EUGS is the result of a long and transparent process of consultations with the EU Member States, the European civil society and the institutions of the EU. According to the topic of this essay, the EU Global Strategy gives a clear statement: *“Our security at home depends on peace beyond our borders.”¹⁷*

8.2.1 Interests and Principles of the EU Global Strategy

The main aim stated in the EUGS is to promote peace and guarantee the security of EU citizens and territory. Other interests according to the EUGS are the prosperity of European citizens, an open and fair international economic system, the strengthening of the resilience of its democracies as well as promoting a rules-based global order. Principled pragmatism as a new term for a course between isolationism and interventionism was charted in the EUGS.

8.2.2 The Five Priorities of the EU Global Strategy

The five priorities, to promote the shared interests of all EU member states, according to the EUGS of 2016 are as followed:¹⁸

- The Security of our Union.
- State and Societal Resilience to our East and South.
- An Integrated Approach to Conflicts.
- Cooperative Regional Orders.
- Global Governance for the 21st Century.

¹⁶ Rehr, J. (2017). Handbook CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. Vienna. Armed Forces Printing Center. Volume 1. 3rd edition. P. 17.

¹⁷ Ibid. P. 22.

¹⁸ Cf.: Rehr, J. (2017). Handbook CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. Vienna. Armed Forces Printing Centre. Volume 1. 3rd edition. P. 20.



Figure 3: The five priorities of EU's external action.¹⁹

In the author's opinion, the points above show the EU's clear will to establish a safe and secure European environment.

8.3 The Concept of CSDP

Framed by the TEU the CSDP is an integral part of the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy. The CSDP sets the framework for the EU military operations and missions all around the globe.²⁰

The Lisbon Treaty provides a clear legal framework on institutional aspects, while the EUGS lays out the strategy underlying the CSDP.²¹

According to the HR/VP the CSDP gives the EU the possibility to take a leading role in international security, conflict prevention and world-wide peacekeeping operations.

All decisions relating to the CSDP are taken by the Council of the European Union. The role of the HR/VP is to make proposals for actions regarding the strategic objectives and the tasks which the EU should accomplish on strategic levels. Excepting decisions on the EDA and the PESCO, where majority voting applies, decisions are usually taken by consentaneousness.²²

8.4 EU Border Protection

In the following chapter the author analyses the structure and organisation of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCG). First of all, knowledge of the Schengen Treaty and its effects on the European external border management is essential to understand the topic.

8.4.1 The Schengen Agreement of 1995

The Schengen Area was established separately from the European Economic Community in 1995, when the EC member states were not able to reach consensus among all EC member states on the abolition of inter European border controls.²³

¹⁹ Figure created by the author.

²⁰ Cf.: Bampenko, I. (2016). History and future of CSDP with special consideration onto EU missions and operations. Theresan Military Academy Wiener Neustadt. Bachelor Thesis. P. 27.

²¹ Cf.: Homepage of the European External Action Service. Page of the CSDP structure, instruments, and agencies. URL.: https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5392/csdp-structure-instruments-and-agencies_en. [22-11-17].

²² Cf.: Ibid.

²³ Cf.: Homepage of the European Parliament. Page Fact Sheet on the European Union. URL.: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_5.12.4.html. [19-11-17].

When the Schengen Convention supplemented the Agreement in 1990 the rules and agreements were completely different to the structures of the EC, which led to the establishment of the Schengen Area in 1995. The Schengen Agreement was incorporated into the EU law by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, when more EU member states signed the Schengen Agreement.²⁴

According to the Schengen Treaties, States in the Schengen Area have strengthened border controls with non-Schengen countries.

Today, the Schengen Area consists of 26 European states that have abolished all types of border control at their mutual borders. The Schengen area has a common visa policy and functions as a single legal body for international travel purposes.

In response to the European migrant crisis and terror attacks all around Europe, border controls within the Schengen Area were temporarily reintroduced in seven Schengen Agreement member states. Those states are Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Norway, Poland and Sweden.²⁵




Figure 4: The Schengen Area.²⁶

8.4.2 The Establishment of the EBCG

In the following chapter the author analyses the structure and the legal background of the EBCG, also known as FRONTEX. The term FRONTEX is from French and is an abbreviation for “external borders”.

The predecessor of the EBCG, the “European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the

²⁴ Cf.: Ibid.

²⁵ Cf.: Ibid.

²⁶ Homepage of Polgeonow. The Schengen Area. Europe’s Free Travel Zone. URL.: <http://www.polgeonow.com/2016/03/what-is-schengen-list-countries-map.html>. [22-11-17].

Member States of the European Union” was established in November 2004.²⁷

A Mechanism for the creation of Rapid Border Intervention teams, as well as a regulation on the tasks and powers of guest officers was established in 2007.²⁸

The European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) was established in October 2013 provides for “*a common framework for the exchange of information and for the cooperation between Member States and the [Frontex] Agency in order to improve situational awareness and to increase reaction capability at the external borders of the Member States of the Union (‘external borders’) for the purpose of detecting, preventing and combating illegal immigration and cross-border crime and contributing to ensuring the protection and saving the lives of migrants (‘EUROSUR’)*”.²⁹

When the EBCG replaced the “European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union” in 2016, it also took over the legal personality of its predecessor.³⁰

8.4.3 Organisation and Task of the EBCG

Today the EBCG is headquartered in Warsaw, Poland, and is tasked with border control of the European Schengen Area. To protect the European exterior border the EBCG has to work in coordination with the border and coast guards of Schengen Area member states.

By decisions of the European Council, and after a vote by the European Parliament, the European and Coast Guard was officially launched on 6 October 2016 at the Bulgarian external border with Turkey.³¹

According to the European Commission FRONTEX “*will bring together a European Border and Coast Guard Agency built from FRONTEX and the Member States’ authorities responsible for border management” with day-to-day management of external border regions remaining the responsibility of member states*”.³²

The Protection of the EU’s external borders are a shared responsibility of FRONTEX and the border and coast guards of the member states. With regard to coastguard tasks the “agency” coordinates its work alongside the

²⁷ Cf.: Homepage of the European External Action Service. Page of the CSDP structure, instruments, and agencies. URL.: https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5392/csdp-structure-instruments-and-agencies_en. [24-11-17].

²⁸ Homepage of the European External Action Service. Page CSDP. URL.: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/431/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp_en. [1-11-17].

²⁹ Ibid. URL: http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Legal_basis/Eurosur_Regulation_2013.pdf

³⁰ Cf.: Ibid.

³¹ Cf.: Homepage of the European Union. Page EU Agencies. URL.: https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/agencies/frontex_en. [28-11-17].

³² Ibid.

European Fisheries Control Agency and the European Maritime Safety Agency.

The budget of the EBCG was € 281 million in 2017 and will reach up to € 322 million in 2020. The EU also shows its ambition to strengthen FRONTEX by increasing the staff from 500 to 1000 by the year 2020.

FRONTEX supports EU countries facing pressure on their borders by coordinating the deployment of additional technical equipment and specially trained border staff. Special European Border Forces of rapidly deployable border guards, called Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT)³³ were created by EU interior ministers in April 2007 to assist in border control, particularly on Europe's southern coastlines.

According to the European Commission the EBCG has following areas of responsibility:³⁴

- **Risk analysis** – To assess risks at Europe's external borders is one of EBCG most important tasks, because all border protection activities coordinated by FRONTEX have to be risk-analysis driven. Trends in irregular migration as well as cross-border criminal activity at the EU's external borders are set up by the EBCG. Trends and findings are shared with the Commission and national authorities for planning joint activities.

- **Joint operations** – With increasing capabilities in the fields of border protection assistance and surveillance, FRONTEX is able to coordinate the deployment of technical equipment and specially trained staff to external border areas in need of additional assistance. This technical equipment includes surveillance equipment as well as aircraft, land vehicles, and vessels. FRONTEX also has a mandate to send liaison officers and launch joint operations with third countries, which also includes operating on the third countries' territory.

- **Rapid response Teams** – FRONTEX coordinates the deployment of European Border Guard Teams if a member state is facing extreme pressure at an EU external border. Those Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT) are armed and are able to patrol cross-country.

- **Research** – FRONTEX coordinates talks between border control experts and industry to enable the research in the fields of new technology needed by border control authorities.

- **Training** – FRONTEX is responsible for the harmonisation of training standards for border protection authorities within the EU and Schengen associated countries. Border Guards from different countries have to be able to work together efficiently.

³³ Cf.: Ibid.

³⁴ Cf.: Ibid.

- **Joint return Operations** – FRONTEX coordinates joint return operations of illegal migrants. The Decision who should be returned is always made by the member state.

- **Information-sharing Systems** – FRONTEX is also responsible for developing and operating an information system between national border authorities.³⁵

Furthermore, FRONTEX is empowered to intervene, when deficiencies in the functioning of the border protection of a national state are identified as a threat. FRONTEX is able to step in, in situations that put the functioning of the Schengen area at risk. The Agency is allowed to do so even if the concerned member state does not request assistance.³⁶ By decision of the European Commission FRONTEX is able to intervene and deploy Teams to ensure that proper action is taken, even when a Member state is unwilling to take the necessary measures.

9. Discussion of Results and personal Conclusions

In this part, the author would like to ask his questions and find the answers for them. Further the pros and cons will be discussed and result in the authors personal conclusion.

9.1 Questions and Answers

Question 1: What is the Common Security and Defence Policy?

The current name of CSDP was given by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.

“The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) enables the Union to take a leading role in peace-keeping operations, conflict prevention and in the strengthening of the international security. It is an integral part of the EU’s comprehensive approach towards crisis management, drawing on civilian and military assets.”³⁷

Question 2: How does the EUGS affect the protection of the EU external borders?

The EUGS is much more a framework of common European principles, interest, and priorities. The first priority of the EUGS shows the importance of the protection of the EU external borders. Security within the EU can only be reached by defending the Schengen Area against external threats. Direct and detailed border protection measures cannot be found within the EUGS.

Question 3: What is the Schengen Area?

³⁵ Cf.: Ibid.

³⁶ Cf.: Homepage of the European Parliament. Page Fact Sheet on the European Union. URL.: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_5.12.4.html. [29-11-17].

³⁷ Homepage of the European External Action Service. Page CSDP. URL.: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/431/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp_en. [29-11-17].

The intention behind the Schengen Treaties is to create a borderless Area in Europe. It proposes the abolition of border checks at the mutual borders of the Member States and the harmonisation of visa policies. It currently consists of 26 European states with together more than 400 million citizens. The Treaty of Amsterdam incorporated the Schengen Treaties and Rules into European Union law, while providing opt-outs for Ireland and the United Kingdom. Several non-EU Member States are also included in the area. According to the Schengen Treaties, States in the Schengen Area have strengthened border controls with non-Schengen countries.³⁸

Question 4: What is FRONTEX and what is it responsible for?

“The mission of FRONTEX - the European Border and Coast Guard Agency - is to promote, coordinate and develop European border management in line with the EU fundamental rights charter and the concept of Integrated Border Management.”³⁹

The role of FRONTEX is to support national authorities in need of assistance, as well as to coordinate the border management at Europe’s external borders.

The responsibilities range from Joint Operations, including RABIT, to risk analysis and technical support, as well as Research and Training in the fields of border protection and the coordination of joint return operations of illegal migrants.

What is the role of CSDP in border protection?

Like in the past, each state is responsible for the protection of its EU external border. With the EUGS and PESCO the EU has gained more competences and capabilities in security matters. The EBCG, as an agency within CSDP, is responsible for coordinating the joint border protection measures of the EU.

9.2 Personal Conclusion

An unprecedented flow of irregular migrants, especially along the Western Balkans route, was a big challenge for the Central European States in 2015. In the author’s opinion, the whole migration issue is highly mediatised and even has effected current elections in Europe.

The real challenge for the EU is not to prevent migrants from getting into the Schengen Area. The real challenge is to effectively use all capabilities to offer migrants, a safe and secure environment, as well as the opportunity for a better life, in their region of origin. But peace and prosperity in the European neighbourhood, especially in Northern Africa and the Sahelian zone, is unlikely to be achieved within the next decades.

³⁸ Cf.: Homepage of the European Parliament. Page Fact Sheet on the European Union. URL.: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/display.html?ftuId=FTU_5.12.4.html. [1-11-17].

³⁹ Cf.: Homepage of the European Union. Page EU Agencies. URL.: https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/agencies/frontex_en. [28-11-17].

Therefore, the EU and its Member States have to use the tools that the CSDP provides, in order to establish a more effective protection of our European borders.

10. Annexes

10.1 List of Abbreviations

CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
EBCG	European Border and Coastguard
EC	European Commission
EEC	European Economic Community
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDA	European Defence Agency
EEAS	European External Service
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EUMC	European Union Military Staff
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUNAVFOR MED	European Union Naval Force Mediterranean
HR/VP	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
PSC	Political and Security Committee
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UN	United Nations

10.2 List of Figures

Figure 1: The main actions of the EU's defence and security package.

Figure 2: Flowchart of the hermeneutical approach to answer the main question.

Figure 3: The five priorities of EU's external action.

Figure 4: The Schengen Area.

10.3 List of Literature

10.3.1 Books

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THE ROLE OF CSDP IN BORDER PROTECTION

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in Veliko Tarnovo – Bulgaria

1. Abstract

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is a valuable asset of the European Union (EU). It enables the Union to prevent conflicts, strengthen international security, embark on peace-keeping operations, and deploy supporting missions globally. The integrated approach – utilising civilian and military capabilities for long-term solutions to security challenges – empowers the EU to offer reasonable security for its citizens.

Since the end of the Second World War, efforts were made that led to the creation of modern CSDP. With the Schengen agreement entering into force, for the first time a need has arisen to manage the external borders of the signatory states. And while the geopolitical environment has been

changing constantly, border protection has been further improved. The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCG) emerged and numerous CSDP Missions and Operations were deployed.

Recent events in the world forced the EU to take a stronger and more proactive stance regarding its Foreign and Security Policies. The introduction of the EU Global Strategy aimed at meeting those requirements, and with initiatives like the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the Union is emancipating itself from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Yet the rethinking of its CSDP was encouraged due to the migration crisis a few years ago. As this crisis management tool is meant to be deployed outside of the Union, the future will show if an enhancement of the legal framework will create the possibilities for internal application. Until then the CSDP will be used to stabilise the vicinity of the EU, protecting its external borders by dealing with the causes for security issues on the spot.

2. Preface

The motivation of the author for writing this essay – as a Cadet of the Theresan Military Academy - is based on his interest for historical and geopolitical issues. For a future officer, sound knowledge of European policies, treaties, and agreements is indispensable for his service in the Austrian Armed Forces. It goes without saying that such expertise is further extended while researching the topic. What is more, by authoring this essay, he may also improve his understanding of the decisions for the implementation of past and present European Missions on Operations.

Today's CSDP has come a long way since the first steps for European cooperation were taken. After the Second World War large parts of Europe were devastated and a number of organisations, such as the United Nations (UN) and the NATO came into existence to maintain, or if need be, restore peace and order. The European Recovery Program (ERP) also referred to as “Marshall Plan” was launched to rebuild and strengthen the weakened economies and with the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community the foundation for the EU was laid.

Nowadays evolving security challenges, like migration, terrorism, and hybrid threats, demand to be coped with and the EU has already embarked on numerous initiatives and deployed a number of missions and operations to protect its external borders.

In view of the occasion, the author would like to express his gratitude to Col Dr. Gell and Col Mag. Pauschenwein for their excellent support in writing this essay.

3. Introduction¹

In 2015 Europe had to deal with a refugee and migration crisis of unprecedented dimensions. More than one million refugees and migrants crossed the Austrian border alone and the topic of migration became a top priority of many European politicians in the countries directly affected. Firstly, the migration flow was moving along the Central Mediterranean Route and later on shifted to the Eastern Mediterranean – Western Balkans Route. While the EU tackled the issue slowly with few measures, CSDP entirely focused on the Central Mediterranean Route so as to achieve tangible results.

EU Member States were forced by the continuous refugee and migrant flow to organise themselves in regional cooperative partnerships, such as the Central European Defence Cooperation (CEDC) or in bilateral cooperation, like between Austria and Hungary. The result was a cessation of the migration via Western Balkans Route and an agreement between the EU and Turkey, which mitigated the pressure by the influx of migrants.

CSDP is not the principal tool for managing refugees and migration, but the integrated approach of the EU, in this regard, is well suited for such measures as it can provide governance, assistance, training, capacity building, and security.

4. Current State of Research

In this chapter the present status of research will be dealt with by showing and explaining the treaties and policies that are currently valid for the EU.

4.1 The Lisbon Treaty (2007/2009)

The Lisbon Treaty is the latest primary treaty at EU level, signed by the heads of state and governments of the Member States in December 2007. It entered into force in December 2009 and the main intent of the treaty was to reform the functioning of the EU following the increases of the number of Member States from 15 to 27.² The Treaty provided an end to the different legal statuses of the European Community (EC) and the EU. Furthermore, it implemented the function of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who is also the Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP). The HR/VP is responsible for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and ensuring consistency and coherence among all of EU external actions. Other significant changes were the

¹ Cf.: Biscop, S. & Rehrl, J. (2016) Migration – How CSDP can support. Vienna. Armed Forces Printing Centre. P. 14 ff.

² Remark of the author: Croatia joined the EU later in 2013.

reduction of the number of Commissioners and the extent of the scope of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) to new areas.³

4.2 The EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy

The EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) was presented in June 2016 by the HR/VP Federica Mogherini. The main purposes of the strategy are to provide new political goals and ambitions for more responsibility of Europeans regarding their own security and defence, new financial tools for developing defence capabilities through the European Defence Action Plan, and a set of concrete actions as follow-up to the EU-NATO Joint Declaration.⁴

The predecessor of EUGS was the European Security Strategy (ESS). After changes in the political environment and a continuous debate, a report on a European Global Strategy (EGS) was produced, which catalysed the creation of EUGS. A new approach on CFSP was hereby introduced, focusing on the security of the EU itself, the neighbourhood of the Union, and management of war and crises for example.⁵

4.3 The Permanent Structured Cooperation on Security and Defence

The Permanent Structured Cooperation on Security and Defence (PESCO) is a treaty-based framework that came into existence as a consequence of the EUGS starting a process of closer cooperation in security and defence issues. PESCO is a form of cooperation with binding nature aiming at jointly developing defence capabilities and making them available for EU military operations. Under the guidance of the European Council, Member States indicate the willingness and ability to participate in the areas of defence investment, capability development, and operational readiness. The ambition was established in November 2017 by QMV.⁶

5. Research Gap

This passage is meant to constrain the research gap of the work. Today a vast number of literature and homepages that deal with the EU itself, its policies and treaties and even with its security issues can be found easily. Yet one has to read through a lot of sources to establish an understanding of CSDP and grasp this policy's influence in terms of protection of the external borders of the EU.

³ Cf.: Homepage of The Lisbon Treaty. Page Introduction. URL.: <http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty.html>. [5-12-17].

⁴ Cf.: Rehl, J. (2017). Handbook on CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. Vienna. Armed Forces Printing Centre. Volume 1. 3rd edition. P. 20 ff.

⁵ Cf.: Rehl, J. (2017). Handbook on CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. Vienna. Armed Forces Printing Centre. Volume 1. 3rd edition. P. 30 f.

⁶ Cf.: Homepage of the EEAS. Page Files. URL.: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/pesco_factsheet_19-10-2017_1.pdf. [6-12-17].

The combination of the historical development of CSDP, an overview of security challenges for the EU, conducted past or ongoing missions and operations, constitutes a work of vast extent. Therefore, to narrow the research gap, it will be formulated as follows:

This essay is to give an overview of the history of the establishment of modern CSDP. In addition, light will be shed on security challenges as regards border protection. Finally, examples of border protecting measures brought forth by CSDP should round up the essay and should lead to the conclusion.

6. Research Question

Hence the key question that will be answered is:

What is the role of CSDP in border protection?

For improved understanding, the author will answer the following sub-questions regarding the role of CSDP in border protection:

1. How did CSDP develop?
2. What are the security challenges for the protection of the Union's external borders?
3. What significant measures have been taken in border protection?

7. Methodology

The methodology which is used for authoring this essay is literature research. As the author participated in a "Common Module on CSDP" which took place at the Theresan Military Academy, he was issued with useful handbooks dealing with the mentioned topic. Other literature was obtained in different libraries and additional knowledge was acquired through studying sources of the internet. The author has created following sketch to visualise the methodology:




Figure 1: Sketch of the methodology used for authoring this essay.⁷

8. Research and Results of Research

In this chapter the author provides a summary of the development of CSDP. For better understanding it starts with key initiatives after the Second World War. In the next chapter, the security challenges which the EU has to face in terms of border protection are discussed. Furthermore, an overview of significant measures which the EU has taken to manage the external borders is given, leading to the role of CSDP in border protection itself.

8.1 The Development of CSDP

“The idea of a common defence policy for Europe dates back to 1948 when the UK, France, and the Benelux signed the Treaty of Brussels.”⁸

The signing of the Brussels Treaty led to the creation of the Western European Union (WEU). The goals were economic, social, and cultural collaboration and collective self-defence. Conceived largely as a response to

⁷ Figure created by the author.

⁸ Homepage of the EEAS. Page Shaping of a CSDP. URL.: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/5388/shaping-common-security-and-defence-policy_en. [4-12-17].

Soviet moves to impose control over Central European countries, commitment to mutual defence in case of an armed attack on any of the signatories was a key element. Therefrom resulting, military cooperation was initiated and a plan for common defence was adopted. Further negotiations of the signatory states with the United States of America (USA) and Canada led to the creation of NATO in 1950. Other states were to join the WEU thereafter, like the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy and the Union was playing an important role for promoting development of consultation and cooperation in Western Europe until the 1970s, when the intergovernmental activities gradually slowed down.⁹

The establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community placed strategic resources under a supranational authority and secured economic and political unification.¹⁰

Moreover, the signing of the Treaties of Rome in 1957 created the European Economic Community (EEC), referred to as the Common Market.¹¹

As a response to efforts of the EC to harmonise members' foreign policies, the concept of European Political Cooperation (EPC) was presented in the 1970 Davignon Report. EPC aimed to facilitate the consultation process among EC member states and served as the foundation for CFSP. Introduced in the Maastricht Treaty, which entered into force in November 1993, CFSP was the second pillar of the institutional framework of the EU and included all questions regarding the security of the Union, eventually leading to a common defence policy.¹²

In the aftermath of the wars of secession in the Balkans, the calls for a more proactive policy of the EU reverberated, leading to a bilateral meeting between France and the United Kingdom (UK) in Saint-Malo in 1998 that many consider the catalyst for the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). As a result, numerous European Council summit meetings defined the military and civilian capabilities needed to fulfil the Petersberg tasks. The foundations for ESDP were laid in the Cologne and Helsinki European Council Meetings in 1999, and it ultimately became operational through the first missions in 2003. The same year the ESS was presented. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, ESDP was renamed CSDP.¹³

⁹ Homepage of the WEU. Page History of WEU. URL.: <http://www.weu.int>. [5-12-17].

¹⁰ Cf.: Rehr, J. (2017). Handbook on CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. Vienna. Armed Forces Printing Centre. Volume 1. 3rd edition. P. 17.

¹¹ Cf.: Homepage of the EU. Page History of the EU. URL.: https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history_en. [5-12-17].

¹² Cf.: Rehr, J. (2017). Handbook on CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. Vienna. Armed Forces Printing Centre. Volume 1. 3rd edition. P. 16 f.

¹³ Cf.: Ibid. P. 17 ff.

CSDP is an essential tool in the EU's foreign policy. It gives the possibility for intervention outside the EU for civilian and military crisis management missions and operations, aimed at peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security.¹⁴

8.2 Security Challenges for Border Protection

When looking at European political agendas today, migration and security are two issues that clearly stand out, amongst a multitude of security challenges, and dominate discussions.¹⁵

The ESS had defined five main threats for Europe: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organised crime. Being a security threat itself, terrorism can - as well as regional conflicts and state failure - be linked to massive migrations directly. Even if not quoted as a threat, migration has to be considered one, especially when occurring massively and uncontrolled.¹⁶

According to the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Population Division, the major destination for the greater part of the international migrants from 1990 to 2015 was Europe. The number of migrants is growing steadily and will most likely not decrease in the future, without measures taken.¹⁷

To give a meaningful figure, between January and November 2015 an estimated 1.5 million persons crossed the EU external borders illegally, which was an all-time peak.¹⁸

Surely, irregular migration is not the key challenge for the EU and its CSDP as numerous new threats are rising up. However, increasing numbers of illegal migrants crossing European borders, especially during the migrant crisis in 2015, showed that CSDP was not geared to fully coping with this challenge, but has been a useful tool, nevertheless.¹⁹

Considering the EU's counter-terrorism (CT) efforts, civilian CSDP missions have been evolving as important tools of EU's CFSP, operating with post-conflict and conflict- prevention mandates in a variety of countries and regions abroad, when there is a link to Europe's security. The only ongoing CSDP mission with CT experts is deployed in the Sahelian

¹⁴ Cf.: Homepage of the EU. Page European Union Global Strategy. URL: http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/pages/files/2016-12_-_factsheet_-_implementation_plan_on_security_and_defence.pdf. [5-12-17].

¹⁵ Cf.: Rehr, J. (2017). Handbook on CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. Vienna. Armed Forces Printing Centre. Volume 1. 3rd edition. P. 42.

¹⁶ Cf.: Gell, H. et al. (2015). Crisis Management Operations. Vienna. Armed Forces Printing Centre. P. 9 ff.

¹⁷ Homepage of the UN. Page International Migration. URL: <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimatesgraphs.shtml?0g0>. [4-12-17].

¹⁸ Cf.: Rehr, J. (2017). Handbook on CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. Vienna. Armed Forces Printing Centre. Volume 1. 3rd edition. P. 112.

¹⁹ Cf.: Ibid. P. 104 ff.

zone. Afghanistan and Palestine would be examples of other CSDP efforts, and Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, amongst others, for considerable CT assistance. To ensure and enhance the effectiveness of external CT measures, the EU will have to focus on addressing specific aspects in the supported governments or regions:

- CT-related information exchange.
- Adaptation of national legislation to international standards.
- Developing specific practices for law enforcement and the judiciary, and so forth.²⁰

Besides terrorism, other evolving security challenges are issues regarding cyber security and hybrid threats. When cyber security across all military and civilian CSDP Missions and Operations is concerned, the success remains dependent on state-of-the-art technology, well-functioning structures, competent staff and on a focus on an integrated approach to counter cyber threats.²¹

8.3 Significant Measures for Managing European Borders

Firstly, the EBCG, also called FRONTEX, is to be mentioned. Its tasks include monitoring migratory flows and the management of the external borders, deploying European Border and Coast Guard teams, fighting organised cross-border crime, terrorism and so on. When the Schengen agreement entered into force in 1995, it abolished checks at the internal borders and created a single external border. In order to maintain security and order, the participating EU Member States enhanced cooperation and coordination regarding the work of police and judicial authorities. Several steps towards stronger cooperation on behalf of the European Council on Justice and Home Affairs led to the creation of the External Border Practitioners Common Unit. The decision of the European Council to improve the procedures and methods of the Common Unit brought forth the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the EU. In September 2016 a regulation of the EU established the EBCG, also called FRONTEX.²²

The EBCG utilises the European Surveillance System (EUROSUR) as its information exchange network. The system includes automated vessel tracking and detection capabilities, weather and oceanographic forecasts and identifies risk levels for illegal border crossing or cross-border crime through drones, aircraft and sensors, just to mention some examples.²³

²⁰ Cf.: Rehr, J. (2017). Handbook on CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. Vienna. Armed Forces Printing Centre. Volume 1. 3rd edition. P. 114 ff.

²¹ Cf.: Ibid. P. 114 ff.

²² Cf.: Homepage of FRONTEX. Page About FRONTEX. URL.: <http://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/origin/>. [6-12-17].

²³ Cf.: Homepage of FRONTEX. Page Intelligence. URL.: <http://frontex.europa.eu/intelligence/eurosur/>. [6-12-17].

As part of the EU's integrated approach to better managing irregular migration, EUNAVFOR Med Operation Sophia was launched on 22 June 2015. The European Council extended the mandate for the operation until 31 December 2018. "Sophia" has the task to disrupt the business of migrant smugglers and prevent human trafficking. Two supporting tasks consist of training the Libyan Coastguard and Navy and contributing to the implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya. Furthermore, the Council also amended the mandate to setting up new surveillance activities and enhancing the possibilities for sharing information on human trafficking with FRONTEX and EUROPOL, amongst others.²⁴

8.4 The Role of CSDP in Border Protection

Since the inception of CSDP the EU has conducted more than 30 military operations and civilian missions.²⁵ All of them were meant for stabilisation and reconstruction and were deployed with the consent of the host country. The majority of military CSDP operations were deployed in Africa and most were initiated by France, which has also been the largest troop contributor.²⁶

The main effort of civilian and military CSDP missions and operations is to oppose instability in the regions that are affected outside the EU, dealing with the roots and in this way weakening the consequences before they reach Europe. The EU is providing favourable conditions for growth and development to neighbouring regions and states and is, in return, more secure itself.

It has to be clear that the legal framework of the EU does not allow for operational capacities of the CSDP to be deployed inside the Union. If capacities of the CSDP were needed as a fast response for management of refugees or migrants on external borders, a political decision would be needed to enhance the current legal framework for the conduct of CSDP action, whether civilian or military.

9. Discussion of Results and personal Conclusions

In this chapter the author gives answers to the research questions.

9.1 Results

"The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) enables the Union to take a leading role in peace-keeping operations, conflict prevention and in the

²⁴ Cf.: Homepage of the European Council. Page Press Releases. URL.: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/07/25/eunavformed-sophia-mandate-extended/#>. [6-12-17].

²⁵ Cf.: Homepage of the EEAS. Page Military and Civilian Missions and Operations. URL.: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en. [6-12-17].

²⁶ Mehrlingen, M. (2012). EU Security Policy – What It Is, How It Works, Why It Matters. London. Lynne Rienner Publishers. P. 127 ff.

strengthening of the international security. It is an integral part of the EU's comprehensive approach towards crisis management, drawing on civilian and military assets.”²⁷

This quotation from the EEAS homepage sums up the meaning of CSDP quite smartly. In the aftermath of the Second World War, enhanced cooperation and drastic political changes have led, in a seemingly roundabout way, to the creation of CSDP. As much it is suited to cope with contemporary security challenges, as many changes are needed to overcome those entirely. Nevertheless, the EU has made successful use of CSDP on many occasions and it proved to be effective and useful. For instance, the missions in the Sahel region, Algeria or Morocco provided considerable assistance in CT.

Numerous projects and initiatives of the EU have shown clearly that the demand is rising for an integrated approach when dealing with given security challenges. With increased migration due to conflicts and instability, measures of border management and surveillance – like FRONTEX is providing – are required. EUNAVFOR Med Operation Sophia is of similar importance, carrying out its tasks in an integrated manner.

The EUGS strengthens the CSDP, creates autonomy, and improves internal cooperation and advancement with initiatives like PESCO.

9.2 Personal Conclusion

The political climate of the world has been changing swiftly in the past years. Regional conflicts in the proximity of Europe were followed by unstable economic situations and irregular migration of vast extent. As a consequence, terrorism could be spread more easily because of radicalisation of growing numbers of people and mentioned issues started to grow more important in the EU. It seems that Member states had to organise themselves for managing the refugee and migrant concerns, even if a multitude of CSDP missions was conducted abroad. Thus, the migration crisis in 2015 showed that an issue, which had not been assessed as a security challenge before, but merely as a consequence of crises, namely migration, nearly became a threat for the solidarity of the EU.

As CSDP missions are not designed for internal crisis management, the conduct of missions within the Union for situations that demand fast internal reaction, should be considered because the military usually is well equipped, trained, and ready for measures of border protection and/or migration management.

With the EUGS as a stronger guideline for the EU positioning itself in the world today, a step in the right direction was done. CSDP as a part of CFSP was and is a very important tool for handling crises; significant

²⁷ Homepage of the EEAS. Page CSDP. URL.: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/431/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp_en. [3-12-17].

measures are being set in the proximity of the EU to improve stability and security abroad, ultimately leading to a more secure EU. Moreover, CSDP will lead to enhanced cooperation of EU Member States among each other and less dependence on NATO.

Nevertheless, the demand for a strong and proactive Union, which can provide its citizens with the protection and security they deserve, is as high as never before seen. If the EU wants to satisfy those requirements sufficiently, even higher efforts have to be made for advancing its CSDP. Cooperation between Member States has to be improved, civilian and military capabilities have to be further developed, and the legal framework has to be enhanced. The sooner those concerns are addressed, the better the Union will be geared to manage crises of the future.

10. Annexes

10.1 List of Abbreviations

Benelux	Union consisting of Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg
CEDC	Central European Defence Cooperation
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union
CT	Counter-terrorism
EBCG	European Border and Coast Guard Agency or FRONTEX
EC	European Community
EEAS	European External Action Service
EEC	European Economic Community
EGS	European Global Strategy
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ESS	European Security Strategy
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EUGS	European Union Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy
EUNAVFOR Med	European Union Naval Force – Mediterranean
EUROPOL	European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation
EUROSUR	European Border Surveillance System
FRONTEX	(Acronym for “Frontières extérieures”) EBCG
HR/VP	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy/ Vice President of the European Commission
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation on Security and Defence
QMV	Qualified Majority Voting
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
WEU	Western European Union

10.2 List of Figures

Figure Number:	Description:
1	Sketch of the methodology used for authoring this essay.

10.3 List of Literature

10.3.1 Books

01. Biscop, S. & Rehrl, J. (2016) Migration – How CSDP can support. Vienna. Armed Forces Printing Centre.
02. Gell, H. et al. (2015). Crisis Management Operations. Vienna. Armed Forces Printing Centre.
03. Mehrlingen, M. (2012). EU Security Policy – What It Is, How It Works, Why It Matters. London. Lynne Rienner Publishers.
04. Rehrl, J. (2017). Handbook on CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. Vienna. Armed Forces Printing Centre. Volume 1. 3rd edition.

10.3.2 Internet

- Homepage of the Lisbon Treaty. Page Introduction. URL.: <http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty.html>. [5-12-17].
- Homepage of the EEAS. Page Files. URL.: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/pesco_factsheet_19-10-2017_1.pdf. [6-12-17].
- Homepage of the EEAS. Page Shaping of a CSDP. URL.: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/5388/shaping-common-security-and-defence-policy_en. [4-12-17].
- Homepage of the WEU. Page History of WEU. URL.: <http://www.weu.int>. [5-12-17].
- Homepage of the EU. Page History of the EU. URL.: https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history_en. [5-12-17].
- Homepage of the EU. Page European Union Global Strategy. URL.: http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/pages/files/2016-12_-_factsheet_-_implementation_plan_on_security_and_defence.pdf. [5-12-17].
- Homepage of the UN. Page International Migration. URL.: <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimatesgraphs.shtml?0g0>. [4-12-17].
- Homepage of FRONTEX. Page About FRONTEX. URL.: <http://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/origin/>. [6-12-17].
- Homepage of FRONTEX. Page Intelligence. URL.: <http://frontex.europa.eu/intelligence/eurosur/>. [6-12-17].
- Homepage of the European Council. Page Press Releases. URL.: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/07/25/eunavformed-sophia-mandate-extended/#>. [6-12-17].
- Homepage of the EEAS. Page Military and Civilian Missions and Operations. URL.: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en. [6-12-17].
- Homepage of the EEAS. Page CSDP. URL.: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/431/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp_en. [3-12-17]

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**EUROPEAN DEFENCE - A PROJECT ON THE MOVE HOW
HAS THE NATURE OF THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE CHANGED
OVER TIME AND HOW HAVE RECENT CHANGES IN THE
EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ALTERED
THE PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE?**

**created for the CSDP Olympiad 2018
in Veliko Tarnovo – Bulgaria**

1. Abstract

This paper seeks to engage with a topic, which has attracted considerable attention and has become particularly prominent more recently but has not been properly examined in the scholarly literature - namely European Defence. It aims to address the deficit of scholarly work on the issue through an analysis of the evolution of the institutional and legal framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy and the consequences of recent changes in the European security situation for European Defence. The study looks at the provisions on European Defence

outlined by the three main treaties that have defined the evolution of the European Union throughout time. The texts of the Treaty of Maastricht, the Amsterdam Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty are examined in detail in order to assess the relative importance of Member States and European supranational institutions in the decision-making process on issues concerning European Defence. This is done through a focus on treaty provisions on competencies of different EU organs, voting regulations, sources of funding as well as the extent to which Member States are expected to comply with decisions.

Overall, a comprehensive analysis of the existing legal framework seems to suggest that no notable evolution or a shift toward supranational decision-making has taken place in the field of European Defence, despite rapidly changing international environment. However, this institutional inertia is compensated by extra-treaty developments such as the founding of PESCO, which, while not completely institutionalised in the European legal infrastructure and still very much governed by the intergovernmental principle of decision-making, demonstrate an emerging political will for closer integration in the field of defence on the European level

2. Preface

As a member of the military, it is common to hear complaints that politics complicate military operations. Comments are easily made but often the reasons for these complications are not thoroughly studied. In an attempt to comprehend what factors influence military operations, in which I will myself participate in the future, and to have a more comprehensive knowledge about why specific operations are conducted the way they are, I have decided to study the theory, which supports the practical execution of such operations. Furthermore, the Collective Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has a significant influence on every member of the armed forces around Europe. An opportunity to learn more about the European Union's legislative framework governing military cooperation would be highly enlightening.

With my research I aim to validate or enfeeble a belief which exist amongst many people, namely that the EU is at the core of the political choices in Europe. Many EU citizens believe, that European Defence should receive more support and should be reinforced.¹ Since this is a widespread belief, it is important that citizens their wishes are respected. Therefore, I will assess whether this belief is correct, and study the nature of change within the CSDP over time.

¹ De France, O. (2013). What EU citizens think about European Defence. European union. Institute for Security studies. URL: https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_43_CSDP_polls_01.pdf. [30-11-2017]. P. 1.

I would like to express my gratitude to Miss Denitsa Marchevska for her advice and feedback given during the work on this paper.

3. Introduction

Since the initiation of the European project, debates about security and defence have always been difficult and reaching a compromise has proven to be hard. This was clear from the beginning with the failure to ratify the Treaty on the European Defence Community in 1954. However, since the 1998 Franco-British Saint Malo Declaration and the launch of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), European Defence has become a more relevant topic and compromises have been found.² Due to the current state of affairs (e.g. Brexit, Russian assertiveness, economic crisis, the Arab Spring, the refugee crisis and increasing terrorism throughout Europe), Security and Defence is becoming too important to ignore.³

In this study I will review the most important treaties since the Maastricht Treaty focusing especially on different aspects of decision-making styles related to defence. In this way I will try to find out in how far the decision making style has evolved over time.

The end goal of this paper is mapping out how the supranational nature of the CSDP has developed over time. The concept of supranationalism in this paper is defined as passing on more competences from the national level to the institutions, which represent the EU itself.⁴ The supranational nature of the Security and Defence can be found between two different methods which are the extremes of the different approaches for the Security and Defence. The community method and the intergovernmental method. In the intergovernmental method EU Member States have the power to make decisions while in the case of the community approach the EU institutions have the power to make decisions (e.g: the European Parliament, the Commission, and the European Court of Justice).

4. Current State of Research

Due to increased political interest, academics are starting to do more research on the CSDP. While there is an abundance of policy analysis on the issue, academic work is still scarce. Additionally, most academic research

² Delreux, T. & Keukeleire, S. (2014). *The European Foreign Policy of the European Union*. Basingstoke, Hampshire. Palgrave Macmillan. 2nd edition. P. 172.

³ Bogzeanu, C. (2017). *From the Treaty of Rome (1957) to Forging a new way ahead for the EU. Post-Brexit Security and Defence*. Romania. The Central and Eastern European Online Library. Strategic Impact. Volume 1. No.1/2017. P. 19.

⁴ Rehr, J. (2017). *Handbook on CSDP The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union*. Vienna. Directorate for Security Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria. 3rd edition. P. 201.

has been descriptive, and thus lacking a strong theoretical framework.⁵ When examining the extent to which the CSDP is becoming more supranational, research is scarce and deals with very specific issues.

First of all, research on the effectiveness of the CSDP has been conducted. Within this body of literature the general consensus sees the policy as one of limited effectiveness which is in need of significant improvement. Zarembo, for example, executed a case study on the effectiveness of two missions under the CSDP in Ukraine.⁶ She concluded that much can be improved in order to boost the CSDP's effectiveness. Firstly, the mandate should be clearer before the mission. Secondly, the mission should be better tailored to the needs of the host state. And lastly, the pace of interaction during the mission should be more intensive.⁷ However, because of the lack of a comprehensive theoretical framework this approach cannot be easily applied universally. Thus, the findings are confined to the two researched EU missions (e.g. EUAM and EUBAM) only and do not provide sufficient insight into the nature of the CSDP.⁸

Furthermore, research reviewing and analysing the patterns of funding and spending of CSDP operations has also been conducted.⁹ This might not instantly look relevant to the research topic. Nonetheless, following the money trail often gives a good idea of the role of various actors in the decision-making process. This body of literature has found that funding of civilian operations mainly comes from collective (supranational) funding sources, while funding of military operations largely is paid by national governments themselves (the costs falls where they lie). The final conclusion is that due to the inertia of the system and the lack of political will this status quo is expected to remain for the years to come.¹⁰

Furthermore, information about which institutions play which role in the context of the CSDP can be found in various official sources.^{11 12} This information is very relevant for understanding the extent to which the CSDP is operated supranationally. Furthermore, Delreux and Keukeleire make two strong arguments about the CSDP. The first argument postulates that the CSDP is not about defence as understood in traditional terms (i.e. defending the European Union), since NATO already plays that role. Instead,

⁵ Zarembo, K. (2017). Perceptions of CSDP effectiveness in Ukraine: a host state perspective. United Kingdom. Taylor & Francis Group. *European Security*. Volume 26. No. 2/2017. P. 191.

⁶ *Ibid.* P. 190.

⁷ *Ibid.* P. 204.

⁸ *Ibid.* P. 203.

⁹ Terpan, F. (2015). Financing Common Security and Defence Policy operations: Explaining change and inertia in a fragmented and flexible structure. United Kingdom. Taylor & Francis Group. *European Security*. Volume 24. No. 2/2015. P. 221.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* P. 236.

¹¹ Rehrl, J. (2017). *Op. Cit.* P. 42-77.

¹² Delreux, T. & Keukeleire, S. (2014). *Op. Cit.* P. 63-92.

the CSDP is meant to do the tasks, which NATO or individual Member States do not want to fulfil.¹³ Secondly, CSDP is not so common as the term makes us believe. The reason for this is that the EU lacks common capabilities and relies on Member States' assets. What is more, there is a great deal of variation in terms of the Member States' commitment to the CSDP with Denmark having opted out completely.¹⁴

Finally, there is an ongoing debate concerning the two different approaches to decision-making in the European Union.¹⁵ A definition for these approaches can be found in the EUR-Lex:¹⁶

“the Community method is characterised by

- *the sole right of the European Commission to initiate legislation;*
- *the co-decision power between the Council and the European*

Parliament, and

- *the use of qualified majority voting in Council.*

It contrasts with the intergovernmental method of operation used in decision-making, mainly on Common Foreign and Security Policy and aspects of police and judicial cooperation. This method has the following salient features:

- *the Commission's right of initiative is shared with the EU countries or confined to specific areas of activity;*
- *the European Council, explicitly mentioned in the Lisbon Treaty, often plays a key role;*
- *the Council generally acts unanimously;*
- *the European Parliament has a purely consultative role.”*

This debate is ongoing between proponents of more integration within the EU, who support the community method, and those who want to keep the power at the national level, thus supporting the intergovernmental method.¹⁷ ¹⁸ As the quote shows, the CFSP is following the intergovernmental method and that is one of the first indications that the CSDP was not meant to be supranational in nature. Yet, this does not imply that the CSDP is not becoming more supranational with time.

¹³ Ibid. P. 174.

¹⁴ Ibid. P. 174.

¹⁵ Ibid. P. 22-23.

¹⁶ EUR-Lex. Community and intergovernmental methods. Access to European Union law. URL: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/community_intergovernmental_methods.html [28-11-2017].

¹⁷ Nugent, N. (2003). The Government and Politics of the European Union. Basingstoke. Palgrave Macmillan. 5th edition. Passim.

¹⁸ Ponzano, P. (2011). Community and intergovernmental method: an irrelevant debate?. Notre Europe. Policy Brief P. 1.

5. Research Gap

“A new European Defence Fund is in the offing. As is a Permanent Structured Cooperation in the area of defence. By 2025 we need a fully-fledged European Defence Union. We need it.”

President Jean-Claude Juncker at the State of the Union Address 2017¹⁹

As is clear from the literature review, not a lot of academics support the idea that the CSDP is supranational in nature. This, however, does not mean that the CSDP is not becoming more supranational over time. A clear comprehensive study on this has not been conducted. Nor has there been much research studying the influence of the current political situation. This is logical because many events (e.g. Brexit, Russian assertiveness, economic crisis, the Arab Spring, the refugee crisis and increasing terrorism throughout Europe) have only recently happened thus being too recent for scholarly work on them and their impact to have been completed. Judging by the quote by Mr Juncker, it looks like the CSDP has received a massive boost, and thus research on this upgrade is very much needed. This is why I will focus on creating a sound theoretical framework for the evaluation of the nature of the CSDP and its changes over time. A potential limitation of my approach is that I mainly focus on what the treaties say. This, however, only indicates the supranational nature of the CSDP in theory. Its nature can be altered by other factors as well. While some extra-treaty developments will be considered, a comprehensive discussion of additional interfering factors is beyond the scope of this paper. Thus I invite other researchers to look into the other interfering factors, so that more definitive conclusions can be drawn.

6. Research Questions

In the previous chapter I have explained the main research gap on which I shall focus in this paper. This makes it necessary to create a research question to address this gap. Firstly, this paper aims to develop a comprehensive study on how the nature of the CSDP has developed over time. Secondly, it seeks to examine how current events have shaped the CSDP. Thus, the research question will be as follows: European Defence, a project on the move - how has the nature of the CSDP changed over time and how have recent changes in the European international environment altered the prospects for the future?

¹⁹ Juncker, J. (2017). President Jean-Claude Juncker’s State of the Union Address 2017. European Commission press release database. URL: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-3165_en.htm. [27-11-2017].

7. Methodology

In order to answer the research question, I will utilise the method of process tracing which will allow me to identify all important changes over time in the key legislations in the field of European Security and Defence. The Maastricht Treaty will be used as a departure point, followed by the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Lisbon Treaty. In terms of the second aspect of the question, the treaties offer a limited insight as they do not reflect the current situation. Therefore, a research of other documents explaining newer decisions made about European Defence will be conducted. The documents, which will be investigated are the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) notification and the EU Council review on Security and Defence from 2017. Looking at the differences in these documents can be instrumental in explaining how the nature of European Security and Defence has changed over time, and if it in fact has become more supranational.

As noted earlier, there is no sound theoretical framework and that is why I will develop one in order to answer the question. In order to establish the nature of the CSDP in different periods I will make use of dependent variables and independent variables. The dependent variable on which I will focus is decision-making style, while the independent variables are: influence of different EU organs in CSDP, if decisions are made by Qualified Majority Vote (QMV) or unanimity, if decisions are voluntary or binding as well as the sources of CSDP funding. After analysing these variables, I will be able to draw conclusions about the changing nature of the CSDP. A graphic model of this research method is found at the end of this section.




Figure 1: Graphic model of the applied research method.²⁰

8. Research and Results of Research

8.1 The Maastricht Treaty

This treaty not only created the EU but also founded the CFSP. However, at this time the European Security and Defence Policy still did not

²⁰ Model and diagram were created by the author for the specific use of this paper.

exist. All competences of the EU in the security field are described in Title V, Provisions on a common foreign and security policy.²¹ One of the main reasons why the CFSP was created is explained in Article B of this treaty.

“to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence”²²

When considering which organs were assigned the most important role, Article J.3 and Article J.4 clearly indicate that the Council and the European Council are the organs, which possess all the power.

Article J.7 indicates that organisation of security in the EU is subordinate to other organisations such as NATO and the sovereignty of Member States.²³ However, the fact that the main power lies with the Council and the European Council does not mean the Commission has no say at all. Article J.9 says:

“The Commission shall be fully associated with the work carried out in the common foreign and security policy field.”²⁴

Additionally, the Commission is also mentioned in articles J.5-9. Its competencies are, however, very limited in comparison with the powers of the Council.²⁵ Furthermore, when it comes to the way decisions are made, it is quite clear the intergovernmental approach is preferred. Evidence of this can be found in articles J.8 and J.11, which state that decisions made by the Council under this title shall be taken unanimously, although some minor exceptions are mentioned. In article J.3 par. 2. two possibilities for QMV are discussed but these are only of minor importance in comparison to the votes, on which unanimous decisions are to be made.²⁶

When it comes to the extent to which decisions are binding, no strong commitments are written down in the Maastricht Treaty for decisions on European security. This means that there are no tools provided in the treaty to make sure that the Member States comply with the decisions made. Then again, since the treaty necessitate unanimity of decision-making, it is likely that such a provision was not seen as necessary. The same argumentation can be used when it comes to the budget. Article J.11²⁷ states that most of the CFSP budget comes from the European Communities, however, since decision-making should be unanimous, this does not necessarily suggest a

²¹ The European Union, (1992). Treaty on European Union. Maastricht Treaty. URL: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/treaty_on_european_union_maastricht_7_february_1992-en-2c2f2b85-14bb-4488-9ded-13f3cd04de05.html. [28-11-2017].

²² Ibid. P. 7.

²³ Ibid. P. 98.

²⁴ Ibid. P. 99.

²⁵ Ibid. P. 98-99.

²⁶ Ibid. P. 98

²⁷ Ibid. P. 99.

supranational nature. It is clear that the provisions in the Maastricht Treaty in correspondence to the CSDP strictly follow the intergovernmental method, where the Member States dominate the EU institutions. What reinforces this argumentation even further is the fact that Denmark opted out of the defence provisions in this treaty since the Danish population was against it.²⁸

8.2 Treaty of Amsterdam

With the implementation of the Treaty of Amsterdam some changes to the Maastricht Treaty were introduced. The first important change was the creation of the new post of the High Representative of the CFSP, provision for which can be found in article J.8.^{29 30} The reason why this new function is so important is because the creation of the High Representative of the CFSP meant that for the first time there was a permanent EU actor dealing specifically with this policy field.³¹

Overall, in terms of the four independent variables not much changed. However, some new opportunities in Security and Defence were created. The first one was the decision on the common strategies (Article J.3).³² However the decision making on the common strategies is in no way supranational, but the fact that it exists and that the Member States come together in order to try and create a common vision makes the process itself de facto a bit more “supranational”. This does not take away, however, the fact that the decision-making process in relation to defence in the EU itself still follows the intergovernmental model.

Around the same time the Treaty of Amsterdam was created, the ESDP came to life. Even though this is not present in the Amsterdam Treaty, it is an important development that should not be overlooked when discussing decision-making in Security and Defence. The ESDP changed the nature of the CFSP significantly.³³ It provided the CFSP with more capabilities to focus on a policy of proactive crisis management. It also created for the first time a framework to pool national resources under the CFSP.³⁴ However, the four independent variables this study is examining were not altered in a

²⁸ Olsen, G., & Pilegaard, J. (2005). *The costs of Non-Europe? Denmark and the Common Security and Defence Policy*. United Kingdom. Taylor & Francis Group. *European Security*. Volume 14. No. 3/2005. P. 347.

²⁹ Neuwahl, N. (1998). *A Partner With a Troubled Personality: EU Treaty-Making in Matters of CFSP and JHA after Amsterdam*. Kluwer Law International. *European Foreign Affairs Review*. Volume 3. No. 2/1998. P. 190.

³⁰ European Communities, (1997). *Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts*. Treaty of Amsterdam. URL: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf>. [28-11-2017]. P. 13.

³¹ Delreux, T. & Keukeleire, S. (2014). *Op. cit.* P. 51.

³² European Communities, (1997). *Op. cit.* P. 10-11.

³³ Delreux, T. & Keukeleire, S. (2014). *Op. Cit.* P. 53.

³⁴ European Parliament. (2006). *The European Security and Defence Policy: from the Helsinki Headline Goal to the EU Battlegroups*. Brussels. Research note.

meaningful way. And thus, at this time Security and Defence still very much followed the intergovernmental method.

The reason it was possible to create these “EU capabilities” was because of the geopolitical context at the time. With the ongoing instability in the Balkans so close to European borders, it was clear that the EU needed more capabilities to make the CFSP more credible. The fact that the French and the British, who were two of the most powerful states in the EU, considered such a change a priority at the time, made the shift relatively easy to introduce.³⁵

8.3 Lisbon Treaty

One of the major innovations of the Lisbon Treaty was the abolishment of the pillar structure, thus bringing all the dimensions of foreign policy under one treaty title. However, this did not mean that policy-making methods for CFSP/CSDP, external action and Union policies were now the same.³⁶

Upon a look at the treaty, article 4(2) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) instantly stands out.

“The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.”³⁷

This article shows that there is still a lot of power residing at the national level. Furthermore, the treaty proves that there have been some changes in terms of the EU institutions which influence CSDP decision-making. This is demonstrated in Article 22 par. 2 of the TEU, which grants the Commission the power to submit joint proposals to the Council in the field of external action, which refers to the CFSP.³⁸ This means that this is not important for the decision-making method of the CSDP as external action is something different than the CSDP. The powers to make decisions concerning the CSDP remain in the hands of the Council and the European Council. This can be shown by Article 18 par. 2 of the TEU:

“The High Representative shall conduct the Union’s common foreign and security policy. He shall contribute by his proposals to the development of that

³⁵ Delreux, T. & Keukeleire, S. (2014). Op. cit. P. 52.

³⁶ Ibid. P. 57

³⁷ The European Union, (2010). Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The Lisbon Treaty. P. 18

³⁸ Ibid. P. 30.

policy, which he shall carry out as mandated by the Council. The same shall apply to the common security and defence policy.”³⁹

In Art. 36 of the TEU it is stated that the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP) has to inform the European Parliament (EP) on the main decisions made concerning the CFSP and CSDP. The HR/VP has to also ensure that the views of the European Parliament are taken into consideration. Additionally, the EP competencies granted the right to address questions or make recommendations to the Council or the HR/VP. This is not necessarily as revolutionary as a provision, however, the article does refer to the CSDP specifically and this is the first time the EP is granted such competencies vis-à-vis the CSDP.⁴⁰

When it comes to how decisions are made not much has changed. The same rules regarding the need for unanimity still apply. In some cases, QMV voting is possible, however, this is only applicable in a limited range of cases of relatively minor importance.

When it comes to the extent to which decisions are binding, no strong commitment is prescribed by the Lisbon Treaty for decisions on European security. This means that there are no tools provided in this treaty to make sure that the Member States will comply with the decisions, which are made. Then again, since the nature of this treaty makes that all decisions are made unanimously, this is not completely necessary. Only in case Member States decide independently to cooperate more closely together by establishing a permanent structured cooperation (Article 42 par. 6) there is a possibility for making decisions more binding.⁴¹

8.4 Analysis of the current situation

Due to the changing international environment, the national priorities of many EU Member States have changed. Due to the new challenges they have been facing, and because of Brexit new wishes were voiced for a more integrated EU defence.⁴² As a consequence, 23 Member States have joined the PESCO.⁴³ In the following section I will discuss how this has altered the nature of defence in the EU.

The main goal of PESCO is to enhance the coordination between the participating Member States in the field of defence and to increase their investments in the military. The big difference between PESCO and other

³⁹ Ibid. P. 27

⁴⁰ Ibid. P. 35-36.

⁴¹ Ibid. P. 39.

⁴² Bogzeanu, C. (2017). Op. Cit. P. 19.

⁴³ Participating Member States, (2017). Notification on Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). URL: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31511/171113-pesco-notification.pdf>.

forms of cooperation is the fact that the decisions made in PESCO are binding.⁴⁴ This is proven in Annex I of the PESCO notification.

“PESCO offers a reliable and binding legal framework within the EU institutional framework. Participating Member States will meet their binding commitments, confirming that the establishment and implementation of Permanent Structured Cooperation will be undertaken in full compliance with the provisions of the TEU and the protocols attached thereto and respecting constitutional provisions of the member[sic] States.”⁴⁵

It must be said, however, that participation in PESCO remains voluntary and decision-making is still in the hands of the participating Member States.

When it comes to the EU institutions, it is clear that none of them have a direct influence. All power is in the hands of the Member States. The same is true for the budget concerning military missions - this budget also mainly comes from the Member States. However following Article 41 par. 1 of the TEU, administrative expenditure will be charged to the Union Budget.^{46 47,}

“In the end PESCO is about 100% national sovereignty coupled with 100 % European solidarity. You can’t have the one without the other. And that goes for smaller and bigger member states alike.”⁴⁸

9. Discussion of Results and Personal Conclusions

Considering the observations from the researched documents, it is clear that the decision-making style in connection to European Defence and security has not really become more supranational over the years. This is at least the case, when considering the legislative framework put forward by the treaties. There have been changes though, which clearly indicate that the nature of the CSDP has evolved over time. Therefore, it could be concluded that the supranationality of the CSDP is defined by more than just the treaties. This was clearly demonstrated after the Treaty of Amsterdam, which introduced almost no changes in comparison with the Maastricht Treaty, but where the creation of the ESDP very much altered the nature of European Defence. The same argumentation can be applied in relation to the Lisbon Treaty. With this treaty the structure of the EU was changed significantly, however, almost no changes in decision-making style were introduced. However, the creation of the PESCO greatly altered the nature of the CSDP.

⁴⁴ European Union, (2017). Permanent Structured Cooperation factsheet. URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/pesco_factsheet_14-11-2017_.pdf. [28-11-2017] P. 1.

⁴⁵ Participating Member States, (2017). Op. cit. P. 1.

⁴⁶ Ibid. P. 6.

⁴⁷ The European Union, (2010). Op. cit. P. 37.

⁴⁸ Coelmont, J. (2017). With PESCO Brought to Life, Will European Defence Live Happily Ever After. Security Policy Brief. Egmont Institute. Policy Brief. P. 4.

The previous paragraph clearly shows that when looking at the model applied, almost no changes in decision-making style can be registered. Nonetheless, the nature of the CSDP has been altered significantly. It is clear that with the foundation of the PESCO a more integrated system of European Defence came into existence. The nature of the CSDP is thus dependent on more than just the officially prescribed decision-making process. The alignment of the national priorities of many of the Member States have influenced the nature of the CSDP as well.

It can thus be stated that the nature of the CSDP has only changed outside of the official legal framework since the four researched independent variables have barely changed from treaty to treaty. However, as said before, the nature has changed nonetheless. In these changes lies a big danger though. First of all, the fact that these changes are introduced outside of the official legal framework makes these changes easily reversible. When a nation decides to no longer collaborate on defence and security it can easily pull out of the created structures since power remains officially at the national level. This is particularly evident in the case of PESCO. In PESCO a qualified majority of the Member States (which are not involved) is needed to join or leave the PESCO. However, all other decisions in PESCO are made unanimously.⁴⁹ Thus when a country wants to leave the PESCO it can block all decisions in the organisation until the other countries agree to let that Member State leave. This makes the nature of the CSDP, which is becoming more supranational because of organisations like PESCO where the willing members do try to commit themselves to a same strategy on a higher level, very weak and reversible.

Thus, if the EU wants to create a stronger and more supranational CSDP, it is vital that this is done by altering the treaties and giving more official power to the EU institutions. In this way, decisions, which are made, will be more difficult to reverse thus creating a truly more supranational CSDP in the fullest definition of the concept. A concept map of my conclusion is found at the end of this section.

As stated before, this paper mainly focused on the treaties of the EU and only scrapes the surface of other projects created through the EU but not completely defined in the treaties. That is why I would like to invite other researchers to conduct a study for these other influences on the nature of the CSDP. This way more definitive conclusions can be made about this topic.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ European Union, (2017). Op. cit. P. 1-2.

⁵⁰ Author's note: Conclusions based on the author's arguments so far.




Figure 2: Concept map of my conclusion of this paper.⁵¹

10. Annexes

10.1 List of Abbreviations

CSDP	Collective Security and Defence Policy
CFSP	Collective Foreign and Security Policy
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
EUAM	EU Advisory Mission
EUBAM	EU Border Assistance Mission
HR/VP	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and

⁵¹ Model and diagram were created by the author for the specific use of this paper.

IPSD	Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission
PESCO	Implementation Plan on Security and Defence
TEU	Permanent Structured Cooperation
QMV	Treaty on the European Union
WEU	Qualified Majority Voting
	Western European Union

10.2 List of Figures

Figure 1: Graphic model of the applied research method

Figure 2: Concept map of my conclusion of this paper

10.3 List of Literature

10.3.1 Books:

- 1) Delreux, T. & Keukeleire, S. (2014). The European Foreign Policy of the European Union. Basingstoke, Hampshire. Palgrave Macmillan. 2nd edition.
- 2) Nugent, N. (2003). The Government and Politics of the European Union. Basingstoke. Palgrave Macmillan. 5th edition.
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10.3.2 Academic references:

- 1) Bogzeanu, C. (2017). From the Treaty of Rome (1957) to Forging a new way ahead for the EU. Post-Brexit Security and Defence. Romania. The Central and Eastern European Online Library. Strategic Impact. Volume 1. No.1/2017.
- 2) Huff, A. (2015). Executive Privilege Reaffirmed? Parliamentary Scrutiny of the CFSP and CSDP. United Kingdom. Taylor & Francis Group. West European Politics. Volume 38. No. 2/2015.
- 3) Neuwahl, N. (1998). A Partner With a Troubled Personality: EU Treaty-Making in Matters of CFSP and JHA after Amsterdam. Kluwer Law International. European Foreign Affairs Review. Volume 3. No. 2/1998.
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- 6) Zarembo, K. (2017). Perceptions of CSDP effectiveness in Ukraine: a host state perspective. Taylor & Francis Group. European Security. Volume 26. No. 2/2017.

10.3.3 Official documents:

- 1) European Communities, (1997). Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts. Treaty of Amsterdam.
URL: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf>. [28-11-2017].
- 2) Participating Member States, (2017). Notification on Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). URL: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31511/171113-pesco-notification.pdf>.
- 3) The European Union, (2010). Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The Lisbon Treaty.

4) The European Union, (1992). Treaty on European Union. Maastricht Treaty. URL: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/treaty_on_european_union_maastricht_7_february_1992-en-2c2f2b85-14bb-4488-9ded-13f3cd04de05.html. [28-11-2017].

10.3.4 Research reports:

1) Coelmont, J. (2017). With PESCO Brought to Life, Will European Defence Live Happily Ever After?. Security Policy Brief. Egmont Institute. Policy Brief.

2) European Parliament. (2006). The European Security and Defence Policy: from the Helsinki Headline Goal to the EU Battlegroups. Brussels. Research note.

3) Ponzano, P. (2011). Community and intergovernmental method: an irrelevant debate?. Notre Europe. Policy Brief.

10.3.5 Online sources:

1) De France, O. (2013). What EU citizens think about European Defence. European union. Institute for Security studies. URL: https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_43_CSDP_polls_01.pdf. [30-11-2017].

2) EUR-Lex. Community and intergovernmental methods. Access to European Union law. URL: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/community_intergovernmental_methods.html [28-11-2017].

3) European Union, (2017). Permanent Structured Cooperation factsheet. URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/pesco_factsheet_14-11-2017_.pdf. [28-11-2017].

4) Juncker, J. (2017). President Jean-Claude Juncker's State of the Union Address 2017. European Commission press release database. URL: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-3165_en.htm. [27-11-2017].

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**CSDP PUBLIC RELATIONS
HOW TO PROMOTE CSDP TO THE
EUROPEAN CITIZENS?**

**created for the CSDP Olympiad 2018
in Veliko Tarnovo – Bulgaria**

1. Abstract

Knowing how to properly get the message across to target groups is a challenge of any organisation. This is also true for the European Union. Communication on a strategic level has increasingly become important over the last years of changing threats and disinformation from different players. At this point, European solutions must be advertised more and more to the European citizens, because European problems need European solutions. The time in which members of the EU have only thought within a national framework should therefore come to an end.

One idea for such a solution on strategic communication could be the use of the “multiplier effect”. Using this effect in different ways, such as through experts, on social media or military exercises could increase the number of people which are reached by the EU to implement European thinking and narratives. But also the messages of the EU must be improved. Experts are needed to translate the EU documents to an understandable language for everyone. Working closer together in the communication sectors will be needed too, in order to tackle future challenges.

Not everyone in the world wants that the Member States in the EU work closer together as a Union. Disinformation from different players to disturb a European way of thinking in the last years has been applied very effectively. One way to tackle this problem is to build up resilience against such disinformation.

The proposals in this essay are only few possibilities to get the message across to the European citizens. The way ahead is clear: a lot of work needs to be done in regard to European thinking and narrative.

2. Preface

The first time the author got in touch with Common Security and Defence Policy was during the European Union action EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2016. From the beginning on, it was clear for the author, that successful work in an international environment can only be achieved through a well-developed communication. Therefore, it should not only incorporate intra-operation communication, but also communication with and between the EU-institutions and the respective Member States.

For a young soldier who is to be deployed to a CSDP mission or operation with limited background information about the EU, it is not easy to find suitable answers for all his or her family members pressing questions. But why is it so difficult? Could the reason be, that European citizens are not interested enough in the EU and they are predominantly focused on national issues? Or is it rather the case that the communication from the EU to its citizens in the Member States is insufficient? For sure there will be not only one reason.

Because of this background, the author chose this topic for the 4th CSDP Olympiad 2018 in Veliko Tarnovo in Bulgaria in order to identify what the EU can do better to promote CSDP to its citizens.

3. Introduction

“The purpose, even existence, of our Union is being questioned. Yet, our citizens and the world need a strong European Union like never before.”¹

¹ EEAS (2016). Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. Foreword by Federica Mogherini.

These are the words from the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission Federica Mogherini on the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy published in June 2016. Since the global environment is changing rapidly, the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) and the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence (SDIP) were implemented as a European response.

The complexity and unpredictability of our time is clearly shown by the Brexit. Especially this factor can affect the affairs of the EU in adopting a new direction. Consequently, the withdrawal of the United Kingdom triggered hope and could open the door to a real strengthening of CSDP and a common European thinking. Not only the Brexit, also the factor that the United States have a new President, who brings a certain unpredictability with him, could become a test for the EU in case that the Transatlantic relationship would seriously be put into question by the new US administration.

Moreover, by looking into the East there are more challenges for the EU. There the EU also needs a strategy to tackle these challenges. Russia's alleged interference in the US election campaign and Russia's strategic communication against the EU shows us more and more the importance of communication on this level. To tackle all these challenges in a proper way, the calls for a strong European communication strategy become louder and louder. To show the European citizens that the EU is able to overcome these challenges, it is necessary to give the citizens a better understanding of the actual situation and the future decisions to develop a sense of security within the Union. These communication challenges cannot be solved from the institutions of the EU in Brussels alone. All EU Member States have to work together to implement European thinking for its societies.

Especially the promotion of the CSDP's goals and ideals to the Member States and their citizens is one main part of this essay.

The main idea proposed in this essay can be summarised with the term "multiplier effect". A "multiplier effect" increases its members in their network with each additional person. This means, if you give a number of persons a certain message, these persons become a potential amplifier of your message and can give it to friends in their respective environment.²

Furthermore, the author will try to identify how communication in the field of CSDP can be improved to implement a better understanding of the EU and create a European thinking.

² Cf.: Homepage of Portent. Page social media multiplier effect. URL: <https://www.portent.com/blog/internet-marketing/social-media-multiplier-effect.htm>. [18-11-17].

4. Current State of Research

While researching for this essay, it was important to find out which are the main institutions of the EU dealing with CSDP in particular with public relations, what are the important supporting documents and what is the state of research.

The European External Action Service is the EU's diplomatic service and was established by the Treaty of Lisbon on 1st December 2009. The head of this department is the HR/VP.³ Embedded in the EEAS is a division which focuses onto Common Security and Defence Policy. This division is responsible for the full spectrum of crisis management of the EU.⁴

The Strategic Communications Division (STRATCOMS) leads the EU's efforts on the public dimension of European diplomacy and its communication on Foreign Affairs and Security Policy as part of the EEAS. It works to project and promote key EU policies and core values globally as well as to audiences at home and works closely with other EU institutions.⁵

The EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) is an autonomous agency of the EU which was set up in January 2002 to foster a common security culture for the EU, support the elaboration and projection of its foreign policy, and enrich the strategic debate inside and outside Europe.⁶ In July 2016 one report of this institute was about "Strategic Communications – East and South". This report explains in detail how disinformation from two main players on this communication field works. On the one hand it is Russia and on the other hand the so called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), two external players which contribute the most to destabilising the EU's neighbourhood in recent years.⁷

In June 2016, the HR/VP Federica Mogherini presented the EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS). The main aim of this strategy is to form the basis for a targeted, efficient and sustainable EU foreign policy in the context of new geopolitical challenges.⁸

³ Cf.: Homepage of the European Union External Action Service. Page What we do. URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/2725/what-we-do_en. [1-11-17].

⁴ Cf.: Ibid. Page CSDP structure, instruments and agencies. URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/5392/csdp-structure-instruments-and-agencies_en. [25-11-17].

⁵ Cf.: Ibid. Page Strategic Communications. URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/100/Strategic%20Communications. [1-11-17].

⁶ Cf.: Homepage of EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). Page About Us. URL: <https://www.iss.europa.eu/about-us>. [25-11-17].

⁷ Cf.: EU Institute for Security Studies. (2016). Strategic communications. East and South. Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies. Paris. P. 3.

⁸ Cf.: Homepage of the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Page EU Global Strategy. URL: <https://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/european-foreign-policy/european-policy/eu-foreign-policy/eu-foreign-policy-cfsp/eu-global-strategy>. [25-11-17].

In November 2016, the EUGS Security and Defence Implementation Plan (SDIP), the European Defence Action Plan and the proposal in line with the EU-NATO joint declaration were presented.⁹

To move forward quickly, together with the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Directorate for Security Policy of Austria's Ministry of Defence organised a workshop on strategic communication in Vienna from the 5th to the 6th December 2016 with the topic – “the EU Global Strategy – from Vision to Action. Making Europe Safer – Getting the EU message across”.¹⁰ The goal of this conference was to start proactive and coordinated strategic communication, aimed at both, inwards to the EU citizens and outwards to partners and other organisations as it was outlined in various EU documents.¹¹

5. Research Gap

From the author's point of view one of the major challenges for the EU is the need to improve the institutions' communication efforts to get their messages across to the European citizens. Without any effective advertising for its goals and concrete results achieved, it will be quite hard to establish comprehensive European thinking.

When it comes to CSDP, these challenges become even more pressing. Most of the European citizens do not know what the EU's problems with regard to CSDP are, and how its institutions are working on to tackling these challenges. The EU should use simple messages for describing threats and its associated complex challenges in order to make them clear to its citizens. The EU should also apply a sophisticated strategy to counter disinformation from the out- as well as from the inside, which is another aspect, which is not favourable to European narratives. To tackle this problem sustainably, education should be elevated to a key strategy. Until today, the EU does not know exactly how to deal with it though. Without this, a distinct European way of thinking will remain a distant goal. Also, a lot of researches must be undertaken to support the challenges laid out in this essay so far.

6. Research Questions

The main part of the essay is to find examples of possibilities which can improve the promotion of CSDP. Because of that, the main question of the essay is:

⁹ Cf.: Homepage of the European Union External Action Service. Page EU Global Strategy Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, 17 November 2016. URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/15148/eu-global-strategy-implementation-plan-security-and-defence-17-november-2016_en. [2-12-17].

¹⁰ Cf.: Homepage of EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). Page From vision to action: making Europe safer – Getting the EU message across. URL: <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/vision-action-making-europe-safer-%E2%80%93-getting-eu-message-across>. [25-11-17].

¹¹ Cf.: Annexes. Interview with expert. Question 2.

How to promote CSDP to the European Citizens?

Before responding to the main question, the author has created three sub-questions to research on the main question in different possibilities.

Sub-question number 1: How to improve the messages of the EU?

Sub-question number 2: How can the EU deal with disinformation?

Sub-question number 3: How can multipliers be build who bring the message to the European citizens?

7. Methodology

In this essay the author tries to find examples of possibilities which can improve the promotion of CSDP. Therefore, the author analyses a wide range of information from the various EU institutions' web pages and important EU documents. This method is known as content analysis. Additional to the content analysis the author conducted an interview with a security policy expert to obtain deeper information about the workshop on strategic communication, which was held on 5th to 6th December 2016. At the end of the research the reader can find a discussion of the results covering advantages, disadvantages, as well a personal conclusion.




Figure 1: Flowchart of methodology in this essay¹²

8. Research and Results of Research

8.1 Improving the Message of the EU

Reading documents and strategies from the institutions of the EU without any background is very difficult for the citizens of the EU. Not only

¹² Figure created by the author.

the language is a problem, also the political and legal knowledge are usually not available. This means, that most of the European citizens need someone who translates these difficult documents into an understandable language for everyone. Therefore, communication experts are needed to translate the jargon of Brussels, which is used in the documents.¹³

This should not be a task for the EU institutions exclusively. Working closer together with the Member States to coordinate communication efforts, pooling of communication experts, and implementing tools to facilitate communication is needed. The common goal should be that communication becomes a joint collective effort.¹⁴

Another point is that the EU should promote concrete results. They should generate a narrative which focuses on selected success stories combined with powerful and understandable messages, enriching the existing perception of the EU as a peaceful and prosperous project.¹⁵

8.2 Dealing with Disinformation

In the last years another important reason which works against a European thinking is disinformation from Russia and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Especially Russia's strategic communication is quite effective, while often crude and deceitful in terms of content its delivery is sophisticated, targeted, and tailored to different audiences, and therefore capable of exploiting the EU's weaknesses.¹⁶ The strategic communication of ISIL works different. They have quickly gained a strong reputation with slick magazines, videos, and effective use of social media. The goal is to spread their political will to active members of ISIL and potential recruits to ensure its own survival, ideally to control the most territory possible.¹⁷ To tackle these challenges in a good way, the main goals for counter disinformation is to build up resilience with empowerment of civil society and free media, strengthening the freedom of expression and the rule of law as well as supporting good basic local education. However, a communication strategy should always include the European citizens themselves.¹⁸

8.3 Building "multiplier" for CSDP

Another way to improve the communication efforts of the EU is to use the "multiplier effect". By applying this method, it is possible to increase a

¹³ Cf.: Annexes. Interview with expert. Question 4.

¹⁴ Cf.: Ibid.

¹⁵ Cf.: Ibid. Question 3.

¹⁶ Cf.: EU Institute for Security Studies. (2016). Strategic communications. East and South. Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies. Paris. P. 7.

¹⁷ Cf.: Ibid. P. 29.

¹⁸ Cf.: Annexes. Interview with expert. Question 5.

network with each person you get for your subject, because this person adds to potential amplifiers of your message.¹⁹

So, the difficult question is, how the EU can build “multipliers” to use this effect in CSDP, to get their messages across to the European citizens? This question will be answered within the next sub-chapters.

8.3.1 Experts for CSDP

One idea is to train people of the various EU Member States to become experts on CSDP. These people do not necessarily need an academic background. From the author’s point of view they need enough information and knowledge in order to explain the problems and understand why the chosen solution is the best for the EU. It also means that these people cannot work without support. They need special assistance from a political service to be provided with edited information about current political situations, decisions, or threats. It must be made available in their mother tongue. These experts can explain the difficult situations in their professional and private environment and can become another carrier for the message to improve the European thinking. The goal must be to build up a pool of people in the EU Member States, who bring the message and the knowledge of CSDP to as many people as possible. The best target group for CSDP are military officers of Member States, but also civilian personnel should be considered.

One example could be to use young officers from the Member States. Therefore, the EU Ministers of Defence decided with the 2903rd External Relations Council Meeting to establish an Implementation Group for the European Initiative for the exchange of young officers inspired by Erasmus. This Implementation Group has the task to harmonise the EU Basic Officer Education and to increase interoperability of future officers. The Implementation Group agreed on common modules, which are important for all European Officer Cadets. One of the common modules is the CSDP module, which goal is to standardise the familiarization of officer students with CSDP with a view to Europeanisation of officer education.²⁰

¹⁹ Cf.: Homepage of Portent. Page social media multiplier effect. URL: <https://www.portent.com/blog/internet-marketing/social-media-multiplier-effect.htm>. [18-11-17].

²⁰ Cf.: Homepage of European initiative for the exchange of military young officers. URL: <http://www.emilyo.eu/sites/default/files/2017%2008%2023%20Implementation%20Group%20Objectives.pdf>. [19-11-17].



Figure 2: Participants of the CSDP Module 2017 in Wiener Neustadt in Austria²¹

Exactly these young officers could be used as future experts for CSDP. After concluding the CSDP Module they already have the basic knowledge to explain why some problems must be solved together as EU and which are the benefits for each Member State. In this case the EU has the advantage that they would use already existing capacities for their communication. But as the author mentioned above, especially these young officers need support from the beginning. Such support could be through continuing lectures on CSDP, online courses, or subscriptions of journals on current important topics.

8.3.2 Social Media

The term social media is a collective term for internet-based media information which is based on social interaction and the technical possibilities of the so-called Web 2.0. Communication and the exchange of user-generated content are in the foreground. Social media is also increasingly gaining commercial importance, such as the networked structure of the user base has great potential for the effective transmission of commercial news and content.²² The most popular social media channels with the most followers are Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube.²³

The EEAS for example is using all of these social media channels. The contents on current CSDP topics are well prepared. But looking at it more detailed, one can see that the videos on these pages are not watched very

²¹ Picture created by the Theresan Military Academy during the CSDP module 2017 in Wiener Neustadt in Austria on 22nd of November 2017.

²² Cf.: Homepage of Gabler Wirtschaftslexikon. Page social media. URL: <http://wirtschaftslexikon.gabler.de/Archiv/569839/soziale-medien-v2.html>. [19-11-17].

²³ Cf.: Homepage of Gründerküche.de. URL: <https://www.gruenderkueche.de/fachartikel/die-besten-10-soziale-netzwerke-und-wie-sie-sie-nutzen>. [28-11-17].

often. Compared with the number of European citizens, the impressions and views of this content can certainly be increased.²⁴

But how can you reach more people with these instruments?

The first step would be to use the language of the respective Member State. However, translating each video into all languages which are spoken in the EU would be costly. On the other hand it would be possible to include subtitles with some different languages. With these subtitles people, whose English skills are not that good, could be reached. Another idea would be to increase the number of followers. Therefore, the EU could encourage people who are participating courses on CSDP describing the videos for example on Facebook. In doing so, every member of their friends or followers could have the possibility to see these videos on their account and subscribe to the videos. If these people also talk or discuss about the videos, the message will be spread out much more.²⁵

8.3.3 Military Exercises

Military exercises are another example to build multipliers for promotion of CSDP. Exercises on European level would show that the military trains for a special task in order to solve problems together in the future. Concerning that, the challenge is not to conduct exercises, the problem is to find partner countries for such military exercises which are interested in solving or preparing problems together. For this reason, conducting a military exercise with all EU Member States to solve one problem is nearly impossible, because of the different opinions. Therefore, one possible solution could be to find partners among the EU Member States and to try to cooperate and to train on a military level. Such exercises give a huge signal of security to the citizens in an area which is transmitted from the different soldiers to a wide range of media in the Member States.²⁶

8.4 Outcomes of Research

The outcome of sub-question number one is, that one step into the right direction is to work closer together to coordinate communication efforts, pooling of communication experts, and implementing tools to facilitate communication is needed. Another point is to generate a narrative which focuses onto selected success stories combined with powerful and understandable messages to enrich the existing perception of the EU as a peaceful and prosperous project.

²⁴ Cf.: European External Action Service on Facebook and YouTube. URL: <https://www.facebook.com/EuropeanExternalActionService>. [3-12-17].

URL: https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=European+Union+external+action+service. [3-12-17].

²⁵ Cf.: Homepage of Portent. Page social media multiplier effect. URL: <https://www.portent.com/blog/internet-marketing/social-media-multiplier-effect.htm>. [18-11-17].

²⁶ Author's note: Content of the paragraph based on a personal opinion of the author.

The author's result for sub-question number two is, that the main goals for counter disinformation is to build up resilience with empowerment of the civil society and free media, strengthening the freedom of expression and the rule of law, as well as supporting good, basic and local education.

The answer for sub-question number three is, to train experts for CSDP, improve the use of social media to get more followers and increase the number of exercises between the Member States.

The answer for the main question is that the EU need a mix of different approaches to tackle this challenge. First step would be, working closer together on communication. Second step, build up resilience against disinformation. Thirdly, build "multipliers", who bring the message to the European citizens. These could be experts on CSDP, followers on social media and participants in military exercises.

9. Discussion of Results (pros and cons) and personal Conclusion

From the beginning on it was clear for the author that these complex questions could not be answered thoroughly with the results that have been produced in this essay. Naturally, some of the suggestions are easier to implement than others. However, if and if yes, how these possibilities can promote CSDP remains questionable. Unquestionable is the fact that the EU will not be able to face future challenges of strategic communication alone. To get the message across, the EU needs the help from the Member States.

Improving the message of the EU should be a top priority for the activities in future, because a simple and understandable message is the key for communicating with the citizens. For sure, to implement communication experts will take a lot of time and money, but it is absolutely necessary. Without these experts and their translation, it is very likely that not anything will change in future.

Another important factor for the coming years will be how to deal with different players' disinformation. Therefore, resilience is needed and the EUGS is already taking this into account. The concept of resilience signals that the EU has realised the changing constellation of power in the world. Although the EU keeps its ambition to transform its neighbourhood as the best way to guarantee its own security, we also realise that there is a growing risk of certain dangerous developments in our neighbourhood which can transform the EU itself and put at risk its survival.

The multiplier concept sounds like an easy and fast way to reach a lot of people. But to implement this concept on European level, especially among experts, it needs more time and it costs much money. First, to implement a CSDP expert network, the EU or EEAS must define criteria for candidates and the Member States should suggest suitable candidates. This

could be an essential weak point of the multiplier concept, because the candidate decides to what extent he or she meets the organisations' expectations. It means that it is very important to set precise criteria for the candidates' selections. If this does not happen and a bad candidate is chosen who does not find acceptance, then no effect will be achieved either. Thus, not everyone is suitable who concluded a CSDP module. To sum up, there must be criteria to continue the work and there must be a willingness of the designated experts themselves. If this concept would be implemented in the EU though, it would have an important tool to bring their message fast, cost effective, and in their language to the citizens to the Member States.²⁷

Finally, the message of the essay should be clear: Working together on European solutions, improving the way the EU communicates with its citizens and the promotion a European way of thinking in order to promote CSDP to the European Citizens.

10. Annexes

10.1 List of Abbreviations

CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
EEAS	European Union External Action Service
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force
EUGS	European Union Global Strategy
EUISS	European Institute for Security Studies
HR/VP	High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
SDIP	Implementation Plan on Security and Defence
STRATCOMS	Strategic Communication Division

10.2 List of Figures

Figure	Description
Figure 1	Flowchart of methodology in this essay
Figure 2	Participants of the CSDP Module 2017 in Wiener Neustadt in Austria

10.3 List of Literature

10.3.1 Documents

01 EEAS (2016). Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy.

²⁷ Cf.: Homepage of the Institute of Technology and Labor. URL: <http://www.optimus-spitzencluster.de/Multiplikatoren.pdf>. [18-11-17].

02 EU Institute for Security Studies. (2016). Strategic communications. East and South. Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies. Paris.

10.3.2 Internet

01 Homepage of the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Page EU Global Strategy. URL: <https://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/european-foreign-policy/european-policy/eu-foreign-policy/eu-foreign-policy-cfsp/eu-global-strategy>. [25-11-17].

02 Homepage of the European Union External Action Service. Page EU Global Strategy Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, 17 November 2016. URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/15148/eu-global-strategy-implementation-plan-security-and-defence-17-november-2016_en. [2-12-17].

03 Homepage of the European Union External Action Service. Page CSDP structure, instruments and agencies. URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/5392/csdp-structure-instruments-and-agencies_en. [25-11-17].

04 Homepage of the European Union External Action Service. Page Strategic Communications. URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/100/Strategic%20Communications. [1-11-17].

05 Homepage of the European Union External Action Service. Page What we do. URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/2725/what-we-do_en. [1-11-17].

06 European External Action Service on Facebook and YouTube. URL: <https://www.facebook.com/EuropeanExternalActionService>. [3-12-17]. URL: https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=European+Union+external+action+service. [3-12-17].

07 Homepage of European initiative for the exchange of military young officers. URL: <http://www.emilyo.eu/sites/default/files/2017%2008%2023%20Implementation%20Group%20Objectives.pdf>. [19-11-17].

08 Homepage of Gründerküche.de. URL: <https://www.gruenderkueche.de/fachartikel/die-besten-10-soziale-netzwerke-und-wie-sie-sie-nutzen>. [28-11-17].

09 Homepage of EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). Page About Us. URL: <https://www.iss.europa.eu/about-us>. [25-11-17].

10 Homepage of EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). Page From vision to action: making Europe safer – Getting the EU message across. URL: <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/vision-action-making-europe-safer-%E2%80%93-getting-eu-message-across>. [25-11-17].

11 Homepage of European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). Report Strategic communications. East and South. URL: https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Report_30.pdf. [25-11-17].

12 Homepage of the Institute of Technology and Labor. URL: <http://www.optimus-spitzencluster.de/Multiplikatoren.pdf>. [18-11-17].

13 Homepage of Portent. Page social media multiplier effect. URL: <https://www.portent.com/blog/internet-marketing/social-media-multiplier-effect.htm>. [18-11-17].

14 Homepage of Gabler Wirtschaftslexikon. Page social media. URL: <http://wirtschaftslexikon.gabler.de/Archiv/569839/soziale-medien-v2.html>. [19-11-17].

10.4 Interview with Expert

The author conducted an interview with Mag. Lukas Wank to obtain deeper information about the workshop on strategic communication, which was held on 5th to 6th December 2016. The interview was done in Vienna from 13:15 to 14:00 on 11th of November 2017.

Lukas Wank, Mag., is the Director of “Shabka”²⁸ and has served in as political advisor, policy officer, and conflict analyst for the Austrian Ministry of Defence and the Austrian Armed Forces.

1. In your past work, did you deem issues concerning strategic communications as an important aspect of the EU’s work?

Yes of course. Actually, during my time as a security policy expert in the Austrian Ministry of Defence, the Directorate for Security Policy organised an entire international conference focusing on how the EU can help make Europe safer by getting the message across to its citizens. This was in late 2016.

2. Why the workshop was held and what was the goal?

Two of the most important issues facing the EU are migration followed by terrorism. It is therefore no surprise that most Europeans want the EU to achieve tangible results on these issues.

The EU’s ambition to strengthen military and civilian capabilities and foster cooperation in security and defence is timely but unfortunately it is often misunderstood and poorly communicated. Therefore, the challenges the EU and its member states face are also a crisis of communication and messages.

The goal of the 2016 conference in Vienna was to kick start proactive and coordinated strategic communication, directed both inwards to the EU citizens and outwards to partners and other organisations as it was outlined in various EU documents. Moreover, the intention was to equip policy makers with tangible recommendations on how to implement coherent strategic communication in line with the EUGS.

3. What were the important recommendations?

After reviewing the material gathered from the discussions in the conference it became clear that the EU urgently has to move forward in various aspects if it wants to overcome its crisis of communication and messages.

²⁸ “Shabka” is a NGO, which provides people a space to come together. The idea behind is to connect people, ideas and perspectives of the world we live in.

On the one hand, it will be important for the EU to generate a narrative that focuses on selected success stories combined with powerful and understandable messages, enriching the existing perception of the EU as a peaceful and prosperous project. As a result of this, it will become increasingly important to move from presenting the processes to presenting results since the narrative gets lost once communication becomes process-oriented. This means, that the EU needs to promote concrete results.

The challenge posed by fake news, disinformation, propaganda, and hybrid threats touches upon another side of strategic communications, which is equally important for the EU: How to respond to outside challenges? Here the EU should convincingly counter disinformation and expose fake news and propaganda by correcting false information and exposing the sources. This involves systematising disinformation in order to be able to counter it more efficiently as well as reinforcing resources.

4. What does this concretely mean for dealing with disinformation or improving the message?

All this can be done through better involving communication experts to translate the jargon of Brussels documents into understandable language or by exploiting new ways of communication.

Additionally, the conference clearly identified that is important to coordinate communication efforts and that the EU needs tools to facilitate institutions to work together. Communication therefore should become a joint collective effort. As part of this, pooling and coordinating of resources can allow concentrating on a few campaigns with clear messages and increase impact.

5. Why is dealing with disinformation so important for CSDP?

One of the main reasons to counter disinformation is to build up resilience. Any strategic communication strategy should therefore always include the European citizens themselves. The empowerment of civil society and free media, strengthening the freedom of expression and the rule of law, and supporting good basic local education constitute important aspects in countering disinformation and building resilience.

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**THE CURRENT STATE OF THE EUROPEAN
ENERGY SECURITY SUPPLY**

**created for the CSDP Olympiad 2018
in Veliko Tarnovo, Bulgaria**

Abstract

The European Union is the largest importer of primary energy in the world. This leads to a high dependency on non-member states, and thus raises threats to energy supply security. Due to events, which occurred in 2006 between Ukraine and Russia, resulting in shortages of energy supply resources, the European Union created a common energy policy, which was later developed into the European Energy Union. The was to decrease European vulnerability to shortages in energy supplies. EU created three pillars plan, which is meant for securing uninterrupted energy supply. Those pillars are: increasing the energy efficiency, increasing the share of renewable energy produced within EU and creating the infrastructure, which would empower member states to create common energy market

and, in case of an energy crisis, utilize solidarity mechanisms. The goals are systematically fulfilled and all the targets set for 2020 are prospected to be met. This directly into increasing the security of energy supply and a stronger political position in negotiations with business partners. Due to increasing pace of the "new industrial revolution" resulting in great progress made in the fields of renewable energy and its storage, European Union is moving towards achieving its security and climate energy goals.

1. Preface

A comprehensive approach is a fundamental principle of European security and defence system. It is widely agreed that international security can be achieved only by ensuring that all political, social, military and economic related factors are taken into consideration.

Machines, computers, vehicles, to serve their purpose, must be provided with energy. Only stable and steady access to cheap and dependable sources of power is able to make the economy thriving. However, the uneven distribution of energy supplies among countries has led to significant vulnerability of the European Union economy, which own reserves do not match needs of its industry. This forces the European Union to depend on imported resources.

Any shortage of energy supply in Europe would have a significant impact on economies and citizens, hence it comes with no surprise that European leaders are eager to carry out any actions, which would increase the security of energy supply to Europe.

2. Introduction

European economy (when Member States' economies are added) is the second largest in the world¹. It means a need for massive quotas of energy and thus, powerful bargaining position. However, single Member States have significantly less purchasing power, and thus they cannot achieve satisfactory security or price of energy supplies.

This problem has been noted by European institutions and in the beginning of 2007 the energy policy for Europe² has been published. The communication stated, that increasing dependence of European Union on imported hydrocarbons may carry significant political and economic threats. A separate problem was forecast, which was provided by International Energy Agency. In that document, authors predicted global demand for oil to grow over 40%, and for natural gas to grow by 67% by

¹ <https://www.thebalance.com/world-s-largest-economy-3306044> [8-12-2017]

² Commission of the European communities (2007) (PDF) Communication from the Commission to the European Council and the European Parliament- An energy policy for Europe URL: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0001:FIN:EN:PDF> [12-11-2017]

2030. The IEA stated that *"the ability and willingness of major oil and gas producers to step up investment in order to meet rising global demand are particularly uncertain"*³. This prediction meant growing over time risk of supply failure.

The last of the problems connected to the security of supply was lack of solidarity mechanisms, connecting the Member States in case of energy crisis scenario. This was an alarming statement, especially in the context of several Member States largely or completely dependent on one single gas supplier.

In response to raised issue, the strategic objective of European's energy policy has been set. It stated that to increase Europeans security in supply three conditions must be fulfilled:

- Reduce the overall energy needs, creating more energy efficient economies;
- Increase share of non-fossil energy sources in energy mix;
- Create the Internal Energy Market

From this day sustainability became European way to provide more security in the area of energy supply. The Plan presented in Commission's document stated the need for a new industrial revolution, which would dramatically increase the amount of locally produced, renewable energy.

3. Current state of research

3.1. The European Energy Union

In 2009 European Union survived a severe shock. As a outcome of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis, the supply of natural gas via Ukraine has stopped for few weeks. This event made the European Union realise how fragile was its energy supply security dependent on one exporter. As a result, within Union appeared parties which would like to create even more complex cooperation between the Member States in terms of energy supplies.

In 2014 prime minister of Poland, and current president of the European Council, Donald Tusk, published in Financial Times an article titled *„A united Europe can end Russia's energy stranglehold"*⁴ in which he shared an idea of the European Energetic Union, which ultimate goal was to made countries of Central and Eastern Europe more independent from energy supplied by Russia.

Suggested by Donald Tusk plan assumed undertaking following actions:

³ International Energy Agency (2006) (PDF). World Energy Outlook. URL. <https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/weo2006.pdf> [1-11-2017], pages: 86-88, 112-114

⁴ Tusk, D. (2014) A united Europe can end Russia's energy stranglehold. Financial Times as of 11-11-2017. Interview

- Development of a mechanism for jointly negotiating energy contracts with Russia
- Strengthening mechanisms guaranteeing solidarity among member states in case energy supplies are again cut off
- Supporting the building of adequate energy infrastructure, able to provide energy supplies from different contractors
- Making full use of the fossil fuels available, including coal and shale gas, as long as it is done in a sustainable way
- Reach out to our partners outside Europe and sign contracts for hydrocarbons overseas
- Strengthen already existing Energy Community with transit countries to boost energy security not only of the EU but of Europe as a whole.

Three months later, future president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker in his political programme⁵, recognized the idea of Energy Union as one of the priority challenges facing a new European Commission. In June The European Council set the creation of an Energy Union as one of the five main objectives of the European strategic agenda. Energy Union objective is threefold:

- provide affordable energy for businesses and consumers
- secure energy for all EU countries by reducing EU's energy dependency
- generate more green energy and continue the fight against climate change

In 2015 European commission published so-called Energy Union Package⁶, which provided three pillars of the new energy strategy:

- A framework strategy detailing the goals and concrete steps for the energy union
- EU's vision for the Paris global climate agreement
- A plan to achieve the target of 10% electricity interconnection by 2020

4. Research gap

Common European energy policy is already ten years old. It was set to secure EU's energy supply and to focus member States' efforts on creating conditions to foster renewable energy sources. Through the years the policy

⁵ Juncker, J.C. (2014) (PDF) A new start for Europe: My agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change. Strasbourg Political Guidelines URL: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/juncker-political-guidelines-speech_en.pdf [15-11-2017]

⁶ European Commission (2015) (PDF) Energy Union package. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/publication/FOR%20WEB%20energyunion_with%20annex_en.pdf [15-11-2017]

evolved to the idea of the Energy Union, which is about to be fully implemented in the coming years. It is justified, to summarize, what Union has achieved over this period of time. And compare the current state of European energy security supply with predictions of 2007 policymakers claiming, that rising dependency of EU will result in a decline in EU's security.

5. Research Questions

This article looks at the production and consumption of primary energy within the EU. It is to describe current shortfall between them and possible risks caused by a massive dependency on imported energy resources. The aim of the work is to compare the situation in the sector of energy security in the year 2007 and now, just after 10 years of common energy policy. To achieve this goal the paper must answer the following questions:

- What is the difference between the primary energy production and consumption and how has it changed over last 10 years
- How has Union's dependency on imported fuels changed over last 10 years
- What are the biggest partners in EU's energy trade and what is rate of diversification within the European portfolio
- What activities are carried out to improve European energy supply security?

Answering on those questions should provide enough material to evaluate changes which occurred in Europe and to predict the future of energy security supply for the European Union.

6. Methodology

To provide answers to paper's question author uses documents published by the European Commission, such as:

- **An energy policy for Europe**⁷
- Energy Union package⁸
- Annual reports on the stage of the Energy Union and its annexes⁹

Another source of information was data provided by Eurostat. An overview of used data can be obtained on Eurostat's database on energy statistics. For the paper has been used data from a period between 2005

⁷ Op. cit. Commission of the European Communities (2007) (PDF) Communication from the Commission to the European Council and the European Parliament- An energy policy for Europe

⁸ Op. cit. European Commission (2015) Energy Union package.

⁹ European Commission (2017) (PDF) Third Report on the State of the Energy Union. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/third-report-state-energy-union_en.pdf [20-11-2017]

and 2015, which provide both long enough historical data, and most-up-to-date information provided by Eurostat.

Apart from those official data and documents, author used for work variable available online sources and papers concerning energy security, energy production and new energy-linked innovations.

7. Research and results of research

7.1. Net balance of primary energy in Europe


One of the most important factors affecting the area of energy supply security is the difference between produced and used primary energy. In case of shortages of energy produced within the region, the import is the only possible solution.

7.1.1. Production of Primary Energy in Europe between 2005 and 2015

	Total production of primary energy		Share of total production, 2015 (%)				
	2005	2015	Nuclear energy	Solid fuels	Natural gas	Crude oil	Renewable energy
EU-28	904.2	766.5	28.9	18.9	14.0	9.8	26.7
Belgium	13.7	10.4	65.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	28.5
Bulgaria	10.6	12.0	33.2	48.7	0.7	0.2	17.0
Czech Republic	33.2	28.8	24.2	58.6	0.7	0.7	14.9
Denmark	30.8	15.7	0.0	0.0	26.4	48.7	22.5
Germany	136.8	119.8	19.8	35.9	5.3	3.0	32.5
Estonia	3.9	5.5	0.0	75.6	0.0	0.0	23.2
Ireland	1.6	1.9	0.0	39.8	5.6	0.0	51.3
Greece	10.3	8.5	0.0	67.0	0.1	0.7	31.2
Spain	30.0	33.4	44.2	3.7	0.2	0.7	50.5
France	135.6	136.7	82.5	0.0	0.0	0.8	15.7
Croatia	4.8	4.4	0.0	0.0	33.5	15.6	50.7
Italy	30.3	36.1	0.0	0.1	15.3	16.1	65.2
Cyprus	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0	0.0	97.4
Latvia	1.9	2.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	99.6
Lithuania	3.9	1.6	0.0	1.3	0.0	4.8	92.5
Luxembourg	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	76.9
Hungary	10.3	11.2	36.7	13.6	12.2	7.6	29.0
Malta	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
Netherlands	62.5	47.6	2.2	0.0	82.0	4.3	10.1
Austria	9.8	11.9	0.0	0.0	8.7	7.3	78.0
Poland	77.9	67.3	0.0	79.6	5.5	1.4	12.8
Portugal	3.6	5.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	97.7
Romania	28.2	26.7	11.3	17.7	33.0	15.6	22.3
Slovenia	3.5	3.4	43.0	25.4	0.1	0.0	30.2
Slovakia	6.3	6.3	62.6	7.8	1.2	0.2	25.2
Finland	16.6	17.5	34.2	4.8	0.0	0.4	59.3
Sweden	34.2	33.5	43.2	0.3	0.0	0.0	54.6
United Kingdom	204.0	118.3	15.3	4.3	30.1	39.3	10.0

Table 1: Production of primary energy in Eu28 between 2005 and 2015¹⁰

¹⁰ Eurostat (2017) URL: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Energy_production_and_imports [4-12-2017]



Source: Eurostat (online data code: nrg_100a)

Figure 1: Development of the production of primary energy (by fuel type)¹¹

The primary energy coming from the production of natural gas and crude oil fell by over 40%, solid fuels production fell over 25%, and nuclear energy production decreased by almost 15%. The only source of primary energy, which showed an increase in terms of production is a renewable one. It must be noted, that increase in this area was impressive 70%. However, this progress could not balance the decreases in other areas of primary energy productions, resulting in over 15% fall of production in years 2005-2015.

Such situation was caused by:

- Running out of reserves, which exploitation could be economical
- Increasing focus of European lawmakers on pivoting EU's economy on renewable energy

As we can see renewable energy is becoming more and more important part of EU's primary energy with 26,7% share of total production in EU. And if decreasing inner extraction of fossil fuels is quite alarming in the terms of security of energy supply, the rapid growth of renewable energy may provide an alternative to imported from non-member states resources.

¹¹ Ibid. [4-12-2017]

7.1.2. Gross inland consumption of energy between 2005 and 2015

	2005	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Share in EU-28, 2015 (%)
EU-28	1 830.9	1 764.4	1 698.9	1 685.6	1 667.8	1 607.8	1 627.5	100.0
Belgium	59.1	60.9	57.0	54.6	56.6	53.5	54.2	3.3
Bulgaria	19.8	17.8	19.1	18.2	16.8	17.7	18.5	1.1
Czech Republic	45.4	45.4	43.8	43.5	43.5	42.2	42.4	2.6
Denmark	19.6	20.0	18.6	17.9	17.8	16.8	16.8	1.0
Germany	341.9	332.5	315.8	317.9	324.5	313.2	314.2	19.3
Estonia	5.6	6.2	6.2	6.1	6.7	6.7	6.3	0.4
Ireland	15.3	15.2	13.9	13.8	13.7	13.6	14.2	0.9
Greece	31.4	28.7	27.8	27.6	24.2	24.4	24.4	1.5
Spain	144.2	130.3	128.5	128.1	119.3	116.7	121.4	7.5
France	276.4	265.9	257.8	258.1	258.9	248.5	252.6	15.5
Croatia	9.8	9.4	9.3	8.9	8.6	8.2	8.5	0.5
Italy	190.1	177.9	172.5	165.7	159.5	151.0	156.2	9.6
Cyprus	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.5	2.2	2.2	2.3	0.1
Latvia	4.8	4.6	4.4	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.4	0.3
Lithuania	8.7	8.8	7.0	7.1	6.7	6.7	6.9	0.4
Luxembourg	4.8	4.6	4.6	4.5	4.3	4.2	4.2	0.3
Hungary	27.6	26.6	26.0	24.7	23.9	23.8	25.2	1.5
Malta	1.0	0.9	0.9	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.0
Netherlands	84.1	85.8	80.2	80.5	80.3	76.4	77.6	4.8
Austria	34.1	34.3	33.3	33.2	33.7	32.5	33.2	2.0
Poland	92.2	100.7	100.8	97.6	98.0	94.3	95.4	5.9
Portugal	27.5	24.3	23.6	22.2	22.4	22.1	23.0	1.4
Romania	39.2	35.8	36.6	35.4	32.4	32.2	32.4	2.0
Slovenia	7.3	7.3	7.3	7.0	6.9	6.7	6.6	0.4
Slovakia	19.0	17.9	17.4	16.7	17.0	16.2	16.4	1.0
Finland	34.5	37.1	35.8	34.7	34.1	34.8	33.2	2.0
Sweden	51.0	50.8	49.5	49.8	49.1	48.2	45.5	2.8
United Kingdom	234.2	212.9	198.6	203.9	201.2	189.7	190.7	11.7

Table 2: Gross inland consumption of energy¹²




Figure 2: Gross inland consumption, EU-28, 2005-2015¹³

As it can be observed in Table 2, and Chart 2;

¹² Eurostat (2017) URL: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Consumption_of_energy [4-12-2017]

¹³ Ibid. [4-12-2017]

- Overall consumption during analysed years also showed a downward trend. Between years 2005 and 2015 European demand for energy fell by 11.4%. It shows how significant impact on EU's economy has the rule of pursuing energy efficiency. Those savings decreased the industry needs of energy resources, which led to lower import and thus improving the security of energy supply.

- Increasing share of renewable energy use affects the energy sources based on fossil fuels. which indicates that falling production of Europeans own hydrocarbons is replaced not by imported one, but instead by energy from renewable sources.

7.1.3. Net import of energetic resources between 2005 and 2015

Net imports of energy	2005	2007	2009	2011	2013	2015
European Union (28 countries)	980 186,0	983 658,0	936 433,0	943 563,0	908 012,0	902 124,0

Imports of solid fuels (TOE)	2005	2007	2009	2011	2013	2015
European Union (28 countries)	168 261,8	162 372,2	136 208,9	153 828,3	160 293,5	151 489,9

Imports of crude oil (TOE)	2005	2007	2009	2011	2013	2015
European Union (28 countries)	616 460,4	613 549,6	561 919,6	556 688,4	523 411,3	555 375,3

Imports of natural gas (TOE)	2005	2007	2009	2011	2013	2015
European Union (28 countries)	335 988,3	349 537,4	365 904,6	345 439,7	320 415,3	341 278,0

Table 3: Net imports of primary energy, 2005-2015¹⁴

As it can be observed despite decreasing production, the overall imports of main energetic resources slightly fell. It means that predictions from 2007 Energy Policy for Europe¹⁵ will not be fulfilled. Instead of dramatic fall in area of energy security supply small progression can be seen.

¹⁴ Table created by the author using data provided by Eurostat

¹⁵ Op.cit. International Energy Agency (2006) (PDF). World Energy Outlook

7.1.4. Main origin of primary energy imports

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Solid fuels											
Russia	20.2	21.4	21.5	22.7	26.2	22.8	22.9	23.0	25.9	25.9	25.8
Colombia	10.0	9.7	11.0	10.7	15.2	16.9	20.7	21.7	19.6	18.8	21.3
United States	8.5	8.7	7.9	12.2	11.8	14.2	15.7	20.6	19.5	18.3	14.0
Australia	11.2	10.3	11.3	10.2	6.5	8.9	7.7	6.6	6.7	5.6	8.1
South Africa	21.4	19.8	17.4	14.4	13.7	8.2	6.9	5.7	6.0	8.7	6.9
Indonesia	6.2	7.9	6.8	6.3	6.1	4.7	4.4	4.0	2.8	3.0	3.1
Canada	2.7	2.4	2.6	2.3	1.2	1.7	1.9	1.5	1.6	2.2	1.4
Mozambique	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.3	0.4
Ukraine	1.9	1.4	1.5	2.0	1.5	1.6	2.1	1.5	1.4	1.3	0.4
Others	19.9	20.4	20.0	19.2	17.8	20.9	17.6	15.5	16.2	15.8	18.6
Crude oil											
Russia	30.5	31.2	31.2	29.8	31.5	32.4	32.8	31.8	31.9	28.9	27.7
Norway	15.6	14.2	13.8	14.0	14.2	12.8	11.7	10.6	11.1	12.4	11.4
Nigeria	3.0	3.3	2.5	3.7	4.2	3.9	5.7	7.7	7.7	8.7	8.0
Saudi Arabia	9.8	8.3	6.6	6.4	5.3	5.5	7.6	8.3	8.2	8.5	7.5
Iraq	2.0	2.7	3.2	3.1	3.5	3.0	3.4	3.9	3.5	4.3	7.2
Kazakhstan	4.1	4.2	4.3	4.5	5.0	5.1	5.4	4.8	5.4	6.1	6.2
Azerbaijan	1.2	2.1	2.7	3.0	3.8	4.1	4.6	3.6	4.5	4.2	4.9
Algeria	3.2	2.3	1.7	2.4	1.5	1.2	2.4	2.7	3.7	4.0	4.0
Angola	1.1	0.7	1.9	2.4	2.5	1.5	2.0	1.9	2.8	3.2	4.0
Others	29.5	30.9	32.0	30.8	28.4	30.5	24.4	24.5	21.1	19.8	18.9
Natural gas											
Russia	34.6	33.0	32.1	31.2	27.6	26.8	28.3	27.8	32.4	29.7	29.4
Norway	20.2	21.7	23.3	23.7	24.5	22.9	22.1	24.9	23.6	25.0	25.9
Algeria	15.0	13.6	12.7	12.3	11.9	11.7	10.7	10.8	10.1	9.7	8.8
Qatar	1.3	1.5	1.8	1.9	4.6	8.1	9.6	6.8	5.2	5.5	6.1
Libya	1.4	2.1	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.2	0.6	1.5	1.4	1.7	1.7
Nigeria	2.9	3.6	3.8	3.3	2.0	3.4	3.6	2.8	1.4	1.2	1.6
Trinidad and Tobago	0.2	1.0	0.7	1.4	1.9	1.2	0.9	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.5
Peru	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.2
Turkey	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2
Others	24.5	23.5	23.1	23.5	24.8	23.5	24.2	23.9	24.8	26.0	25.5

Table 4: Main origin of primary energy imports, EU-28 2005-2015(% of extra EU imports)¹⁶

Data from the table 4 shows how centralised is the structure of European energy supply. Very few importers provide the significant share of European import. As for natural gas, three biggest importers (Russia, Norway, Algeria) provide 64.1% of EU's import. The same problem occurs with solid fuels, where Russia, Columbia and United States are responsible for 61% of the whole market. Only crude oil seems slightly better with 47,1% of import from Russia, Norway and Nigeria. Such lack of diversification is one of the biggest threats to EU's security of supply. An exporter who is so essential for their partner's economy has a powerful tool of pressure in his hands. Russian- Ukrainian crisis in 2009 showed¹⁷us how devastating power can be unleashed by simple suspension of energy supplies. The picture is even worse if we take into consideration that few of Member States import their hydrocarbons from only one partner. This leaves them especially vulnerable. That is why the improvement of infrastructure (which will allow signing contacts with new partners) and solidarity mechanisms are so important for the Union security.

¹⁶ Eurostat (2017) URL: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Energy_production_and_imports [4-12-2017]

¹⁷ Pirani S., Stern J., Yafimava K. (2009) (PDF) The Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute of January 2009: a comprehensive assessment. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies URL: <https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:3e2ad362-0bec-478a-89c1-3974c79363b5> [22-11-2017]

7.1.5. Energy dependency




Figure 3: Energy dependence rate EU28(% of net imports in gross inland consumption and bunkers)¹⁸

Chart 3 shows how energy dependency of the whole Union changed over years. In spite of a decrease in import, dependency (which shows the extent to which an economy relies upon imports in order to meet its energy needs) has risen over the last years. It grew from 52% to 54%. Dependency on crude oil rose from 82% to 89%. On natural gas from 58% to almost 70%, and on the solid fuels rose from 39% to 42%. As it can be noticed, Union's dependency has risen, in spite of decreasing the absolute values of imports. It means that European primary energy production decreased faster than economy's needs.

7.2. Relations with exporters and transit countries

To ensure that the contracted supplies will not become the tool of diplomatic pressure on the Member States, maintaining good diplomatic relations with exporters and transit states¹⁹ is crucial.

7.2.1. Exporters

Unfortunately, European geographical position is not making bilateral talks with possible hydrocarbons exporters easy. The most resourceful lands in the EU neighbourhood lies in Norway's offshore area, in Russia, the Middle-East and North Africa. From those three possible

¹⁸ Eurostat (2017) URL: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Energy_production_and_imports [4-12-2017]

¹⁹ Czech. A (2015) (PDF) Współpraca Unii Europejskiej w zakresie bezpieczeństwa energetycznego z wybranymi państwami. Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Katowicach URL: http://yadda.icm.edu.pl/yadda/element/bwmeta1.element.desklight-d4140d71-7a04-462c-b15e-bf76222e91ad/c/02_31.pdf [5-12-2017]

business directions only Norway seems to be dependable and predictable partner. As we concern the Middle East and North Africa, the ongoing crisis which started with so-called Arab Spring, makes it currently impossible to create a dependable and secure way of importing resources. Russia, on the other hand, happens to be quite unpredictable as it is concerning its foreign affairs. Returning Russian imperialism happens to affect neighbouring countries (Georgia 2008, Ukraine 2007, 2009, 2014) and makes it highly reckless to give the Russian officials another tool of political pressure on Eastern and Central-Eastern Europe. A possible solution to this situation is diversification using gas and oil ports. This, however, requires new infrastructure which is under development but is not operational yet. By the time Member States finish those investments, it is required to proceed with caution and make energy business as usual.

7.2.2. Transit countries



Figure 4: Map of existing oil and gas pipelines connecting Europe and Russia as of 2006²⁰

The most important transit countries for the European Union are Belarus, Ukraine and Turkey. All of them are sources of potential risks connected to energy supply. Ukraine is now in a state of hybrid war with Russia, which means all tools of pressure may be used by Moscow on Ukraine. And the favourite threat of Russian officials is closing hydrocarbon pipelines coming through Ukrainian territory. There is also a matter of highly unstable political environment in this country and a big problem with corruption, which obvious falw of potential business partner. Belarus, on the other hand, is quite a stable country, however, due to its authoritarian system, there is not much cooperation between Belarus and

²⁰ <https://www.nationalgeographic.org/photo/europe-map/>

the European Union. Turkey which had been the most dependable partner in the Middle East region, in recent years drifts toward autocratic reigns of president Erdogan. This makes pipelines coming through Turkey excellent measure for Erdogan's policy towards EU.

As it can be seen European energy import environment is highly unstable. It is essential for the EU security to take any possible measures to decrease dependency on our neighbours.

7.3. Ongoing European Union's activities aiming to increase security of energy supply

7.3.1. Common energy market, development of international infrastructure

One of the most important goals of the Energetic Union is to create common, European market of energy, which would boost both competition on the market and security of supplies. The goal written in energy union package²¹ is to achieve 10% electricity interconnection by 2020. The member states (with exceptions Cyprus, Great Britain, Poland and Spain²²) are on track with this target. Another safety measure which all member States should apply is called N-1 rule for gas. This supply Regulation requires that, if the single largest gas infrastructure fails in one Member State, the capacity of the remaining infrastructure is able to satisfy total gas demand during a day of exceptionally high gas demand. All Member States (except Cyprus²³, Bulgaria²⁴ and Sweden²⁵) already comply with this requirement.

7.3.2. Increasing energetic efficiency²⁶

One of the pillars of the Energetic Union is to achieve 20% of energy savings (compared to predictions of primary energy consumption) by 2020. Such achievement will not only provide significant savings, and boost the competitiveness of Member States economies, but will also increase the level of energy security supply by decreasing needs of European industry. Following areas are main sources of savings:

²¹ Op. cit. European Commission (2015) Energy Union package.

²² Op.cit. European Commission (2017) (PDF) Third Report on the State of the Energy Union. Page 10

²³ European Commission (2017) (PDF) Energy Union Factsheet Cyprus https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/energy-union-factsheet-cyprus_en.pdf [5-12-2017]

²⁴ European Commission (2017) (PDF) Energy Union Factsheet Bulgaria https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/energy-union-factsheet-bulgaria_en.pdf [5-12.2017]

²⁵ European Commission (2017) (PDF) Energy Union Factsheet Sweden URL: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/energy-union-factsheet-sweden_en.pdf [5-12-2017]

²⁶ Homepage of European Parliament URL: http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/pl/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_5.7.3.html [3-12-2017]

- Cogeneration – increasing of this form of producing heat and electricity may bring primary energy savings even up to 30%
- Energetic characteristics of buildings - more than 75% of buildings in Europe is not constructed in energy- saving way. The goal is to every new building in EU after 2020 was near-zero emission construction
- Energy efficiency of products
- Smart Grids – electrical grids, which by monitoring of demand may flexibly adjust the supply of electricity²⁷
- Increasing the efficiency of solar and wind sources of energy by utilizing ongoing battery revolution²⁸

7.3.3. Increasing significance of renewable sources of energy

Increasing the share of energy coming from renewable sources of energy is one of the goals of the Energy Union package. This document states that the European Union should achieve 20% of gross inland consumption from those sources by 2020, and as the third report on the implementation of Energy Union states, EU is on track to meet this target.

The increase of production is achieved by:

- Implementation of new, renewable-friendly regulations
- Increasing spending on research and innovation
- Creating a stable investment framework
- Modernising power grids to be able to face new ways of dispersed generation²⁹

7.3.4. Development of new energy technologies

To become truly energy – independent, and thus energy secure Europe must find new ways of producing and using energy. That is why the strategy for innovation is one of the most important parts of common energy policy. The highest hopes are for:

- Electromobility – increasing fashion for electric and hybrid cars may lead to significant reduction in import of crude oil. Some of the analysts predict that by 2035 all new vehicles in Europe may be electric³⁰
- Biofuels and hydrogen fuels development – those are another possible sources of oil-free revolution in motorization
- Nuclear fusion research – in longer, strategical perspective nuclear fusion may provide nuclear energy without radioactive wastes.

²⁷ Op.cit. European Commission (2017) (PDF) Third list of PCIs

²⁸ Op.cit. ²⁸European Commission (2017) (PDF) Third Report on the State of the Energy Union. Page 16

²⁹ Op.cit. European Commission (2017) (PDF) Third Report on the State of the Energy Union. Page 9

³⁰ <https://independenttrader.pl/najwazniejsze-wydarzenia-minionych-tygodni-pazdziernik-2017.html> [8-12-2017]

There are few research centres across Europe looking for subduing this kind of energy³¹

8. Discussion of results and personal Conclusions

8.1. EU Challenges

The European Union faces the difficult task to increase its energy supply security. At this moment over 50% of the primary energy being used in EU is imported from non-member states. This means over 400 billion of Euro are every year paid to various exporters. The low diversification of business partners makes European Union vulnerable to the political pressure of mentioned countries. Countries which not necessarily share European views on egalitarian, democratic world. Lack of diversification and infrastructure connecting member states causes that wholesale electricity and gas prices are 30% and respectively over 100% higher than in the US.

8.2. EU Answers

Comprehensive approach to the subject of energy is starting to pay off. Decreased demand for primary energy results in savings and increased energy security supply. Along with further investments into cogeneration, smart grids, renewable energy, or electric transportation, European dependency on partners will steadily fall. Creating electric and gas interconnection between member states will provide the possibility to increase the diversity of suppliers and thus prices should drop and energy supply security should rise.

Another important advantage of renewable energy is its dispersed generation, making energy grids harder target for potential terrorist attacks.

8.3. Road toward security

Ten years ago European union must have done something in order to secure its future. Approach focused on diversification and non-conventional energy sources was a hazardous policy, however it seems to pay off. The Union is already importing less energy (in absolute numbers) and this trend is probably going to be kept, as we are witnessing a new industrial revolution, which has been once again triggered in Europe. Thousands of new patents made every year within Union border³² makes the future of European renewable energy model even brighter every year. The energy which can be produced, stored and sold by every household is an ultimate goal of energy supply security. And this goal may be achieved in the not-this-far future with a help of the European Energy Union.

³¹ European Commission (2006) Badania fuzji jądrowej. https://www.euro-fusion.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/fusion_research_polish.pdf [8-12-2017]

³² <http://www.epo.org/news-issues/technology/sustainable-technologies/clean-energy/europe.html>

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9.3.1. EU Documents

- Commission of the European Communities (2007) (PDF) Communication from the Commission to the European Council and the European Parliament- An energy policy for Europe
- European Commission (2006) (PDF) Badania fuzji jądrowej. https://www.euro-fusion.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/fusion_research_polish.pdf [8-12-2017]
- European Commission (2017) (PDF) Energy Union Factsheet Bulgaria
- European Commission (2017) (PDF) Energy Union Factsheet Cyprus
- European Commission (2017) (PDF) Energy Union Factsheet Sweden
- European Commission (2015) (PDF) Energy Union package.
- European Commission (2017) (PDF) Third Report on the State of the Energy Union.

9.3.2. Papers

- Pirani S., Stern J., Yafimava K. (2009) The Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute of January 2009: a comprehensive assessment. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies
- International Energy Agency (2006) (PDF). World Energy Outlook
- Czech. A (2015) (PDF) Współpraca unii Europejskiej w zakresie bezpieczeństwa energetycznego z wybranymi państwami. Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Katowicach

9.3.3. Interviews

- Tusk, D. (2014) A united Europe can end Russia's energy stranglehold. Financial Times as of 11-11-2017. Interview

9.3.4. Web pages

- Eurostat [statistics explained page](http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Main_Page)

- Homepage of European Parliament URL: http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/pl/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_5.7.3.html [3-12-2017]
- Homepage of European Patent Office <http://www.epo.org/news-issues/technology/sustainable-technologies/clean-energy/europe.html>
- Homepage of Eurostat <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat>
- Independent Trader <https://independenttrader.pl/najwazniejsze-wydarzenia-minionych-tygodni-pazdziernik-2017.html>
- The Balance; <https://www.thebalance.com/world-s-largest-economy-3306044> [8-12-2017]

9.3.5. Political programmes

- Juncker, J.C. (2014) (PDF) A new start for Europe: My agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change. Strasbourg Political Guidelines

9.4. Definitions

- Primary Energy is an energy form found in nature that has not been subjected to any human-engineered conversion or transformation process. It is energy contained in raw fuels, and other forms of energy received as input to a system.
- Gross inland energy consumption, sometimes abbreviated as gross inland consumption, is the total energy demand of a country or region. It represents the quantity of energy necessary to satisfy inland consumption of the geographical entity under consideration. Gross inland energy consumption covers:
 - o consumption by the energy sector itself;
 - o distribution and transformation losses;
 - o final energy consumption by end users

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**CYBERSPACE IN EUROPE: THE ASYMMETRIC BATTLEFIELD
OF THE FUTURE AND WHAT THE
EUROPEAN UNION CAN DO TO PROTECT ITS CITIZENS**

**Created for the CSDP Olympiad 2018
in Veliko Tarnovo, Bulgaria**

1. Abstract

The information technology of the 21st century underlies rapid changes in all perspectives. Possibilities and threats are evolving equally but completely independently. The characteristics that lead to the Internet's story of success – the interconnectivity, the quick developments, the accessibility – are now imposing threats on our systems. Public safety is no longer separable from cybersecurity. Hackers and cyber criminals target both governmental institutions and private internet users. The situation becomes problematic when the citizens do not have the proper knowledge to deal with the myriad risks online. Most online security measures are not

yet adapted well enough and do not take all facets into account. Therefore, the current state of research will be displayed and definitions for relevant terms will be given. Furthermore, this essay examines the aspects in need of improvement and transfers them to European policy making. The priorities of a European legislation will be pointed out and possible ways will be evaluated. In doing so, processes of public awareness campaigns will be focused on and discussed. Additionally, perspectives for European institutions for cybersecurity and military involvement are subject of the following chapters.

This essay was authored in context of the 4th CSDP Olympiad with the aim of fulfilling all necessary criteria and giving an overview of the state of European cybersecurity and related measures.

2. Preface

It was by the end of November that my friend and comrade, Maren Bestehorn, approached me and introduced me to this CSDP Olympiad project. Shortly afterwards, I received the official confirmation for my participation. Although I knew how difficult it would be to comply with the imminent filing date, the project fascinated me ab initio. Despite not studying political sciences I have always had a strong interest in politics, with an emphasis on defence and foreign policy. On account of this, my motivation for this essay was very high when I received the topic choice. Whilst all themes seemed very interesting there was one amongst them that arose my interest particularly. Cyberspace and cybersecurity are topics that are more urgent than ever and should not be ignored or underestimated in their importance. Being one of a billion internet users, this is a topic that affects me personally as well as approximately half of the world's population¹ every single day. Furthermore, it is probably the fastest evolving issue and underlies rapid and times drastic changes. Being the subject to myriad political debates worldwide, its influence on national developments and the future of international unions and alliances cannot be denied. Exceeding the capabilities of a single state, transnational cooperation and legislation are inevitable for protecting every citizen's privacy and maintaining both security and peace. Therefore, I will be focussing on the aspects of cybersecurity and cyberwar in the European context, evaluate the chances and threats and conclude consequences for future legislations. I am thankful for this chance provided by the European Security and Defence College to express my opinion on prominent issues and to discuss them with other young officers from all over Europe. Lastly, I want to

¹ Cf.: Portal for statistics. URL:
<https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/186370/umfrage/anzahl-der-weltweit-zeitreihe/> [2-12-17] internetnutzer-

acknowledge my comrade's assistance to the realisation of my project. Maren Bestehorn organised all the administrative tasks, gave me advice and helped me to comprehend the regulations and context of the project as quick as possible. Without her, my participation in this project and the timely finalisation of my essay would not have been possible.

3. Introduction

In our globalized world there are many opportunities as well as challenges we must face every day. An extremely complex and probably the most discussed topic nowadays is the cyberspace. Although online information growth can barely be put in numbers, the quick changes and increase in information cannot be denied. Social media gain more and more importance in our everyday life, we are confronted with several thousand advertising messages daily and non-cash payments tendentially exceed the traditional payment methods. Unfortunately, cyber-based threats are also evolving and increasing every second. Hacking, cyber-attacks and cyber war have become a core theme for discussions about national defence and international security. These attacks can come from a broad range of sources such as organized groups, criminals, hackers or intelligence services of other nations. For the European Union, the interconnectivity facilitates the international cooperation. Still, the threats of cyberspace demand for political debates and legislation. Due to the high impact of lacks in cyber security on states and organizations, a steady increase of military engagement can be registered in this domain. Almost every country has already started to develop a department specifically dedicated to cyber defence as well as online intelligence collection. About half of all countries worldwide have already developed cyber security strategies and in the UN's Global Cybersecurity Index 2017, the European region received the highest overall score.² This proves once again the effectiveness of the European Union and justifies its exemplary character. But is that enough? In a world full of developing technologies and interconnectivity there is no time for rest. Due to the IBM Marketing Cloud Study from 2016, 90% of the existing data have been collected in the 12 prior months.³ This points out how inconsistent the internet is and how important it is to continuously adapt to these changing factors. Therefore, a clear legislation is a core agreement for Europe are essential, still, they must be updated constantly. Complex tasks like this cannot be

² Cf.: ITU (2017). Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) 2017. International Telecommunication Union. Research Study

³ Cf.: IBM Homepage. URL:
<https://public.dhe.ibm.com/common/ssi/ecm/wr/en/wrl12345usen/watson-customer-engagement-watson-marketing-wr-other-papers-and-reports-wrl12345usen-20170719.pdf> [2-12-17]

accomplished by a single country. This leads us to pointing out what a tremendous advantage the European Union represents for its member states. However, the great challenge for us Europeans is to adopt the proper measures to establish a secure cyber space for Europe and for the entire world.

4. Current State of Research

“Cyber-attacks can be more dangerous to the stability of democracies and economies than guns and tanks. [...] Cyber-attacks know no borders and no one is immune.”⁴

This quote by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker in his State of the Union Address on 13 September 2017 expresses the cyber security awareness of the European Union and furthermore the complexity of this topic. It is naïve to believe it would be possible to completely understand cyberspace and comprehending the broad range of online threats. Still, it is inevitable to perpetually research on the topic, review concepts and adapt legislation to contemporary developments. Evaluating the current state of research, it is best to take a closer look at the EU’s publications about cybersecurity. They represent the most recent findings of the European Union as well as scheduled measures and future perspectives. In connection with the State of the Union 2017, the European Commission published several factsheets on the topic of cybersecurity. These factsheets summarize the current state of art, outline existing problems and suggest contemplable strategies. On the one hand, European citizens are aware of the benefits of cyberspace, on the other hand they are afraid of the evolving online threats. To put it in numbers, Europeans detect advantages of technological development for the economy (75%), the society in general (64%) and life quality (67%).⁵ Yet 89% believe in the increase of cyber security threats.⁶ This shows very clearly that not only politicians, but the people of Europe do indeed notice the processes and online trends. Already in 2013, 1 billion euros were gained by online shopping fraud and fraud without a present credit card increased by 1.5 billion euros.⁷ However, over 4,000 ransomware attacks daily⁸ against individuals and companies are not the only threats connected to the world wide web. Additionally, a twofold increase of cyber-attacks on governments has been registered from 2014 to 2015.⁹ This dramatic

⁴ Cf.: Juncker, Jean-Claude. (2017). Authorized Version of the State of the Union Address 2017

⁵ Cf.: European Commission. (2017). State of the Union 2017 Factsheet Cybersecurity

⁶ Cf.: European Commission. (2017). State of the Union 2017 Factsheet Cybersecurity

⁷ Cf.: European Commission. (2017). State of the Union 2017 Factsheet Cybersecurity – tackling non-cash payment fraud

⁸ Cf.: European Commission. (2017). State of the Union 2017 Factsheet Cybersecurity

⁹ Cf.: Leonard, M. (2017.) GCN Website. URL: <https://gcn.com/Articles/2017/05/08/cyber-attacks-government.aspx> [3-12-17]

development accentuates the importance of international legislation and cooperation. Therefore, the European Union plans to enhance its resilience to cyber-attacks and strengthening global stability through transnational cooperation.¹⁰ Furthermore, they list the creation of a clear and effective legislation as one of their core issues.¹¹ Moreover, the EU wants to draft a paper on quick response strategies for cyber-attacks.¹² The biggest step towards achieving these and more cyber goals, is probably the establishment of a European Union Cybersecurity Agency on the basis of the European Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA).¹³ Considering the means needed for implementing this agency, the European Commission suggests to increase the ENISA staff by 50% and doubling the budget within four years.¹⁴

ENISA resources	Now	Future
Staff	84 people	125 people
Budget	€11 million	€23 million
	gradual increase: starting with +5 million 1 st year and fully achieved 4 years after entry into force.	

Fig.1 European Commission’s proposal on how to reinforce the ENISA’s capacity to act
Source: European Commission. (2017). State of the Union 2017
Factsheet Cybersecurity – EU agency and certification framework

These measures are meant to improve Europe’s preparedness to react to cyber-attacks by introducing a pan-annual transnational exercise and by improving the member states’ information exchange with the help of activating Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs).¹⁵

5. Research Gap

Although Cyber Security is a widely discussed topic, nevertheless, there are still many deficiencies in the process of execution. Primarily, the lack of a clear, firm and internationally accepted legislation restricts the possibilities of committing to unequivocal rights and boundaries and for pioneering a reasonable prosecution worldwide. Besides laws against cyber criminality, many Europeans demand an updated legislation on privacy in our globalised world. The initiative “Charta of digital fundamental rights of the European Union” by the German Zeit-Stiftung

¹⁰ Cf.: European Commission. (2017). State of the Union 2017 Factsheet Cybersecurity

¹¹ Cf.: European Commission. (2017). State of the Union 2017 Factsheet Cybersecurity

¹² Cf.: European Commission. (2017). State of the Union 2017 Factsheet Cybersecurity

¹³ Cf.: European Commission. (2017). State of the Union 2017 Factsheet Cybersecurity

¹⁴ Cf.: European Commission. (2017). State of the Union 2017 Factsheet Cybersecurity – EU agency and certification framework

¹⁵ Cf.: European Commission. (2017). State of the Union 2017 Factsheet Cybersecurity – EU agency and certification framework

2016 went even further by presenting a complete legislative text to be added to the original Charta of fundamental rights.¹⁶ Furthermore, an all-embrasive awareness concept needs to be created to protect the privacy of citizens of all classes and ages. Nonetheless many experts, as for instance Joachim Gauck, former federal president of Germany and now patron of the DIVSI, stated correctly, most information collected on the internet are not illegally accumulated in a “1984-manner” but submitted to the worldwide web autonomously and voluntarily by the individuals themselves.¹⁷ That illustrates perfectly how urgent a transnational information campaign is needed. Moreover, EU proposal to create a European Cybersecurity Agency for better cooperation and information collection is a great step forward to a more secure European cyberspace. Still, concrete measures are not yet taken, so a detailed implementation plan needs to be introduced. This is essential to maintain a secure cyberspace for Europe and for developing an effective unit against cyberwarfare.

6. Research Questions

By outlining the points above, several critical issues emerged from the whole context. Firstly, what can be done to raise the awareness of the citizens for cyber security threats and the protection of their privacy? In this context it is fundamental to concretise which steps the EU must take for maintaining a safe European cyberspace. What are the characteristics of these threats and how can the definition help with achieving proper understanding? Furthermore, it should be assessed to what extend European strategies can be applied worldwide and how the European Union can support allies with its discoveries and which role European armies play in this context.

7. Methodology

This essay was written to fulfil the requirements of the CSDP Olympiad programme. Therefore, the “Regulation on how to author & evaluate Essays”¹⁸ was the main guideline for the creation of the essay and its formal structure. After choosing one of the ten topics a basic framework was compiled. With the help of the online search engines “GoogleScholar” and “PsychInfo” scientific articles were trawled for reducing the contemplable subitems to a convenient amount. Moreover, official

¹⁶ ZEIT-Stiftung Ebelin und Gerd Bucerius (2016). Charta of digital fundamental rights of the European Union

¹⁷ Gauck, J. (2017). Gauck’s speech at his inauguration in Berlin. Hamburg. DIVSI. DISVI Magazine. Volume No. 10/2017

¹⁸ Cf.: Colonel Dr. Gell, H. (2015). Common Module CSDO Olympiad – Regulation on how to author & evaluate Essays. ESDC

websites of the European Union and its sub-organisations were consulted to ensure to display their correct viewpoint. The essay starts by describing the current situation. Future perspectives are examined, supported by scientific findings and put in a bigger context. The transfer of ideas and concepts is made in order to find possible ways to act in the future.

8. Research and the result of Research

8.1 Wording and definitions

In every debate it is necessary to clarify the meaning of the utilized terms and phrases to prevent misunderstandings. In the following section several definitions will be presented for ensuring the unambiguity of this essay. Craigen et al. introduced the following definition of cybersecurity in 2014:

“Cybersecurity is the organization and collection of resources, processes, and structures used to protect cyberspace and cyberspace-enabled systems from occurrences that misalign de jure from de facto property rights.”¹⁹

This definition points out several important aspects. Firstly, it emphasises the multiple interconnected dimensions of cybersecurity bearing in mind the rapidly changing conditions. The aspect of protection and the concept of cyberspace itself are also incorporated. Neither the predictable nor the unpredictable threats to cybersecurity remain unmentioned. Lastly, not only cyber-attacks, but also violation of property rights, as for instance plagiarism, are included in this definition. When discussing cybersecurity threats in an international context, the term cyberwar is of significant importance. The RAND corporation, a US-American non-profit institution who was one of the first to mention this expression already in 1993²⁰, defines cyberwarfare in the following way: *“Cyber warfare involves the actions by a nation-state or international organization to attack and attempt to damage another nation's computers or information networks through, for example, computer viruses or denial-of-service attacks.”²¹*

Combined with an older definition from Janczewski & Colatik's paper “Cyber warfare and Cyber Terrorism” it generates an overall picture:

“Information warfare is defined as a planned attack by nations or their agents against information and computer systems, computer programs, and data that result in enemy losses.”²²

¹⁹ Cf.: Craigen, D., Diakun-Thibault, N., & Purse, R. 2014. Defining Cybersecurity. Technology Innovation Management Review, 4(10): 13-21

²⁰ Cf.: Encyclopaedia Britannica website. URL: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/cyberwar> [5-12-17]

²¹ Cf.: RAND Corporation. RAND website. URL: <https://www.rand.org/topics/cyber-warfare.html> [5-12-17]

²² Cf.: Janczewski, L. & Colatik, A. (2008). Cyber warfare and Cyber Terrorism. IGI Global

Cyberwar needs to be enforced by a country or international organisation. If it comes from smaller groups or non-governmental organisations it is rather referred to as cyber terrorism. There is one more definition necessary for this essay. David L. Buffalo, a commander and Captain in the US Army defined the term as following:

“Asymmetric warfare is population-centric nontraditional warfare waged between a militarily superior power and one or more inferior powers which encompasses all the following aspects: evaluating and defeating asymmetric threat, conducting asymmetric operations, understanding cultural asymmetry and evaluating asymmetric cost.”²³

In contrast to traditional warfare it does not focus on a specific group of enemies or on territory. The countries of origin and the target do not necessarily have a common law or the same constitutional background. Furthermore, the efforts of the aggressor are often significantly lower as the ones of the defender.

8.2 Threats to Cybersecurity

When talking about cybersecurity threats it is important to specify which groups or actions are included in this term. According to E. Fischer, people causing cyber threats can be divided into the five following groups.²⁴ Firstly, he mentions the term *“criminals”*, which refers to people pursuing monetary incentives by committing crimes such as theft (for instance of data or intellectual property), online fraud or extortion. Next he introduces *‘spies’* who are defined by stealing classified or other secret documents or data from governments or other corporal bodies. Furthermore, *“nation-state warriors”* are described as entities undertaking cyberattacks for the profit of their own country and its (strategic) interests. Moreover, *“hacktivists”* are referred to as having no interest in financial incentives but usually acting from conviction. Lastly, Fischer lists *‘terrorists’* who use cyberattacks for warfare and can be sponsored by states or private entities.²⁵

8.3 Public Awareness

Since the diversity of cyber threats and threat sources is extremely large, it is important to take a closer look at how evident they are for citizens. In a survey of the Chapman University in 2015 about the top ten fears of Americans, 3 out of 10 belonged to the category cyber threats, while three more could be, at least in parts, linked to it.²⁶ A LogRhythm

²³ Cf.: Buffalo, D. (2006). Defining Asymmetric Warfare. Arlington. The Institute of Land Warfare. The Land Warfare Papers. Volume 58. No. 9/2006

²⁴ Cf.: Fischer, E. (2016). Cybersecurity Issues and Challenges in Brief. Congressional Research Services

²⁵ Cf.: Fischer, E. (2016). Cybersecurity Issues and Challenges in Brief. Congressional Research Services

²⁶ Cf.: Chapman University website. (2015) URL: <https://blogs.chapman.edu/news-and-stories/2015/10/14/what-do-americans-fear/> [5-12-17]

report from 2016 showed that Germany, France and the United Kingdom all score in the top ten of countries likely being subjects of cyberattacks.²⁷ Interestingly, most of these ten countries have a high living standard and major influence in worldwide politics. An interesting comparison of cyber threat awareness and knowledge about counter-measurements was made by Yugandhar Gopisetty at Umea University in 2016. While most people are aware of diverse online threats, the majority does not know what measures they can take to prevent attacks.²⁸




Fig.2 Threat awareness sorted by different threats²⁹




Fig. 3 Knowledge of countermeasures on different threats.³⁰

²⁷ Cf.: Logrhythm website. (2016.) URL: <https://logrhythm.com/blog/7-significant-insights-from-the-cyberedge-cyberthreat-defense-report/> [5-12-17]

²⁸ Cf.: Gopisetty, Y. (2016). A study of online users' cyber threat awareness and their use of threat countermeasures. Umea. Umea University

²⁹ Cf.: Gopisetty, Y. (2016). A study of online users' cyber threat awareness and their use of threat countermeasures. Umea. Umea University

³⁰ Cf.: Gopisetty, Y. (2016). A study of online users' cyber threat awareness and their use of threat countermeasures. Umea. Umea University

Although over two billion people currently have a Facebook account,³¹ Facebook and other Social Media are the major issues of people's online security concerns.³²

8.4 Measures of the European Union

The European Union already took a lot of measures for securing the European cyberspace. They can easily be tracked by the help of the European Union factsheets. In their 2013 Cybersecurity Strategy, they defined a fortified cyber resilience, a sharply declining cybercrime rate, enhanced cyber security policy and CSDP potential, advancement in industrial and technological resources and a collective European cyber policy as their core requirements.³³ Two years later they added a new focus on the legislation of specific issues (for instance combating child sexual exploitation), the incorporation of non-cash payment fraud in legal text, removing barriers for immediate investigations and enhancing cyber capacity development with the help of external support to their agenda (2015-2020).³⁴ Furthermore, they developed a Single Market Strategy for innovation, technical priorities and joint cooperation, which will be funded with 450 million euros until 2020.³⁵ In addition, the EU advocated joint cyber security exercises, support of the single market and the establishment of a public-private partnership with the industry with the aim of improving cyber security through innovation.³⁶ The publication of several cybersecurity related directives supporting cooperation and threat awareness as well as guidelines for legislations against different forms of cybercrime were also part of the transformation.³⁷ The introduction of the ENISA plus its planned transfiguration to the European Union Cybersecurity Agency pave the way for conceivable responsibilities and an organised work field for effective developments.³⁸ With the EU Computer Emergency Response Team and Europol's Cybercrime Centre, the EU has created two more initiatives for rapidly reacting to and permanently defeating cyber threats.³⁹ Furthermore, the European Union has invested and will until 2020 invest over €1 billion into research, innovation and infrastructure programmes. On top of that, the European Union has

³¹ Statista website. (2017). U

³² Cf.: Deloitte website (2015). URL:
<https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/consumer-business/deloitte-uk-consumer-review-nov-2015.pdf>

³³ Cf.: European Commission. (2017). EU Cybersecurity Initiatives Factsheet.

³⁴ Cf.: European Commission. (2017). EU Cybersecurity Initiatives Factsheet.

³⁵ Cf.: European Commission. (2017). EU Cybersecurity Initiatives Factsheet.

³⁶ Cf.: European Commission. (2017). EU Cybersecurity Initiatives Factsheet.

³⁷ Cf.: European Commission. (2017). EU Cybersecurity Initiatives Factsheet.

³⁸ Cf.: European Commission. (2017). EU Cybersecurity Initiatives Factsheet.

³⁹ Cf.: European Commission. (2017). EU Cybersecurity Initiatives Factsheet.

introduced the European Cyber Security Month in 2012, which annually takes place in October, is meant to raise cybersecurity awareness and features public events, activities and informative lectures broadly supported by myriad companies and experts.⁴⁰

9 Discussion

9.1 Discussion of results

“To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill”⁴¹ – Sun Tzu, ~ 500 B.C.

The foregoing quote by Chinese military strategist and philosopher Sun Tzu is more relevant than ever in our globalised world. The reason might be, that cyber-attacks and cyberwar are the emerging methods of aggression in the 21st century. According to a study at Umea University, over 70% of the internet users say that they are aware of the different cyber threats, even though they have little knowledge of counter measures against these dangers.⁴² In a survey conducted by Pew Research Center, 66% of the people stated they had photos of themselves online, a smaller percentage even published personal data as for instance email addresses (46%), mobile phone numbers (24%) or even their home addresses (30%).⁴³ Furthermore, 86% of the respondents declared they had tried to reduce their personal information on the internet.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ Cf.: European Cyber Security Month Website. URL: <https://cybersecuritymonth.eu/about-ecsm/whats-ecsm> [6-12-17]

⁴¹ Tzu, S. (~ 500 B.C.). The Art of War

⁴² Cf.: Gopisetty, Y. (2016). A study of online users' cyber threat awareness and their use of threat countermeasures. Umea. Umea University

⁴³ Pew Research Center Website. (2013). URL: <http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/09/05/anonymity-privacy-and-security-online/> [6-12-17]

⁴⁴ Pew Research Center Website. (2013). URL: <http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/09/05/anonymity-privacy-and-security-online/> [6-12-17]




Fig. 4 Shared information online with percentage

Unfortunately, many people do not understand the problematic nature of this mentality. Deleting information from one's profile or website does not necessarily delete it from the internet. From this point one can proceed to develop a possible awareness strategy. Although many citizens are afraid of being monitored by their government or intelligence agency, it is them who submit their own data to the cyberspace unprotected.⁴⁵ How can the people's awareness be raised? EU Campaigns like the European Cyber Security Month are great initiatives for educating Europeans about threats and protection. Unfortunately, many people do not know about this project, especially those who do not do research on this topic. The question is now, how can they be reached? The most obvious way would be through social media. There is no easier and less expensive channel to reach this target group. Moreover, it is important to propagate current EU projects and online security information at universities, schools and eligible workplaces. When young adults are sensitised early enough, it could decrease the amount of compromised information online. At schools the idea could be expanded to introducing 'awareness days' where relevant issues can be discussed and developed through project work, which might even result in entries for possible open contests. Furthermore, the EU could publish guidelines for schools proposing themes and activities as well as recommending related literature that could be discussed (for instance the dystopian novel "The circle"⁴⁶). Besides that, the EU needs

⁴⁵ Gauck, J. (2017). Gauck's speech at his inauguration in Berlin. Hamburg. DIVSI. DISVI Magazine. Volume No. 10/2017

⁴⁶ Eggers, D. (2013). The Circle. London. Penguin Books.

to work on a binding legislation, at least for Europe. For now, there are many directives but no clear law. Cyberthreats must clearly be communicated as the asymmetric threat that they are. Regarding the definitions given above, (8.1) the conformity is distinct. A clear wording might help the citizens realise how urgent and serious the problem is. In the process of legislation, all possible acts of cyber criminality must be included. The principle of territoriality is of great importance for exact legislation and needs to be adapted to its new environment of information technology. For implementing these measures, the advancement of the ENISA, possibly to the 'European Cyber Security Agency', is necessary. Currently, it lacks financial resources, the autonomous ability to act, influence in the legislation process and it needs more personnel. This agency could have the responsibility to constantly research on the rapidly changing field of concern, as well as the evolving threats and perpetually submit amendments for cybersecurity laws and EU measures. Regarding military defence against cyberwar and cyberterrorism, it is important to support the cyber specialist forces that are being developed in European armies. The relevance of a 'European Army' should again be discussed in this light. International cooperation is of immense importance in this matter and a joint European military cyber defence force would not only save resources of the member countries but also portray an exemplary model for the rest of the world. In addition, transboundary exercises like the "Cyber Europe"⁴⁷ must be expanded in number and complexity.

9.2 Conclusion

The European Union still has many challenges to face in the rapidly changing age of information technology. A key for improving the people's awareness of cyberthreats are more visible public campaigns and an early education of prevention. The need of an unequivocal legislation and a reliable institution are essential. Besides that, European military cooperation must be intensified and optimised. It is time for Europe to pave the way for a more secure cyberspace worldwide.

10 Appendix

10.1 Abbreviations

CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CSIRT	Computer Security Incident Response Teams
DIVSI	Deutsches Institut für Vertrauen und Sicherheit im Internet (German Institute for Trust and Security on the Internet)
ENISA	European Network and Information Security Agency
EU	European Union

⁴⁷ ENISA website. URL: <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/cyber-exercises/cyber-europe-programme> [6-12-17]

GCI	Global Cybersecurity Index
IBM	International Business Machines
RAND	Research and Development
UN	United Nations
URL	Uniform Resource Locator
US	United States

10.2 Figures

Fig. 1	European Commission's proposal on how to reinforce the ENISA's capacity to act
Fig. 2	Threat awareness sorted by different threats
Fig. 3	Knowledge of countermeasures on different threats
Fig. 4	Shared information online with percentage

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THE ROLE OF CSDP IN BORDER PROTECTION

Created for the CSDP Olympiad 2018
in Veliko Tarnovo – Bulgaria

1. Abstract

The European Union (EU) is able to utilise the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in order to be a forerunner in peace keeping operations, conflict prevention, and the strengthening of international security. This is a key aspect of the Union's ability to manage crises through civilian and military cooperation.

The precursor to the CSDP was the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which was founded in 1998 after the Franco-British meeting in St. Malo. The next step in the evolution of the CSDP was the Treaty of Lisbon. Entering into force in 2009, it established the post of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission (HR/VP). Another innovation was the extension of the Petersberg tasks, which lists the military and security

priorities of the Union. The EU Global Strategy of 2016 gives new momentum to the Common Security and Defence Policy. Defence and Security has become a priority for implementation in this strategy.

The first step to a common border regulation was taken in 1985 in Schengen. Belgium, France, Western Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands decided to dismantle their external borders. Agreements and rules according to Schengen are called Schengen Acquis. They rule legal border crossings, the money reallocation, the development of central data banks, and the regulations for illegal immigration. Therefore, one year ago, the FRONTEX successor, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCG) was launched. The European Commission-led EBCG was reinforced and has now more capabilities to support countries with an external border.

The new EU border doctrine is to use all available sources to protect the border. Therefore, they will also consult the military component. The tasks of these CSDP missions and operations are, among others, to strengthen local security institutions by making them modern and accountable. This is to get a safer environment and to prepare favourable conditions to return migrants back to their home countries. Those measures will reduce the pressure of illegal migration. In the future, similar operations will be launched.

2. Preface

The author has always been interested in military structures and procedures. As an Officer Cadet at the Theresan Military Academy, he gets the possibility to study how national and international military business works. To intensify that knowledge, this essay was written.

Since the end of World War Two, many things have changed. A big amount of international organisations, such as the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were founded. In these years, the basics for the European Union were also built. In 1951, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was founded. This was the beginning of the most successful peace project in the European area ever. Back then, it was hard to imagine how far the European approach would go by 2017. The Treaty of Maastricht and the subsequent bilateral meeting in Saint Malo in 1998 were the beginning of a stronger military cooperation. The main goal of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which is an integral part of the European foreign policy, is to establish a common security and defence capability under the control of the European Commission (EC). One of the lessons learned from the 2015 migrant crisis was that in border protection every resource has to be used. Since then,

operations have been launched in order to diminish the quantity of migrants.

To this occasion I would like to thank Col Assoc. Prof. Dr. Harald Gell and Mag. Christian Thuller for their excellent support in authoring this essay.

3. Introduction

In 2015 about 1.3 million asylum seekers completed an asylum application in the EU.¹ This was an amount never before experienced. The European Union did neither have the number of authorities, opportunities, nor the necessary resources to protect their borders and to control each refugee or migrant. Refugees from all over the world, mainly from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan came uncontrolled over the border, along with terrorists, illegal weapons, and criminals. Two years later, the impact is immense because terror attacks have increased significantly. To prevent this in the future, the European Union and their Member States have searched for solutions involving better and more efficient border security management. But in 1952, when the precursor organisation of the EU was founded, nobody could imagine the problems which the grandchildren of the founders would face.²

The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was the first supranational organisation ever and ruled the coal and steel trade. The foundation states of this community were Belgium, Western Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The ECSC transitioned into The European Economic Community (EEC), which was founded with the Rome Treaty in 1957. This was the beginning of a Common European Market.³

The first enlargement started in 1973, when the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark joined the Community. Six years later, the first members of the European Parliament were elected directly. The Single European Act provided the basis for an enormous six-year program, which aimed to create the single market. This was completed in 1993 with the four freedoms: movement of goods, services, people, and money. In the 1990ies, two big treaties were signed, the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union and the Amsterdam Treaty. These two treaties explained initially how Europeans can act together when it comes to security and defence matters.⁴

¹ Cf.: Homepage of EUROSTAT. Page Asylum Statistics. URL.: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics. [21-11-17].

² Cf.: Homepage of the European Union. Page EU History. URL.: https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history_en. [21-11-17].

³ Cf.: Ibid.

⁴ Cf.: Ibid.

By generating the Schengen Area, a new milestone for the European integration was set, because people are allowed to cross the border without passport checks. In 2004, no fewer than 10 new countries, most of them former Eastern Bloc countries, joined the EU and healed their political divisions after nearly 50 years of separation. The first CSDP mission was launched in 2003, which was a police mission in Bosnia. The Treaty of Lisbon, which gave the EU new institutions and created the position of the HR/VP, entered into force in 2009. Since then, the Common Security and Defence Policy has received more and more international attention.

The refugee crisis in 2015 showed that the European Union was not yet capable enough to prevent such challenges. After that, a lessons-learned process began. The main problems were the failed civil-military cooperation, the missing solidarity between the Member States, and a lack of rights. To prevent this in the future, the European Union generated several improvements, for example the new global strategy and in launching the new European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCG).

The CSDP was not always successful in the past. How the CSDP evolved will be explained in the following chapters.

4. Current State of Research

In this chapter, the author's aim is to give a small overview of the present status of documents and information. The most important and currently in-effect treaties, agreements, and documents are shown and explained.

4.1 The Treaty of Lisbon (2007/2009)

The Treaty of Lisbon is also known as the Reform Treaty. The most prominent change was the move from quality-majority voting to a new variety. Another significant change was the implementation of the post of the HR/VP. This person is responsible for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) within the Council.⁵

4.2 The EU Global Strategy (GS) 2016

The GS was like a springboard for a stronger partnership between the Member States in security and defence matters. Its major alterations were to invent a command for EU military training and advisory missions, a coordinated annual review of national defence budgets, and the enhanced cooperation on defence and security with NATO and all other partners.⁶

⁵ Cf.: Homepage of the Treaty of Lisbon. Page General. URL.: <http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty.html>. [22-11-17].

⁶ Cf.: Homepage of the European Union. Page global strategy 2016. URL.: <http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/global-strategy-foreign-and-security-policy-european-union>. [22-11-17].

4.3 Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) 2017

In the recently signed Permanent Structured Cooperation, 23 of the 28 Member States took part. The four Member States Denmark, Ireland, Portugal, Malta, and the still EU Member United Kingdom, did not join this cooperation for higher engagement in Common Security and Defence Affairs. The sovereignty of their armies will stay in national business, but there will be a stronger cooperation through the HR/VP, the European Defence Agency (EDA), the European Military Staff (EUMS), the European External Action Service (EEAS), and the European Military Committee (EUMC). PESCO takes many measures toward the integration into a common security policy. The most important measures are an enhancement of the defence budgetary, the implementation of joint armaments projects, better cooperation in cyber defence, providing logistic elements for the EU battle groups, and the generation of a joint armament market.⁷

5. Research Gap

About the chosen topic many articles, documents, and scientific theses were created. Within the following pages, the author will mention the most important treaties and agreements relating to the European Union. The essay divides the topic, the role of the CSDP and border protection into three parts. The first part relegates to the evolution of the CSDP, its meaning and its importance for the European Union. The second part highlights an understanding of the EU and a common border protection. After this, the process to a common border area will also be shown. The third part explains the CSDP mission according to border protection and the link between border protection and CSDP. This amount of information in the format of an essay has never been written before; this will fill the essay's research gap.

6. Research Question

The main part of the essay is to link the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union with its border protection. Because of that, the following question is created as the main one:

What is the role of CSDP in border protection?

Before responding to this main part of the essay, the author will give an answer to some basic questions. These ones are necessary to explain the reader some fundamental terms for a better understanding.

Sub-question number 1: What is the Common Security and Defence Policy?

⁷ Cf.: Homepage of the European External Action Service. Page PESCO Factsheet. URL.: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/pesco_factsheet_14-11-2017_.pdf. [28-11-17].

Sub-question number 2: What does the EU understand under border protection?

Sub-question number 3: Are there any CSDP-led operations related to border protection?

7. Methodology

The author follows with his research a methodology according to the following sketch.




Figure 1: Flowchart of hermeneutical approach on role of CSDP in border protection.⁸

After creating the main question, the author acquired his knowledge by reading topic related books in the library of the Theresan Military Academy. An intensive source study brought him to relevant homepages. Then it was clear that there had to be three sub-questions for a better understanding of the topic. After answering the sub-questions, the requirements were completed towards answering the main question.

⁸ Figure created by the author.

8. Research and Results of Research

This chapter deals with the answering of the sub-questions 1 to 3 and enters in the response to the main question at the end.

8.1 Common Security and Defence Policy

The predecessor of the Common Security and Defence Policy, the European Security and Defence Policy, was created after a bilateral meeting of France and the United Kingdom in 1998 in St. Malo, France.⁹ After the Treaty of Lisbon came into force, the ESDP was renamed into CSDP. In Helsinki, the European Council underlined the basic principles of a European autonomous security and defence policy, which has been valid since December 1999. It aims at the military and non-military crisis management capability, based on the principles of the United Nations Charter and the autonomous legal power to launch EU-led operations responding to international conflicts.¹⁰

Four years after the Helsinki Meeting, which introduced the Headline Goal 2003, the first ESDP mission - the EU police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina - started. In December of the same year, the European Union presented its first ever Security Strategy, outlining key threats and challenges which could face Europe.¹¹

Another milestone in the evolution of CSDP is the Treaty of Lisbon, which was signed in December 2007 and entered into force on 1 December 2009. This treaty not only empowered the European Parliament, it also established the post of the HR/VP. Since 2014, this post has been occupied by Federica Mogherini. This was done in order to combine the posts of both, the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Commissioner for External Relations, which brought great changes to the CSDP. The Treaty of Lisbon further endorsed the extensions of the Petersberg tasks, which now include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making, post conflict stabilisation, and support for third countries in combating terrorism. This extension of the Petersberg tasks are now ingrained in the Treaty of the European Union and the Treaty of the functioning of the European Union, to rule the political and military solidarity among the EU Member States.¹²

⁹ Cf.: Merlinger, M. (2012). EU Security Policy. What it is, How it works, Why it matters. London. Boulder. P. 33.

¹⁰ Cf.: Rehl, J. & Glume G. (2015). Handbook Missions and Operations. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. Vienna. Armed Forces Printing Centre. P. 14.

¹¹ Cf.: Rehl, J. (2017). Handbook CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. Vienna. Armed Forces Printing Centre. Volume 1. 3rd edition. P. 18.

¹² Cf.: Ibid. P. 18.

Since the EU Global Strategy of 2016 has been published, a new momentum was given to the Common Security and Defence Policy. Therefore, defence and security has become a priority for the implementation in the EU global strategy.

On the top of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as well the CSDP stands the HR/VP. She is responsible for the development of those policies. Further she leads the EEAS and thus the delegations in the third countries and international organisations. The HR/VP also has responsibilities regarding to the three European Agencies settled in the CFSP and CSDP.¹³ At the Helsinki council in 1999 these three new instruments for the institutionalisation of the ESDP were built up. These instruments and committees are called Political and Security Committee (PSC), the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS).¹⁴

The PSC is a preparatory body for the Council of the EU. Its main task is keeping track of the international situation and to compile new strategies within the CFSP and CSDP. The EUMC consists of the Chiefs of Defence (ChoDs) of the Member States, who meet each other at least twice a year. Its task is to provide advice and recommendations on all military matters for the PSC. The EUMS is working under the guidelines of the EUMC. It coordinates the military instruments with the focus on missions and operations and the creation of the military potential. Therefore it is an integral part of the EEAS's Integrated Approach.¹⁵

To conclude, CSDP was created as ESDP in 1998 after the Franco-British meeting in Saint Malo. One year later, the EU Council meeting adopted the Headline goals of ESDP, which contains the capability to launch EU-led operations. In 2003 the first Security Strategy of the EU was realised and the first EU-led mission started. The Treaty of Lisbon brought many changes. In 2007, the most important one was the establishment of the post of the HR/VP. Also the assistance obligation was invented, which forced the Member States to support attacked members. The third big change for CSDP was the extension of the Petersberg tasks and the renaming from ESDP to CSDP. In the new global strategy of 2016 Security and Defence has become a priority. The European External Action Service defines CSDP as:

"The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) enable the Union to take a leading role in peace-keeping operations, conflict prevention and in the strengthening of the international security. It is an integral part of the EU's

¹³ Cf.: Bampenko, I. (2016). History and future of CSDP with special consideration onto EU missions and operations. Theresan Military Academy Wiener Neustadt. Bachelor Thesis. P. 27.

¹⁴ Cf.: Ibid.

¹⁵ Cf.: Homepage of the European External Action Service. Page of the CSDP structure, instruments, and agencies. URL.: https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5392/csdp-structure-instruments-and-agencies_en. [1-11-17].

comprehensive approach towards crisis management, drawing on civilian and military assets.”¹⁶

8.2 The EU Understanding of Border Protection

One of the first steps to a common border protection was taken on the 14 June 1985 in Schengen, Luxembourg. Effective in 1995, the five countries Belgium, France, Western Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands decided to dismantle their mutual borders. An abnormality of the Schengen Agreement is that it was signed independently of the European Union, because in this time the EU has not the jurisdiction to abolish border controls.¹⁷

26 countries take part in the Schengen Area currently; not all of them are also EU members. Agreements and rules related to Schengen are called Schengen acquis and are grounded in the Treaty of Amsterdam. You can divide those agreements and rules into five categories.

The first one is the Schengen Border Code, which regulates the external border crossings and gives the conditions affected to the reintroduction of border controls. The second one rules the money reallocation between the Member States, because not every state has an external border but everyone has to pay the same for border protection. The third measure relates to the development of centralised data bases in terms of migration and border management which are the Schengen Information System (SIS), the Visa Information System (VIS), and Eurodac. The SIS is used as an information exchange platform supporting the border control and other security tasks of police and judicial cooperation. The VIS is a network connected to all visa issuing consulates; therefore it provides a common visa policy and consular communication. Eurodac is the European fingerprint database for asylum seekers and guarantees the proper implementation of the Dublin Regulation. The fourth category is known as the Facilitators Package, which was established to prevent and to punish unauthorised entry, transit, and residence. The fifth area includes measures for the operative cooperation in the area of border protection. They are organised by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency which is the successor organisation of FRONTEX with extended tasks.¹⁸

In 2005 FRONTEX was founded and given the task to coordinate border control efforts. The limitations, such as relying on the voluntary collaboration by Member States as providing resources and the lack of own

¹⁶ Homepage of the European External Action Service. Page CSDP. URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/431/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp_en. [1-11-17].

¹⁷ Cf.: Homepage of the European Parliament. Page Fact Sheet on the European Union. URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_5.12.4.html. [1-11-17].

¹⁸ Cf.: Ibid.

operational staff, led to the inefficiency during the migrant crisis. As a reaction of this event the European Council supported the proposal of the European Parliament for giving the agency more power. After nearly one year, the European Border and Coastguard Agency was launched on 6 October 2016 at the Bulgarian external border with Turkey.¹⁹

The main tasks of EBCG are :

- to monitor migratory flows,
- to carry out risk analysis,
- to monitor the management of the external borders of the EU,
- to provide operational, and technical assistance to Member States.
- to support search and rescue operations
- to play an enhanced role in returns of third-country nationals who do not have the right to stay in the EU territory, and
- to support-together with other EU agencies-national authorities of the coast guard functions.²⁰

Another new right of the Council is the possibility of launching emergency interventions of EBCG without the request of the Member States. This is only taken as a last resort in the case that a Member State fails to fulfil the recommended measures by the Executive Director. The EBCG will be able to intervene in the Schengen area and in all EU Member States.²¹

8.3 CSDP Missions related to Border Protection

Since the failure of the European Countries in the case of the migrant crisis in 2015 many questions related to preventing another flop popped up. The European response was to mobilise and use all disposable policies and instruments. For this reason, also the military aspects got more and more attention and with that the relation between CSDP and border protection.

One of the most known missions is EUNAVFOR MED (European Union Naval Force Mediterranean) Operation Sophia. The main task of this operation is to help, identify, and depose shipwrecked migrants. It builds a knowledge base and brings experience before starting more demanding and additional missions. With the Council's decision (CFSP) 2016/993 of 20 June 2016 two supporting tasks were added. Now the operation trains the Libyan Coastguard and Navy and is responsible to enforce the implementation of the United Nations arms embargo on the high seas in front of the coast of Libya. These additional tasks are aimed at capacity

¹⁹ Cf.: Homepage of the European Commission. Page Press. URL.: https://ec.europa.eu/germany/news/europ%C3%A4ische-agentur-f%C3%BCr-die-grenz-und-k%C3%BCstenwache-nimmt-ihre-arbeit-auf_de. [9-11-17].

²⁰ Cf.: Homepage of the European Commission. Page Press. URL.: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-3308_en.htm. [13-11-17].

²¹ Cf.: Ibid.

building and to prevent various armed groups from setting up and to spread terror and instability. It was the involvement of the military domains' contribution from short-term managerial tasks, like helping shipwrecked migrants to, mid-term substantive ones.²²

On the other hand, the European training missions in the Central African Republic, Mali, and Somalia continue to work. The task of these missions is to strengthen the local security institutions by making them modern and accountable. These missions become a key player in providing a safer environment and to prepare favourable conditions to return to these countries. If successful, this will remove some pressure that lies behind illegal migration.²³

The Global Strategy takes a justified main effort in CSDP. The new possibilities that will strengthen the European Union will be used very soon. The migrant crisis showed that CSDP missions come closer and closer to the European borders. Therefore, a deepened military connection between the Member States will give the Union a stronger and more effective instrument to prevent future crises and to protect the European freedom.²⁴

8.4 The Role of CSDP in Relation to Border Protection

According to the three sub-questions, the author is now able to answer the main question. Until now, the CSDP has played a minor role in protecting the external borders. This will be changed in the next few years. The events which triggered the impetus to speed-up the development of the CSDP were the migrant crisis, the disbanding of the United Kingdom from the EU, and the America first policy of Donald Trump. Since the Global Strategy of 2016 and PESCO, the CSDP has more rights, capabilities and plans to improve border protection. The main roles of the CSDP are to improve the Civil and Military Cooperation, providing a secure environment, and political stability at the southern borders as well as in Northern Africa. With these improvements, the EU will utilise all available resources through the CSDP in order to strengthen border security.

9. Discussion of Results and Personal Conclusions

In this chapter the results of the essay will be discussed and the author will give a short personal conclusion on the topic.

9.1 Results

The answer for sub-question number one is that the current name of CSDP was given in the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. The main goal of CSDP is to

²² Cf.: Biscop S. & Rehr J. (2016). Migration – How CSDP can support. Vienna. Armed Forces Printing Centre. P. 17.

²³ Cf.: Ibid. P. 18.

²⁴ Cf.: Ibid.

make the EU able to launch NATO-independent, EU-led military operations and civilian missions. Therefore, it is a part of the EU's integrated approach.

The author's result for his sub-question number two – *“What does the EU understand under border protection?”* – is, that the first steps in joint border protection were taken in the Schengen Agreement in 1995. 22 years later, 26 countries, even non-EU members, are taking part in it. In 2005, FRONTEX was founded with the task to coordinate border control efforts. Thereby, the agency was completely dependent on the cooperation with the affected Member States. The EBCG was launched in 2016. The FRONTEX successor currently has more staff and gives the Council the right to launch emergency interventions without the request of the Member State(s).

The explanation for the sub-question number three – *“Are there any CSDP-led operations related to border protection?”* – is that the EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia is a CSDP-led operation tasked to help shipwrecked migrants, train the Libyan Coast Guard, and to enforce the implementation of the United Nations arms embargo on the coast of Libya. These additional tasks are aimed at capacity building and to prevent various armed groups from setting up and spreading terror and instability.

The European training missions in the Central African Republic, Mali, and Somalia are to strengthen the local security institutions to create a safe environment, prevent people leaving their country, and decrease the pressure of illegal migration at the external border.

The answer for the main question is that due to the events of the last few years, CSDP's tasks in border security will increase. After the Global Strategy 2016 and PESCO, CSDP has gained more rights and capabilities to improve border protection. Using all civilian and military aspects, it will be possible to provide a more secure environment at the southern borders and to Northern Africa.

9.2 Personal Conclusion

In the author's opinion, the European Union was not ready to prevent such a large number of migrants crossing the borders. As soon as the first secret services reported that there will be a big increase of asylum seekers in the second half of 2015, the Member States should have reacted and prepared the necessary measures to control each border crossing. Because the Member States that are not directly connected to an external border did not feel responsible, the directly connected and concerned ones were simply overwhelmed. There should be an agency which is responsible for the surveillance of the external borders only, because the integrated approach is not that developed. This would be the author's short and mid-term solution to solve the problem.

To prevent the 2015 events in the future, we should use CSDP and Economic Partnerships to generate a secure environment and to improve

the economy in the effected countries. This will give the people living in crisis areas hope and give reasons to stay and build up their country together. When this happens, Member States will be able to send some of the migrants back to their homelands, thus reducing the pressure on Europe due to migration. Therefore, the essay ends with an appeal to those bearing responsibility: Invest now in a more effective border protection policy and in the reasons for migrants' escape. If we do not act now, it will be too late.

10. Annexes

10.1 List of Abbreviations

CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
EBCG	European Border and Coastguard
EC	European Commission
EEC	European Economic Community
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDA	European Defence Agency
EEAS	European External Service
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EUMC	European Union Military Staff
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUNAVFOR MED	European Union Naval Force Mediterranean
HR/VP	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
PSC	Political and Security Committee
SIS	Schengen Information System
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UN	United Nations
VIS	Visa Information System

10.2 List of Figures

Figure Number:	Description
1	Flowchart of hermeneutical approach on role of CSDP in border protection

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THE CONCEPT OF SETTLED BATTLEGROUP

Created for CSDP Olympiad 2018
in Veliko Tarnovo – Bulgaria

Abstract

The security situation in the world has changed in the last few years. Especially, formation of new external threats forced the EU to react to this situation. The EU Global Strategy is the EU's answer. The EU needs military approach to be able to respond to emerging threats. For this reason, the EU Battlegroups were established. However, a new external threats and changing security situation, disclosed in the EU Global Strategy, requires new military implication to be beaten. I have researched current EU defence mechanism and I have discovered that it is insufficient. Because of this fact, I have decided that I will try to find a solution for this issue. How to solve this issue is essential question for the EU to provide security for its members? My solution is based on adaptation of EU Battlegroups to the EU

Global Strategy. In this paper I have presented my idea of possible solution which consists of creation of new Battlegroup Concept. I have mentioned the most important task, which results from the EU Global Strategy, and which have to be done during the process of transformation and the most fundamental capabilities of the new Battlegroups.

1 Preface

Security situation of the EU is a common topic for debates between individual authorities of the EU. It is crucial for the EU to find possibilities to improve current state of security and defence capabilities. Protecting the EU and its citizens is maybe the most important task for the EU. How to do so responsibly and securely, is a question which has to be answered. Especially, creation of an entity capable to provide security of the EU and its members is decidedly challenging. Nowadays, the EU is facing a wide range of threats, such as terrorism, hybrid threats, cyber and energy security, organised crime etc. If the EU wants to be able to respond to these threats, military approach is needed. The European Union Battlegroup Concept provides this military approach.

The task which was given to me is to devise military implications of the EU Global Strategy. According to the EU Global Strategy, one of the main objectives for the EU is to enhance its defensive capabilities. The EU needs to be able to defend itself autonomously so it does not need to rely on anybody if necessary. Firstly, military capabilities are needed to be able to guarantee citizens fulfillment of their interests.

Secondly, it is essential to be competent to perform external action so the EU can help to build up state of political and security stability to our east and south. Stable political and security situation in surrounding regions also promotes security situation in the EU. This means that possible threats will be stopped before they will be able to reach our borders.

The EUBGs are responsible for defending Europe in case of need but I do not think it fulfills all requirements. That is why I decided to examine how the EUBGs work and detect their weaknesses. Then, I will use space which was given to me and create new concept of the BG which will be more practical, complex and effective.

2 Introduction

Nowdays, the security situation is noticeably unstable. *„We live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union. Our Union is under threat. Our European project, which has brought unprecedented peace, prosperity and democracy, is being questioned. To the east, the European security order has been violated, while terrorism and violence plague North*

Africa and the Middle East, as well as Europe itself.”¹ This fact means that the EU must have solid system for ensuring its safety.

The EU also desires to play more significant role in endeavor to create the world which is more peaceful and where human rights are ensured. *„In a more contested world, the EU will be guided by a strong sense of responsibility. We will engage responsibly across Europe and the surrounding regions to the east and south. We will act globally to address the root causes of conflict and poverty, and to promote human rights.”² None of the mentioned objectives is feasible without essential military capabilities.*

In the beginning of this paper, taking in consideration the EU Global Strategy, I examined present military capabilities of the EU. I researched the EU Battlegroup Concept as a whole. From theoretical characteristics to practical facts about concept, assets, C2 structures etc.

Then I pointed out its weaknesses and created my own concept of the EUBG. My concept is called the Concept of Settled Battlegroup. It is based on present EUBG and it eliminates its present weaknesses. Afterwards, I mentioned the most essential capabilities of my concept and described its contribution to fulfillment of goals resulting from the EU Global Strategy.

3 Current stage of research

The process of creation of the EUBG shows what has been done so far to ensure security and defence of the EU. The ambition that the EU should have high readiness forces, which are rapidly deployable, mobile and self-sustainable was presented in 1999 as part of The Helsinki Headline Goal for the EU. After this event, an idea of creation of the EU Battlegroups started to be analysed. This resulted into the Council's production of the Headline Goal which was a military capability target that was set for 2003 and specified the need for a rapid response capability where member states should provide small forces at high level of readiness. The need of improvement of rapid response capabilities was repeated at Franco-British summit on 4th February 2003 in Le Touquet. Building on the experience of the operation Artemis in 2003, the EU knew that it should be able to deploy forces within 15 days in response to a UN request. On 10th February 2004, France, Germany and the United Kingdom released a paper outlining the so called Battlegroup concept. This document suggested a number of groups that would be autonomous, consisting of about 1500 personnel and deployable within 15 days. The first Battlegroup reached initial operational capacity as of January 1, 2015 and full operational capacity was reached on 1st January 2007. Since that date the EU is able to undertake rapid response

¹ European Union Global Strategy (2016).
URL:http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf. P. 8ff [25-10-17]

² Cf.: Ibid. P.8

operations through capabilities of two Battlegroups. Nevertheless, the new threats and uncertain security situation in the world requires more monolithic and more rapid defence provider.

4 Research gap

Improving security capabilities of the EU has been a topic of plenteous debates and researches. None of them has discovered an ideal solution for attaining solid security provider, which is able to react rapidly and unanimously to an external threat. This leaves substantial space for creation of possible improvements of already existing EU's autonomous system of security and defence – EUBGs. Possible improvements can be discovered in a whole spectrum of factors impinging on quality and quantity of security and defence provided by the EUBGs. It follows that not only financing of the BGs but also entire system and organization may be changed with ambition to enhance present state of the Europe's security and defence autonomy.

5 Research questions

The main question I will deal with in this paper is:

- What can be done to improve EU's autonomy in the field of security and defence?

To support an answer to the main question I will use these sub-questions:

- How to secure appropriate training of the EUBGs to ensure interoperability?
- How to ensure commonly detailed military capabilities standards?
- How can stabilization of security situation in surrounding regions help to promote security of the EU?

6 Methodology

I have analysed a broad spectrum of documents which was followed by synthesis implemented in accordance with the EU Global Strategy. I have gathered informations from EU factsheets, internet, articles, governmental and non-governmental sources. My approach to this paper was based on analysis of The EU Global Strategy and examination of its outcome. After that, I have identified requirements on security and defence and possible military implementation which results from the EU Global Strategy and I have researched present provider of security and defence – the EUBG and its Concept, so I can analyse whether EUBGs fulfill requirements resulting from the EU Global Strategy. Finally, I have presented my own concept of the EUBG because I consider current status of the EU's security and defence as inadequate.

7 Research

„Europe is the world’s second largest military spender. However, it still lags behind the US and suffers from inefficiency in spending due to duplications, a lack of interoperability and technological gaps.“³

The BGs are providing a general conceptual basis for the management of the EU-led military crisis management operations (CMO) requiring a rapid response. *„A Battlegroup is the minimum militarily effective a credible and coherent, rapidly deployable force package capable of stand-alone operations or for the initial phase of larger operations. It is based on a combined-arms, battalion-sized force, reinforced with combat-support and combat service-support elements. In their generic composition, but depending on the mission, Battlegroups are about 1 500 personnel strong.“⁴* The BGs are supposed to be able to launch operation within 5 days of the approval of the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) and the forces start their operation on the ground not later than 10 days after the approval. This means that BGs have to be built with the aim to ensure required readiness.

Readiness is a state which allows deployment of forces in required time. It is a basic criterium for securing capabilities for a Military Response or Military Rapid Response. Standard Military Response is *„the ability to be able to deploy up to 60.000 troops within 60 days, requirement confirmed in the EU Civilian and Military Capability Development beyond 2010 as a part of the EU multidimensional response is defined as a standard Military Response.“⁵* Contrarivise, Military Rapid Response is supposed to deliver required military effect in reduced time in comparison with Standard Military Response. This encompasses whole field of actions: intelligence collection, decision-making, planning, force generation and deployment, together with the availability of assets and capabilities, and potential Command and Control (C2) options.

Deployability is fundamental aspect of the Battlegroup Concept as the BGs are supposed to respond rapidly according to Military Rapid Response Concept and fulfill the BG’s ambition to become proper security provider for the EU. Last but not least, even if BG was deployed, a problem with its sustainability would occur as a result of an extremely complex net of logistic support.

³ European Commission. European Defence Action plan (2016). Brussels. COM(2016) 950 final, P. 3ff

⁴ Homepage of the European Council. EU Battlegroups Factsheet. URL: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/91611.pdf. [02-11-17]

⁵ European Union MilitaryCommittee. EU Military Rapid Response Concept (2015). Brussels. P. 12ff

7.1 Command and Control

*It is generally envisaged that an EU-led military CMO will be multinational in nature (Combined) and with command structures able to command and control operations in which elements of more than one service participate (Joint). Furthermore EU Operations Headquarters (EU OHQs) and EU Force Headquarters (EU FHQs) for an EU-led military CMO should always be both Combined and Joint.”*⁶ From this it is obvious that C2 structures of the EUBG are not simple. Because of the shortage of reaction time available for the BG it is necessary that C2 structures must be solid and able to react resiliently to an arised situation. The next thing is that the C2 structures must be rigid and not changed, during the whole existence of the BG, and coherent with the rest of the BG. This could cause reduction of time needed for the BG’s deployment and also an Operation Commander or Mission Commander will be already selected and able to react.

7.2 The Concept of Settled Battlegroup

Creation of Settled Battlegroup (SBG) can solve many of the problems mentioned in this paper. This concept goes hand in hand with the EU Global Strategy as it ensures most of the requirements for security provider. SBG should be able to react in rapid time accordingly with the EU Military Rapid Response Concept and provide necessary security and defence for all Member States and at the same time ensure peace in surrounding regions.

The concept of SBG is based on creation of the Battlegroup’s base where the SBGs will be situated. This base will remain the same for all the BGs created. The main difference compared to standart BG will be that forces from the Member States will be deployed to the Battlegroup base where they will remain for 6 months. This period will be divided into two phases.

The first phase will take 3 months. This phase will be preparational as the BG need to undertake regular and realistic training, including multinational exercises. BG and associated capabilities packages are encouraged to develop working relationships with relevant (F)HQs. *„Training could culminate in a joint and possibly combined field exercise at unit level, including an augmented (F)HQ and the required additional capabilities, guaranteeing full operational capability (FOC) for the deployment and conduct of potential EU-led CMOs requiring a rapid response.”*⁷

The second phase will equally take 3 months. During this phase the BG which has just finished preparational phase will enter a standby phase. Throughout the standby period the whole BG will be positioned at the BG base ready to be deployed. Besides that, the Battlegroup Commander

⁶ Council of the European Union (2005). EU Principles for EU HQs. Brussels. P. 5

⁷ Council of the European Union (2006). EU Battlegroup Concept. Brussels. P. 11

should organize some minor exercises which will sustain the BG's readiness during this period. It means that there will always be two SBGs staying at the SBG's base, one in standby phase and the other one in preparational phase.

7.3 Command and Control of the SBG

Command and Control is the key in military organization. That is why C2 centre must be placed at exactly the same place as the BG is. Five national operational headquarters have been made available for use by the EU to fulfil the OHQ role. These operational headquarters are situated all over the EU as the two of them are in France then one in Germany, one in Italy and one in Great Britain. According to the Berlin Plus agreement between NATO and the EU, „NATO assets and capabilities, such as communication units and headquarters are available for EU-led CMOs.“⁸ Neither of these models of ensuring capable C2 framework is ideal. This is why C2 framework of SBG will have rigid structure and the HQ of the BG will be situated directly at the BG's base. Thus there is no need for any liaison elements. The fact that OHQ is in close contact with the BG makes C2 much smoother / flexible and advance planning more accessible.

„Advance planning is conducted continuously at differing levels (strategic, operational, tactical) to allow the EU to deal with potential crises in a timely manner. EU's response time is significantly reduced by the use of advance planning. Notwithstanding, the tight timelines of Military Rapid Response the speed must be compatible with the integrity of military planning for each particular operation.“⁹

7.4 Base of the SBG

It is clear that there are few requirements for a suitable SBG base. Firstly, SGB base must be able to seat approximately 3 000 soldiers. This fact means that a possible SBG base must have great accommodation capabilities. Secondly, it is necessary that the base will be able to provide sufficient training area for at least one battalion. Thirdly, as one of the most important requirement for BG is its Rapid Response ability, it should be situated nearby a suitable airport which can provide the service as an Airport of Embarkation (APOE).

7.5 Financing of the SBG

If the EU wants to be independent and able to autonomously provide security and defence for its citizens, then the EU must invest more in the development of key defensive capabilities to be able to protect itself against external threats. A stronger Europe's defence requires investments from

⁸ Homepage of the European Parliament. Berlin plus agreement. URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/berlinplus_/berlinplus_en.pdf. P. 1 [28-10-17]

⁹ Cf.: European Union Military Committee (2015). Op. cit. P. 40

Member States into their own defensive capabilities. Otherwise, it is not possible to create compatible BG. Delivering defensive capabilities goes hand-in-hand with strong defence industrial base. It is also mentioned in the European Defence Action Plan that *„the European defence industrial base is able to meet Europe's current and future security needs and, in that respect, enhances the Union's strategic autonomy. Without a sustained investment in defence, the European industry risks lacking the technological ability to build the next generation of critical defence capabilities. Ultimately, this will affect the strategic autonomy of the Union and its ability to act as a security provider.“*¹⁰

This fact is also supported by the EUGS where it is said that *“European security and defence must become better equipped to build peace, guarantee security and protect human lives, notably civilians. The EU must be able to respond rapidly, responsibly and decisively to crises, especially to help fight terrorism.”*¹¹

7.6 Support of surrounding regions

The EUBGs haven't been deployed so far. This fact could be caused by many reasons. Maybe it happened because of the potential financial difficulties and maybe there was no reason for the BG deployment. Raising of situations of political and security destabilization beyond our borders causes an increase of potential security risk inside the EU. If we are able to stop potential danger before it reaches our borders we should do so and SBG could be applicable to solve these problems.

Participating in the EUBG Concept should not be voluntary anymore, the EU should act like a strong monolithic entity and everybody should contribute to common goal which is security and defence of the EU. It is also said in the EUGS that *“to acquire and maintain many of these capabilities, Member States will need to move towards defence cooperation as the norm. The voluntary approach to defence cooperation must translate into real commitment. A sustainable, innovative and competitive European defence industry is essential for Europe's strategic autonomy and for a credible CSDP.”*

¹² There is no space for hesitation these days, as the security situation of the EU can get worse anytime.

8 Discussion of Results

Every new concept has got advantages and disadvantages. It is all about evaluating every option and choosing the most suitable one. To do so, it is necessary to reevaluate advantages and disadvantages of every option and determine criteria for decision-taking.

¹⁰ Cf.: European Commission (2016). Op. cit. P. 3

¹¹ Cf.: European Union Global Strategy (2016). Op. cit. P. 30ff

¹² Cf.: Ibid. P. 45

The Settled Battlegroup Concept surely has plenty of advantages and disadvantages. In my opinion, SBG is able to solve many of the problems which the EU is currently facing as it enables fulfillment of the EU's ambitions mentioned in the EUGS.

Originally, SBG fulfills requirements for CSDP resulting from Article 42. 1 TEU. *„It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States“*¹³ as the SBG is able to respond rapidly to any arisen threat inside the EU or beyond its borders. SBG will be capable to be deployed on one of the specific Illustrative Scenarios which are *„Conflict Prevention, Stabilization and Reconstruction, Assistance to Humanitarian Operations, Separation of Parties by Force, Non Combatant Evacuation Operations.“*¹⁴

8.1 Advantages

Compared to current BG Concept, the advantages of SBG are clear. Admittedly, SBG will have much better interoperability and will be more functional because of the preparational phase during which they will have 3 months available for training with aim to become monolithic entity. The common and intensive 3 months training is incomparably more effective than certification exercises.

I agree that certification is important due to the process of ensuring the compatibility of forces joining from different armed forces as they have to work together as one entity. But it is quite obvious, that it cannot ensure the required interoperability of the BG. That is why I believe that preparational phase is vital as it ensures interoperability of the BG and what is more it promotes ability of the EU to defend itself against external threats. Last but not least, it means that the EU can be much more confident during decision making process about deployment of the BG. This will save time which is extremely important for all officers in the BG to be compatible with other commanders so they are able to create effective and resilient C2 structure.

Deployability of the SBG will be also enhanced compared to the standard BG. The fact that all forces of the SBG will be situated at the common base causes essential reduction of time needed for BG's deployment. What is more, the whole process of deployment will be simpler and less logistically demanding. Deployability should be the most

¹³ URL: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF. P. 38 [26-10-17]

¹⁴ FINABEL (2014). European Union Battlegroup Manual. Brussels. P. 14

important and crucial ability of the EU-led military operations to provide security for the EU. Political situation is not stable on the east and south of our borders.

If the political situation is not stable, security situation will not be stable too. Easy-to-deploy military capabilities can be used by the EU to implement peace-making and peacekeeping operation in surrounding regions to promote security situation of the EU itself.

It is in the interest of our citizens to invest in the resilience of states and societies in the east stretching further into Central Asia, and south down to Central Africa. Fragility beyond our borders threatens all our vital interests. *„By contrast, resilience – the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises – benefits us and countries in our surrounding regions, sowing the seeds for sustainable growth and vibrant societies. Together with its partners, the EU will therefore promote resilience in its surrounding regions. A resilient state is a secure state, and security is key for prosperity and democracy.“*¹⁵

8.2 Disadvantages

Hand-in-hand with advantages go disadvantages of the SBG Concept. There are some substantial problems which must be solved to guarantee proper functionality of the SBG.

Firstly, it is necessary to find or create base which will be suitable for the SBG. The requirements are clear but not easy-to-solve for sure. The suitable base must have accommodation and logistics capacities to intake at least 3 000 soldiers.

Secondly, the base has to provide adequate capacities for execution of training.

Thirdly, it has to be close to an airport which is able to provide required capabilities for BG's deployment.

From my point of view, these problems can be solved but it is feasible only if all the Member States will cooperate and contribute to a common goal which is the strong EU with efficient defensive system.

I realize that creation of the SBGs could be very challenging and especially financially demanding, but I am sure that the EU and its members have got sufficient resources. If you want to be safe and live in safe environment you have to spend sufficient money on defence. I believe that if every member of the EU contributes to the common defence, it will be possible.

In my opinion security is one of the most important values in human life and purpose of international organizations as the EU is to ensure that these values are fulfilled. With the objective to accomplish that, we should try to find the best option how to do so. The European Union Battlegroup

¹⁵ Cf.: European Union Global Strategy (2016). Op. cit. P. 23

Concept has brought a solution, but I think, it is only a temporary solution. The EUBGs can provide defence in case of emergency situation but their deployment will be enormous challenge and logistically very demanding. What is more, the EUBGs are not independent as their functionality requires cooperation with NATO.

According to the EU Global Strategy the EU should be able to provide security and defence for itself autonomously. For this reason, I think that the Concept of Settled Battlegroup can be the upgraded version of present EUBGs. The SBGs have more interoperability; they are more flexible and able to act like an autonomous entity which is able to provide security and defence for the EU.

I realize that creation of the SBG will be very difficult and financially challenging operation but if the EU wants to preserve it's status, improving security capabilities is a must. I have neither strategic nor tactical experiences as I am only a cadet. This paper is just my idea of possible solution of how to ensure security and stability in our regional and global security sector.

9 Annexes

9.1 List of Abbreviations

APOE –	Airport of Embarkation
BG –	Battlegroup
C2 –	Command and Control
CMC-	Crisis Management Concept
CMO –	Crisis Management Operations
CSDP –	Common Security and Defence Policy
EU –	European Union
EUBG –	European Union Battlegroup
EUGS –	European Union Global Strategy
FHQ –	Force Headquarters
FOC –	Full Operational Capability
HQ -	Headquarters
NATO –	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OHQ –	Operations Headquarters
SBG –	Settled Battlegroup
TEU –	Treaty on European Union

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**“PROTECTING EUROPE” AND THE CSDP WITHIN THE HYBRID
WAR CONTEXT: IMPLICATIONS OF RUSSIA’S INFORMATION
OPERATIONS IN THE BALTICS AND BEYOND**

**Created for the CSDP Olympiad 2018
in Veliko Tarnovo – Bulgaria**

Abstract

Forming an opinion by controlling information flow is arguably the cheapest way to achieve strategic goals, at least that’s what Russia is currently doing with the Baltics. In this paper the author takes a look at Russia’s information campaigns’ main narratives in the Baltic states and how it could affect the coherence of the EU and thereby the role of the CSDP.

1. Preface

My first encounter with “hybrid warfare” came when I was searching a topic for my school’s final paper. While reading different papers on the actions in Ukraine I got dragged into the different forms of hybrid conflicts. When I needed to write this paper I saw an opportunity to do it from an information warfare perspective that is present in every state of the conflict. By doing so I knew that I had set a stepping stone for myself to pursue a further goal of writing my final paper on a similar subject.

I would firstly like to thank Dr. Vladimir Sazonov for explaining to me the information warfare concept and stimulating greater interest against it.

Furthermore, I would like to thank Dr. Illimar Ploom for advising me on how to connect the EU’s foreign political aspects with the Russian information campaigns, and also for introducing me to Frederking’s work.

2. Introduction

Since the beginning of time people have always used wars to settle their differences. Using all means accessible to the fighter is also not a new phenomenon. Propaganda, deterrence, deception and economical pressure have been a part of armed conflict for a long time.

Be that as it may, after the recent events in Georgia and the annexation of Crimea, the Western world was taken by surprise that using non-conventional and political means could do so much damage. It was an alarm bell for governments who still thought that they could soothe relations with Russia and started to consider them as a potential threat again. People started speculating that this is a new way of warfare. It has been called many names: hybrid, non-linear or even war by all means.

One of the first persons to mention the term “hybrid war” was William Nemeth who speculated on this topic his masters thesis “Future War and Chechnya: A Case for Hybrid Warfare” in 2002.¹ In February 2013 Russia’s chief of General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, published an article “The Value of Science in Prediction” in VPK. There he outlined what he called “non-linear warfare”. This caused a lot of discussion in Western circles and some analysts believed that it was a way of Russian military thinking or even a new doctrine.²

Taking into account the recent challenges the European Union (EU) has had to overcome and the fact that a lot of its neighbours are in severe crisis, emphasizes the importance of quality Common Security and Defence Policy

¹ Nemeth, W. J. (2002). Future War and Chechnya: A Case for Hybrid Warfare. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School. Masters thesis.

² Kofman, M. (2016). Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts. War on the Rocks. March 11.

(CSDP). The EU needs to raise its resilience towards new hybrid threats that may be or already are targeted at them.³

Some steps have already been made towards making the EU a safer place. For example, the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats reached operational capability on 1 September 2017. The centre was founded in co-operation with the EU and NATO, and has currently 12 participating countries.⁴

As they said in the “A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy” paper: “*Only the combined weight of a true union has the potential to deliver security, prosperity and democracy to its citizens and make a positive difference in the world*”.⁵ Relying on that I would like to take a look at the Baltics as a part of the EU and how different subversions against that region could affect the Unions integrity. At a yet deeper political level it is the question of being able to understand the influence that Russia’s actions have on the coherence of the EU in general. In turn, this should help to comprehend the role of the CSDP, especially its internal dimensions.

3. Current State of Research

In 2015 Ulrik Franke published a report that was a review of Russian official documents and literature on military theory about information warfare. There were also few case studies, to show how the theory was applied in practice. In conclusion he stated that information warfare is not considered to be just a matter for the Armed Forces, but rather a strategic matter that requires the coordination of many government agencies. Another conclusion was that information warfare, according to doctrine and theory, is conducted continuously in peacetime and wartime alike.⁶

Keir Giles stated that information warfare can cover a vast range of different activities and processes seeking to steal, plant, interdict, manipulate, distort or destroy information. He said that the channels and methods for doing so cover an equally broad range, starting with computers, smartphones, real or invented news media, statements by leaders or celebrities, online troll campaigns, text messages, YouTube videos, or even direct approaches to individual human targets. Recent Russian campaigning uses all of those activities named and more. Giles agrees with Franke and brings out the fact that these tools and instruments

³ U. a. (2016). Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy. P. 23.

⁴ Homepage of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland. Page Current affairs. URL: <http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=365884&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>. [05-11-17]

⁵ U. a. (2016). Op. cit. P. 8.

⁶ Cf.: Franke, U. (2015). War by non-military means: Understanding Russian information warfare. P. 51. Swedish Ministry of Defence. Report no FOI-R--4065--SE.

are repeatedly described in the Russian sources as being capable of addressing highly ambitious “strategic tasks”. He says that: *“a strategic task such as preventing a NATO consensus on meeting Article 5 commitments when requested would be the ultimate prize for a Russian information campaign”*.⁷

The complexity of predicting Russia’s next move is very well phrased in another of Giles’s works, where he writes: *“the challenge of Russian information warfare is, however, not a static situation, but a developing process. The Russian approach evolves, develops, adapts, and just like other Russian operational approaches, identifies success and reinforces it, and conversely abandons failed attempts and moves on. The result is that Russia should not be expected to fight the last war when it next decides to use an information warfare component in a new conflict. In other words, those nations or organisations that think they understand Russian information warfare on the basis of current studies, and are responding by preparing for currently visible threats and capabilities, are out of date and will be surprised once again by what happens next”*.⁸

Based on interviews with various officials from the Baltics, the United States, Poland and the NATO, Andrew Radin confirms that the analysts generally agree that there is low-level nonviolent subversion currently happening in the Baltic states. He also says that it could intensify in the future, although it will pose limited danger of destabilization. Covert violent action or conventional aggression seem unlikely at the moment.⁹

4. Research Gap

In this essay I would like to take a closer look at Russian information warfare against the Baltic states. I will identify the key pressure points Russia has or is currently exploiting. What makes this work special is the fact that I would like to find out how the subversions in this region will affect the EU’s Strategic Autonomy.

Beyond that, the work tries to understand the effect of these and other similar Russian actions on the coherence of the EU, thereby willing to comprehend better the nature and appropriate role of the CSDP.

5. Research Questions

What are the main narratives of Russian information warfare in the Baltics?

⁷ Cf.: Giles, K. (2016). Handbook of Russian Information Warfare. Pp. 4-5. NATO Defense College. Fellowship Monograph 9.

⁸ Giles, K. (2016). The Next phase of Russian information Warfare. P. 2. NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence.

⁹ Cf.: Radin, A. (2017). Hybrid Warfare in the Baltics Threats and Potential Responses. P. 13. RAND Corporation. Report

What is the impact of Russia's information warfare against the Baltics and, by way of generalisation, what implications it has for the character of the EU and for the CSDP's basic role within the EU?

6. Methodology

In order to be able to answer the research questions only key Russian information warfare targets and narratives in the Baltics were studied. Some examples were also added to give a better example of their essence. In this essay the author did not look at different forms of conducting information warfare.

To answer the second question this paper intends to apply Frederking's classification of international security systems (*War, Rivalry, Collective Security, Security Community*) to the corresponding variety of roles and identity available to the actors and thereby to the nature of the CSDP. By way of establishing the facts and intentions of Russia, the paper attempts to classify the actors' identities as international actors and the sought-after changes in these identities.

7. Research and Results of Research

7.1 Current situation in the Baltics

Ever since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has still thought of the Baltics as part of its sphere of influence. After regaining independence in 1991 the countries made a great effort to distance themselves from the old way of life and started pursuing new goals. In the same year the countries were accepted as new members of the United Nations (UN).¹⁰ In 2004 they joined both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization¹¹ (NATO) and the European Union¹² (EU).

After the Russian aggression in Ukraine in 2014 NATO took a course to put collective defence of the member states back into the centre of its policies and actions.¹³ In 2016 Allies agreed at the Summit in Warsaw to enhance NATO's military presence in the eastern part of the Alliance. They deployed four multinational battalion-size battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, on a rotational basis. These units co-operate with

¹⁰ Cf.: Homepage of the Los Angeles Times. Page Collections. URL: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-09-13/news/mn-2256_1_baltic-states. [19-11-17]

¹¹ Cf.: Homepage of the NATO. Page NATO Update. URL: <https://www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/03-march/e0329a.htm>. [19-11-17]

¹² Cf.: Homepage of the EU. Page Further expansion. URL: https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history/2000-2009_en. [19-11-17]

¹³ Cf.: Praks, H. (2016). NATO Warsaw Summit – Implications for Estonia. P. 45. Appeared in *The Baltic Sea Region: Hard and Soft Security Reconsidered*. Latvian Institute of International Affairs.

national home defence forces and are present at all times in the host countries.¹⁴

Estonia and Latvia have particularly high Russian minorities, with about 24% and 27% of the general population respectively, while Lithuania's Russian population is just under 6%. Percentages of Russian speakers are even higher since other minorities have often adopted Russian as their primary language. Latvia has 34%, Estonia 30% and Lithuania nearly 8% of Russian speakers. Most of them are concentrated in capital cities and in territories close to the Russian border.¹⁵ (See annex 10.2 for the picture)

7.2 Russian-backed media in the Baltic states

In 2016 Russia published its Information Security Doctrine and foreign policy framework. These documents demonstrate that Russia is prepared to use all information influence instruments to achieve its foreign policy goals. The foreign policy framework states that Russia will develop its own measures for influencing foreign audiences, and will support the work of Russian-language media in the international information space with government assistance. Therefore, information resources funded or otherwise supported by Russia must be evaluated in the context of Russia's foreign policy goals and as instruments for achieving these goals, not as independent media products.¹⁶

At least two information resources maintained by Russia's international information agency *Rossiia Segodnya* operate in the Baltics – *Sputnik* multimedia platform and the website *Baltnews*.¹⁷ Despite the difficult economic situation all of the named media, outlets continue to receive financial support from Russia.¹⁸

Besides that, Russian TV channels like NTV or RTR, newspapers like *Moskovsky Komsomolets* and some other Baltic Russian-language media from time to time provide information in line with the Kremlin's policies. Social media such as *Vkontakte* and *Odnoklassniki*, which are very popular among Russian-speaking residents, are also an important instrument of influence. These named channels are just some examples of the Kremlin's leverage, but in fact Moscow's arsenal is much wider.¹⁹

¹⁴ Homepage of the NATO. Page Topics. URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm?selectedLocale=en. [19-11-17]

¹⁵ Cf.: Homepage of the Euractiv. Page Opinions. URL: <https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/opinion/the-new-generation-of-baltic-russian-speakers/>. [19-11-17]

¹⁶ Latvian Security Police. (2017). Annual report for 2016. Pp. 19-22. Riga.

¹⁷ Cf.: Ibid. P. 20

¹⁸ Cf.: State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania & Second Investigation Department Under the Ministry of National Defence. (2016) National Security Threat Assessment. P. 37.

¹⁹ Cf.: Sazonov, V. (2016) Moscow switches from unfriendly rhetoric to state-sponsored lies. Article appeared in Stopfake's homepage. URL: <https://www.stopfake.org/en/kremlin-s-infowar-in-the-baltics/>. [20.11.17]

On 1 March 2017, both Sputnik Estonia and Sputnik Latvia were informed that their news delivery contracts were terminated by the Baltic News Service (BNS) and Latvian news agency LETA.²⁰

7.3 The main narratives of Russian information warfare

Like in every other activity directed to achieving some kind of a greater mission, so do information operations have clear key tasks that need to be accomplished. Recent studies have shown that there are specific events that gain a lot more attention from the media than others. By analysing this data we can clearly identify the key targets that are essential to completing the main mission that information warfare has.

7.3.1 NATO's enhanced presence

All three of the foreign intelligence agencies in the Baltic states point out the fact that information activity against NATO is one of the main topics on Russian-backed media. The usual narrative is that bringing more troops into the Baltics is an act of aggression against the Kremlin. Sometimes they are also described as small countries whose war hysteria keeps other countries from reaching a compromise.²¹

One of the recent examples of an information attack conducted against NATO troops comes from Lithuania. In February 2017 Russian media outlets and pro-Russian activists spread the fake news that German soldiers stationed in the country had raped a teenage girl. Even though this piece of disinformation failed to attract the attention of the mainstream media, similarly constructed attacks are highly likely to continue in the near future.²²

7.3.2 Military exercises

Throughout the years military exercises in the Baltics or in Russia conducted near the border of these countries has caused a buzz in the media. It is quite common for pro-Kremlin media to spread disinformation about the exercises. Their main topics are usually that NATO is gathering troops along its eastern flank to provoke Russia, people in the Baltics are

²⁰ Cf.: Rudzite, L. (2017) Sputnik has new troubles in Baltics. The article appeared on the homepage of Transitions Online: Regional Intelligence. URL: <http://www.tol.org/client/article/26737-estonia-latvia-bns-leta-propaganda-sputnik.html>. [20.11.17]

²¹ Estonian Information Board. (2017). Op. cit. P. 20.; Latvian Security Police. (2017). Op.cit. P. 19.; State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania & Second Investigation Department Under the Ministry of National Defence. (2016). Op.cit. P. 36.

²² Cf.: Kriščiūnas, R. (2017). The testimony of the ambassador of the Republic of Lithuania Rolandas Kriščiūnas before the committee on appropriations subcommittee on state, foreign operations and related programs. P. 9. U.S Senate.

holding anti-NATO protests against them²³ and sometimes false objectives of the war-games are presented to demonstrate hostile intention.²⁴

On the contrary, while covering exercises conducted by Russia, e.g., Zapad 2017, they use the narrative that Western concerns about the threats posed by the exercises have no grounds, even though the annexation of Crimea was also a follow-up to a military exercise.²⁵

7.3.3 Historical aspects

Historical propaganda mainly uses the following narratives: denial of the occupation of the Baltic states, justifying mass deportations, and downplaying the countries' restoration of independence.²⁶ Moreover, the Russian media is trying to paint the Baltics as a place where fascism is reborn and supported by the local population.²⁷ Finally in some cases they are also blamed for "rewriting" the history of World War II and lionising Nazis.²⁸

One such attempted provocation took place in Estonia in 2016 when a Russian skinhead from Saint Petersburg went to the memorial event for those who fell in the Battle of Tannenberg line. While there, he was wearing clothes that revealed his neo-Nazi tattoos, including a swastika. This was quickly spotted by the Kremlin-controlled media and used to describe the situations happening in Estonia.²⁹

7.3.4 Discriminating against Russian minorities

Baltic states have often been accused of violating the rights of the Russian-speaking community. One of the problems is the fact that not all of them were granted citizenship and the right to vote in the general elections after the countries regained their independence. Another target of information warfare is the restricted availability of Russian-language education.³⁰ "For instance, the violation of the rights of the Russian-language population is described as "ethnocultural genocide" and a form of neo-Nazi sentiment."³¹

²³ Cf.: Eslas, U. (2017) Spring Storm: a story of disinformation in three parts. Homepage of CEPA StratCom Program. Page Briefs. URL: <http://infowar.cepa.org/Briefs/Est/Spring-Storm-A-tale-of-disinformation-in-three-parts>. [26.11.17]

²⁴ Cf.: State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania & Second Investigation Department Under the Ministry of National Defence. (2016). Op.cit. P. 38.

²⁵ Cf.: Bankauskaite, D. (2017). Deconstructing Zapad narratives. Homepage of CEPA StratCom Program. Page Briefs. URL: <http://infowar.cepa.org/Briefs/Lt/Deconstructing-Zapad-narratives>. [26.11.17]

²⁶ Cf.: State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania & Second Investigation Department Under the Ministry of National Defence. (2016). Op.cit. P. 37.

²⁷ Cf.: Latvian Security Police. (2017). Op.cit. P. 19.

²⁸ Cf.: Estonian Information Board. (2017). Op. cit. P. 20.

²⁹ Cf.: Estonian Internal Security Service. (2016) Annual review 2016. P. 8.

³⁰ Cf.: Estonian Information Board. (2017). Op. cit. P. 20.

³¹ Ibid.P.20

7.4 CSDP, the EU and Russia through Frederking

	War	Rivalry	Collective Security	Security Community
Rule 1—Identity	We are enemies	We are rivals	We are fellow citizens	We are friends
Rule 2—Autonomy	We do not recognize the autonomy of others	We recognize the autonomy of others	Autonomy is limited by obligations to follow and enforce the community's rules	Autonomy is limited by obligations to follow the community's rules
Rule 3—Security	Survival is based on relative (alliance) military capability	Security is based on relative (alliance) military capability	Security is based on a multilateral commitment to use military capability	Security is based on political relationships
Rule 4—Deterrence	You must surrender	Do not attack me	Do not break the rules of our community	Do not break the rules of our community
Rule 5—Enforcement	We will attack until you surrender	We will retaliate if you violate our sovereignty	We will retaliate if you break the rules of our community	We will resolve conflicts peacefully
Rule 6—Use of force	The use of force is always necessary to resolve conflicts	The use of force is sometimes necessary	The use of force is sometimes necessary	The use of force is not acceptable

Table 1: Frederking's table on global security social arrangements.³²

This paper finds that the best way to describe the EU and the relationships between its member states is to do it according to Frederking's model. This places the EU clearly under the *security community* column. Frederking describes this social arrangement as: "In security communities, agents identify each other as friends committed to the peaceful resolution of conflict (rule 1). Agents in security communities have a strong Consensus about the obligation to follow the rules of their community (rule 2), and they engage in peaceful, multilateral decision making to ensure security through political relationships (rule 3). The directive rule to follow the rules of community does exist in security communities (rule 4), but enforcement does not include the possibility of force (rules 5 and 6)."³³

If we take a look at Russia's current actions we can speak about *Rivalry* or even the *War* regime been activated at least to an extent (e.g., its actions towards Ukraine and Georgia). Yet, in terms of Russia's intentions, it is even more important to realise that Russia will benefit most if it manages to make the EU start losing its character as a *security community*, an association knit together by deep mutual trust and a culture of loyalty. In comparison, *collective security*, let alone *rivalry*, as modes of international relations are much more loosely tied and dependent on power balance and mutual distrust.

However, if we tried to find a place for the CSDP, things get interesting. Despite the fact that it is an official policy of the EU, it rather situates in the *Collective Security* column. Fink-Hooijer pointed out two different views on the CFSP after the Treaty of European Union. The first view said that

³² Frederking, B. (2003). Constructing Post-Cold War Collective Security. P. 368. The American Political Science Review. Vol. 97, No. 3. pp. 363-378.

³³ Ibid. P. 369.

intergovernmentalism had been maintained, however the second one stated the contrary, that it is moving towards becoming more supranational.³⁴ After the Lisbon Treaty Schmid stated that the development of the CSDP started in intergovernmental conferences and is driven by an intergovernmental setting. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily lead to the outcome of these meetings being intergovernmental in nature.³⁵ Both of the authors agree that the CSDP is rather an intergovernmental policy.³⁶ For it to move towards the *Security community* category the member states need to have more trust in each other. In its current state the CSDP is situated somewhere in the middle. For it to be more resilient towards today's hybrid threats it needs to become more supranationalist.

European countries co-operate but in most of the cases the countries that contribute also get some benefits from the cause. In some ways the EU has common values to pursue, but in many cases its members do not see these as their own and continue to work on matters important to them. This kind of situation is ideal for Russia; because of the lack of unity it can target individual states with its information campaigns. Russia's goal is to undermine its target rather from the inside than to create tensions between different countries. To understand this better, it is necessary to look at the paragraph where we looked at the information warfare narratives used against the Baltics. Despite the fact that the key points of influence were the same, the approach to the countries was individual. A member state represents and reflects the whole union and one's decomposition casts a shade to the whole union.

Sven Biscop discusses a similar problem in his paper. He feels that all the European countries are small. None of them can claim global reach in all dimensions of power, military, economic, and political. The obvious conclusion is that some threats and challenges are just too big to face alone and demand collective action to defend someone's national interests.³⁷

As stated in the Estonian Information Board annual report of 2017: "the goal of Russia's influence activities on the EU is to create tensions and sow confusion both in member states' relations with each other and within individual member states. By doing so, the Kremlin hopes to influence the decision-making process and steer the narrative in its own interests".³⁸

³⁴ Cf.: Fink-Hooijer, F. (1994). The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. P. 173. 5EJIL.

³⁵ Cf.: Schmidt, J. (2009). Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defence Policy after the Lisbon Treaty: Old Problems Solved? P. 243. CYELP 5.

³⁶ Ibid. Passim. Fink-Hooijer, F. (1994). Passim.

³⁷ Biscop, S. (2013). Europe and the World or Snow White and the Seven Fallacies. P.5. Egmont paper 61.

³⁸ Estonian Information Board. (2017). International Security and Estonia.

8. Discussion of Results and personal Conclusion

The Russian Federation uses all means to shape the international environment in their favour. One of those means of influence is using information warfare that is currently happening in the Baltic states.

Estonia and Latvia are easier targets for Russia because their population of ethnic Russians, that are the main audience of information operations, is a few times larger than in Lithuania. Despite this fact, the Lithuanian population is still at risk because they remain a target of Kremlin's campaigning.

Russia's information operations in the Baltics are essentially similar to sowing distrust between EU member states. By undermining individual countries it creates a fertile ground for the rise of extremists and also for the far-right and far-left parties. All this could lead to drifting away from the rule of law, the "glue" that holds this union together. Tension between member states will rise and unity will fade away. Causing this havoc is closely intertwined with Russia's political pressure that has the same strategic objective. In conclusion we can see that Russia's activities, even alone in the Baltic states, are a threat to the EU's security and by that a baffling problem to the CSDP.

It is really difficult to predict or prepare for future Kremlin activities because history has shown that they are very eager to use all emerging situations. Analyses of different informational operations against various countries show that there is no actual pattern, they rather use quite a personal approach to every event to merge them in their favour. Therefore we should really consider what the consequences for our actions will be in the future and how they could be used against us.

Within Frederking's model Russia (itself in rivalry or war mode) tries to make EU member states lose their *security community* identity and steer them towards the *collective security* or even *rivalry* modes prevalent before the creation of the EU. If this argument is correct, and Russia manages to do harm to the *security community*, this will seriously threaten the existence of the EU especially when seen in the context of the still heavily felt consequences of the financial and economic crisis.

The CSDP has been working based on inter-governmentalist premises (instead of supranationalism that characterises the majority of EU policy fields, also signifying an identity one step lower on Frederking's scale, i.e., *collective security*), it needs to become more supranational to raise its resilience towards today's hybrid threats and be able to counter Russian aggression. This is also a prerequisite for the CSDP to become a fully-fledged policy. The CSDP relies on an undaunted common and mutual trust and coherence of the union, to avoid getting tangled into different obstacles

on its way to solving important problems, it needs to establish some kind of a decision-making body that stands above the member states.

9. Annexes

9.1 List of Literature

9.1.1 Research papers and reports

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**EU STRATEGIC AUTONOMY.
MILITARY IMPLICATIONS**

**Created for the 4th CSDP Olympiad 2018
Veliko Tarnovo, Bulgaria**

Abstract

An increasingly complex, unstable and insecure international context has pushed the EU Defence into a new era, formally inaugurated by the European Global Strategy (EUGS). European citizens feel increasingly concerned by exogenous phenomena like migration or terrorism and political leaders have responded with unprecedented will. They are committed to a new paradigm that leads to a more relevant role of the EU in the protection of Europe and its citizens, mainly in the EU's extended neighbourhood and global commons. The way of action to achieve the objective is strategic autonomy (SA) to decide and act multilaterally when possible and autonomously when necessary, an ambition that is meant to be complementary and respectful of NATO's role. The prerequisite for

success is the availability of a full set of capabilities and high-end strategic enablers, where EU Member States (MS) have significant gaps that will consume important resources. EU national defence budgets have suffered cumulative cuts and are not in condition to finance the necessary investments in Research and Development (R&D) and procurement. National arms markets and armies are structurally fragmented, a condition that constrains the gains of isolated budget increases. Two initiatives can help reduce these limitations, the Commission (COM) European Defence Action Plan (EDAP) with the innovative European Defence Fund (EDF), and the agreement of 23 MS to activate the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), both with a clear emphasis in industrial cooperation in R&D and joint capability projects. Could all these promising decisions and actions derive in a credible EU SA? A difficult question that has no simple answer.

1. Preface

As son and grandson of navy officers, during my childhood and teenage years I witnessed their activities in the NATO, and grew with the conviction that the European Union (EU) had forever outsourced its protection to its transatlantic partner. However, this feeling started to change just before entering the Naval Academy, when my family moved to Brussels because my father became a counsellor in the Military Representation to the EU Military Committee. There I had the opportunity to share thoughts with students from other countries, visited the EU institutions, took part on discussions on the role of the EU in the world, and understood the growing CSDP ambition.

Last year I participated in an exchange program with the US Navy Academy, where I studied one semester. This experience helped me understand how the US Navy orients its strategy vis-a-vis NATO and its allies, and realized that they expect Europeans to make a bigger effort to share the burden of the global challenges of today's and tomorrow's multipolar world. These international experiences have helped me, a young naval academy midshipman, to start guessing how the maritime environment could evolve, and what dynamics would shape the navy in which I would have to develop my career.

Finally, the CSDP Olympiad acted as spark plug that ignited my interest on the matter. The online modules opened my eyes and provided me data to complement my limited knowledge on the EU. I learnt that the construction of the EU follows the path of least resistance, and like fluids, one knows where the source is but has to let it flow to discover where it takes. This fluidity is especially applicable to policies that require unanimity like the CSDP, policies that can only advance when solidarity is the norm.

Fortunately, the founding fathers were aware and anticipated that behaviour¹.

2. Introduction

The year 2017 un-doubtedly marks a paradigm shift in European defence integration, long awaited after the Libya case, which responds to a mixture of internal and external crucial challenges² and opens a very promising window of opportunity³.

In the wake of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS), the recent activation of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), the launch of PESCO and EDAP with its new European Defence Fund (EDF) for R&D and procurement, are visible symptoms. They required an unprecedented political will from the heads of state and government of the participating Member States (pMS), as well as a show of leadership from France and Germany, and to a lesser extent from Italy and Spain.

In my childhood, I loved to do puzzles and learnt that the first task is to find the frame and, afterwards, the most difficult task is to find the first group of pieces that connect to the frame and help to progressively expand and reach other areas. I see the CSDP in a similar way, the frame is clear (TEU) but for some years we only formed some isolated accumulation of pieces that did not help us advance much, but now we have gathered a promising group and are ready to resume the expansion.

I believe that the EU-27 has firmly decided to achieve EU SA to protect the EU and its citizens, while respecting the role of NATO in collective defence of its members⁴. I have realized that the debate on its implications

¹ C.f. “Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a *de facto* solidarity”. Schuman, R (1950). Robert Schuman Declaration, 9 May 1950. https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration_es [7-11-17].

² C.f. “In the last decades, there has not been a more compelling set of security challenges, economic facts and political arguments justifying a drastic step change in European defence”. Juncker, J.C. (2017). Speech by the President of the EU Commission at the Defence and Security Conference. In defence of Europe, Prague 9 June 2017. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-1581_en.htm [10-11-2017]

³ C.f. “The absence of the UK from decision-making structures in Brussels now provides EU member states with a unique opportunity to make unprecedented bold steps towards a greater level of ambition for the CSDP on the basis of EU Global Strategy’s recommendations”. Faleg, G. (2016). CSDP after BREXIT: a narrow window of opportunity. <https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/csdp-after-brexite-a-narrow-window-of-opportunity/> [21-11-2017]

⁴ C.f. “The build-up of troops on our eastern borders, war and terrorism in the Middle East and Africa, and increasing militarisation around the world are vivid illustrations of an increasingly tense global context. The need to reflect on how to deter, respond and protect against threats, ranging from large-scale cyber-attacks to more traditional forms of aggression, has never been so critical. NATO will continue to provide hard security for most EU countries but Europe cannot be naïve and has to take care of its own security. Being a “soft power” is no longer powerful enough when force can prevail over rules”. European Commission. (2017) White Paper on the Future of Europe. Reflections and scenarios for the EU27 by 2025. COM (2017) 2025 of 1 March 2017.

in the political, defence and military fields have caused rivers of ink to flow. In this essay, I intend to offer a humble contribution to the determination of the margin of manoeuvre for evolution.

3. Current State of Research

It is widely shared by institutions, authors and the public opinion that both the Brexit and the insistent messages from the US Administration calling the EU to do more have catalysed the paradigm shift. The approval of the EUGS and its implementation plan have paved the way to intense



Figure 1 EU Foreign Policy and Defence evolution scenarios for 2025⁵.

institutional work, and to the multiplication of studies and articles on the subject. I will try to mention relevant decisions and papers that have tackled the issue and constitute the starting point for my research.

3.1. EU Decisions

The "winter package" on EU Security and Defence (EU S&D) endorsed by the Council on 15 December 2016 comprises three actions that define its ambition and encompass a wide array of sub-actions to strengthen CSDP, and therefore the EU SA:

- Implementation Plan on S&D. Sets the level of ambition on S&D around three tasks: responding to external conflicts and crisis; working with partners in building their S&D capacities; and protecting the Union and its citizens. The Commission EDAP and its three pillars: a European Defence Fund (EDF); fostering investments in defence supply chains; and reinforcing the single market for defence. The most attractive is the EDF that opens the door to EU funding of defence R&D and joint defence capabilities.

- A Common Set of Proposals for the Implementation of the EU-NATO Joint Declaration⁶.

3.2. Official EU analysis

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/white_paper_on_the_future_of_europe_en.pdf [8-11-2017] P. 8f.

⁵ Op. Cit. European Commission. (2017). P. 29.

⁶ Joint declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of 8 July 2016. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133163.htm. [19-11-2017].

EU institutions have produced several documents of analysis, like the reflection papers published by the Commission. Both the White Paper on the Future of Europe and the Reflection paper on the future of EU Defence⁷ include possible scenarios for the EU27 by 2025 in foreign policy and defence, as described in general terms in the following figure.

4. Research Gap

Existing studies and reflection papers try to decipher which course will the CSDP follow and where will it arrive after the following budgetary cycle. They lack an analysis of the feasibility or affordability that could offer a reality check to the level of ambition, and determine its coherence with the EU realities. Therefore, my research on the military implications will try to contribute to close that gap.

5. Research Question(s)

The subject chosen predefines the question: military implications of being strategically autonomous to protect Europe and its citizens. This question is too wide for a short essay, so I intend to reduce the scope to the following sub-questions:

- Is there a legal basis, political will and the support of the population?
- Is the SA affordable?
- Are there capability limits to the EU SA?

6. Methodology

Given my limited experience on strategic issues, I decided to be pragmatic and opted for an analysis of the existing official documents, studies, articles and databases. I made deductions and extracted enough judgement to apprehend the military implications, and the most limiting elements. I also contrasted my findings with those of important think tanks, what allowed me to remain safe from revolutionary proposals and inconsistent conclusions.

⁷ European Commission. (2017). Reflection paper on the future of European Defence. European COM (2017) 315 of 7 June 2017. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/reflection-paper-defence_en.pdf. [08-11-17].

7. Research and Results of Research

In the following paragraphs, I analyse several factors to determine the feasibility and affordability of the EUSA.

7.1. EU legal framework

The provisions of the TEU on the CSDP do not mention its employment to protect Europe, although in article 3.5⁸ it sets the obligation to protect its citizens. What is more, it does not explicitly mention the ambition of SA. Furthermore, the TEU does not allow deploying CSDP military missions in the EU territory⁹, what comprises the land territory, the territorial waters and the airspace above them. On the other hand, the CSDP has been contributing to the protection of the EU and its citizens abroad, with military missions and operations. EUNAVFOR SOPHIA and EUNAVFOR ATALANTA are clear examples of this role, as the first is fighting against the criminal networks that operate in our close vicinity and the second is fighting against the activity of pirate networks in the Horn of Africa, and thus protecting, among others, EU citizens and interests.

Apart from this, the TEU has instruments that open the door to the employment of EU troops in the EU territory. The solidarity¹⁰ clause, for which the concept of EU SA does not match well from the military perspective, as it is an internal instrument to tackle internal crisis, where it preferably adopts a supporting role for the civilian protection system. For the second one, the mutual assistance clause, the EU SA *“shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their*

⁸ Art 3.5. TEU. In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.

⁹ Art. 42.1 TEU. The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.

¹⁰ Art 222 TEU. The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States, to:

- (a) — prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States;
 - protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack;
 - assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a terrorist attack;
- (b) assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a natural or man-made disaster.

collective defence and the forum for its implementation” (Art 42.7.TEU)¹¹. Therefore, the margin of manoeuvre inside EU will derive from the coordination and consultation with the NATO¹². The ongoing reinforcement of this cooperation would ensure that all the initiatives to increase the EU SA also serve to enhance the capabilities of the European allies.

7.2. What are the implications of EUGS and its Implementation Plan?

Despite its non-binding nature and being somehow watered-down¹³, it covers some strategic gaps in the EU defence architecture. It sets *“an overall rationale for EU foreign policy; outlines sound organising principles; selects priorities in ways broadly consistent with EU interests; points to shortcomings in capabilities and procedures; and it offers quite a bit of guidance or further action”* (Grevi, 2016). One of these elements outstands and sets the course for EU defence, the concept of EU SA. If we took it literally, we could understand an ambition to be self-sufficient in every circumstance, but the intention is more complex and collaborative. The EU SA aims at offering better capability to act in the international arena to his level, to promote its values and defend its citizens in a multilateral context¹⁴, and to be ready to act autonomously to protect itself and its citizens when necessary.

¹¹ Art. 42.7. TEU. If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.

¹² C.f. *“As NATO develops capabilities, it is important to make the most of limited resources, and avoid duplication. That’s one reason why NATO and the European Union are working more closely together than ever before.”* Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg ahead of the meeting of NATO Defence Ministers, 28 June 2017. https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/opinions_145415.htm [15-11-2017]

¹³ C.f. *“A more modest and more concrete approach compared to earlier aspirations, and a more joined-up one compared to current practice. By doing so, the strategy seeks to square the circle between the need for Europe to be cohesive and purposeful in a harder strategic environment and the fact that contested politics within the Union constrain its external action and drain its attractiveness”*. Grevi, G. (2016). A Global Strategy for a soul-searching European Union. European Policy Centre Discussion Paper 13 June 2016. http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_6834_globstrat.pdf [7-11-2017]

¹⁴ C.f. *“The Strategy nurtures the ambition of strategic autonomy for the European Union. This is necessary to promote the common interests of our citizens, as well as our principles and values. Yet we know that such priorities are best served when we are not alone. And they are best served in an international system based on rules and on multilateralism. This is no time for global policemen and lone warriors Our Union will work to strengthen our partners: We will keep deepening the transatlantic bond and our partnership with NATO, while we will also connect to new players and explore new formats We will engage in a practical and principled way, sharing global responsibilities with our partners and contributing to their strengths. We have learnt the lesson: my neighbour’s and my partner’s weaknesses are my own weaknesses. So we will invest in win-win solutions, and move beyond the illusion that international politics can be a zero-sum game”*. European Global Strategy (2016). Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (2016) <https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en>. Introduction by HRVP Mogherini, F. P. 04. [01-09-2017]

7.2.1. Principles and priorities for the EU Strategic Autonomy

Despite the lack of a clear definition, the EUGS sets the main elements: autonomy to decide and act; a solid EU Defence industry capable of producing full spectrum defence capabilities¹⁵; and defence cooperation. Three components have been committed to work hand in hand to achieve it: political, operational and industrial.

The EUGS does something more, it connects SA with a set of priority strategic tasks, formally approved by the Council in November 2016 in its Conclusions on implementing EUGS in the area of Security and Defence (S&D)¹⁶: (a) responding to external conflicts and crises, (b) building the capacities of partners, and (c) protecting the Union and its citizens. To better protect the EU and its citizens is one and at the same time the corollary, because the EU lives and trades in a global world, whose stability and freedom are critical to the European way of life¹⁷.

7.2.2. Political level of ambition: supported by the population?

The EUGS arrived in a moment of uncertainty, with the UK referendum putting enormous pressure to the stability of the European integration project, immigration pressure fuelling the extension of nationalism across Europe, and post-crisis populism questioning the pillars of democracy in the EU.

However, in the middle of this turmoil, public opinion in the EU was demanding to its leaders more security¹⁸. As the following figure shows, the latest Eurobarometer leaves little room to doubt, terrorism and migration, two exogenous security issues, rank first in our citizens' worries and are important political drivers.

¹⁵ C.f. "Full spectrum defence capabilities are necessary to respond to external crises, build our partners' capacities, and to guarantee Europe's safety. Member States remain sovereign in their defence decisions: nevertheless, to acquire and maintain many of these capabilities, defence cooperation must become the norm. The EU will systematically encourage defence cooperation and strive to create a solid European defence industry, which is critical for Europe's autonomy of decision and action." Ibid. P. 10f.

¹⁶ Council conclusions on implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of Security and Defence (2016). Council doc. 14149/16 of 14 November 2016. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/22459/eugs-conclusions-st14149en16.pdf> [5-09-2017]

¹⁷ C.f. "An appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy is important for Europe's ability to promote peace and security within and beyond its borders. We will therefore enhance our efforts on defence, cyber, counterterrorism, energy and strategic communications" Op. Cit. European Global Strategy (2016). P.19.

¹⁸ C.f. "citizens feel increasingly concerned about security and look to the Union for protection. If we want to deliver on their expectations, security and defence must play a more prominent role in the future of the European project". Op. Cit. European Commission (2017). Reflection paper on the future of European Defence European. P. 3.




Figure 2 Main concerns at European level: trend¹⁹.

In its analysis on the future of defence, the EU Commission argues that those perceptions justify the enhancement of EU S&D²⁰.

This implicit population demand explains and sustains the high political level of ambition set by the EUGS²¹ and related decisions. A political will that has to remain in order to avoid repeating some examples of unused instruments due, among other factors, a strong political will to create and maintain them, and weak to use them (e.g. EU Battlegroups)²².

¹⁹ Source: Standard Eurobarometer 87. First Results. Spring 2017. <http://ec.europa.eu/comfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/2142>. P.5.

²⁰ C.f. “pledge to work towards: A stronger Europe on the global scene: a Union further developing existing partnerships, building new ones and promoting stability and prosperity in its immediate neighbourhood to the east and south, but also in the Middle East and across Africa and globally; a Union ready to take more responsibilities and to assist in creating a more competitive and integrated defence industry; a Union committed to strengthening its common security and defence, also in cooperation and complementarity with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, taking into account national circumstances and legal commitments; a Union engaged in the United Nations and standing for a rules-based multilateral system, proud of its values and protective of its people, promoting free and fair trade and a positive global climate policy”. The Rome Declaration. Declaration of the leaders of 27 member states and of the European Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission. (2017). <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/25/rome-declaration/> [17-11-2017]

²¹ C.f. “If we take seriously the four major objectives set by the EUGS, we are clearly talking about the highest possible level of ambition: 1) protection of the European way of life; 2) maintaining security in both the Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods; 3) helping keep open the commercial sea-lanes between Suez and Shanghai; 4) assisting and complementing UN peacekeeping”. Howorth, J. (2017). Strategic autonomy and EU-NATO Cooperation: squaring the circle. EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations, Security Policy Brief 85. P.3. <http://www.egmontinstitute.be/strategic-autonomy-and-eu-nato-cooperation/> [18-11-2017]

²² C.f. “It is now up to the other capitals to accelerate cooperation, and prove that they were not conveniently hiding behind the British objections but are serious about European defence”. Biscop, S. (2016). All or nothing? European and British Strategic Autonomy after the Brexit. EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations, Egmont Paper 87. P.2. <http://www.egmontinstitute.be/european-british-strategic-autonomy-after-brexite/> [20-11-2017]

7.2.3. What does PESCO add?

PESCO is one of the promising achievements that sustain the feeling that this time the political will is really acting²³. Thanks to the bold decision in favour of inclusiveness from the big four, 23 MS opted in for PESCO, and two more could be joining soon. Although the TEU established PESCO as the instrument to allow a group of willing and capable MS take the lead in the conduct of the most demanding missions²⁴, it finally served to achieve a pragmatic compromise that helped gather an ample majority of MS around the table²⁵. The Notification from the participating MS (pMS) to the Council and HR/VP sets its ambition and binding nature, and although considering the TEU Art. 46 the door is opened to leave PESCO, we can at least affirm that all are initially accepting the self-imposed benchmarks²⁶ to strengthen the EU SA. To improve their respective military assets and defence capabilities, the pMS commit to be more collaborative (participate in at least one project under PESCO) and to invest more in defence, mainly in R&D (2% of defence spending) and strategic capabilities (20% of defence spending), and to increase their collaborative projects. This should lead to achieving a coherent full spectrum force package in the long term.

7.2.4. Playground for the EU military CSDP with strategic autonomy.

Recent crisis (Libia, Siria and Ukraine) have approached the arc of instability to the EU borders, refocussing the attention of the EU. Unlike the previous strategy, that primed the force projection capabilities to act in distant scenarios, the EUGS puts a spotlight on our borders, where the EU faces actual risks and threats clearly perceived by its population. This will drive the effort on capabilities that can operate in the EU territory, in

²³ C.f. *“The Common Security and Defence Policy must become more responsive. Enhanced cooperation between Member States should be explored, and might lead to a more structured form of cooperation, making full use of the Lisbon Treaty’s potential”*. Op. Cit. European Global Strategy (2016)

²⁴ Art 42.6. TEU. Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework. Such cooperation shall be governed by Article 46. It shall not affect the provisions of Article 43.

²⁵ C.f. *“What this means is that the idea of more integrated nuclei or a vanguard that pulls the rest behind it, or variable geometry, has not materialised. It does, however, fall to the major states (France and Germany, backed by Spain and Italy) and the institutions to lend weight to the big initiatives, and to ensure that once the UK leaves it is not replaced in its efforts to hinder integration (by the Poles and Hungarians, for instance). It is also true that if defence had not originally been presented as cooperation between a few, it would not have ended up attracting the many”*. Ortega, A. (2017). The EU: (almost) everybody wants to be in everything. Elcano Royal Institute Blog. <https://blog.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/eu-almost-everybody-wants-to-be-in-everything/> [20-11-2017]

²⁶ C.f. Notification on Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) to the Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. (2017) <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31511/171113-pesco-notification.pdf> [15-11-2017]

support and coordination with internal security actors²⁷, the bordering areas and the extended neighbourhood to make it more stable, secure and prosperous²⁸. This also applies to the global commons, although for them the concepts of borders and neighbourhood are more difficult to determine: while in the cyber and space environments, the scope is global by nature, in the maritime environment the scope has to do with the sea-lanes of communication that feed the economy in the EU²⁹.

7.2.5. Is there any change of relations with NATO?

Despite apparent inconsistencies³⁰, the articulation of the EU SA clearly respects NATO's role in common defence of its members, in line with the TEU Art. 42.7., and European leaders have reinforced that message. In this sense, the President of the Commission intervened in Prague in front of EU MS senior representatives, *"NATO has been and will remain the cornerstone of European security for decades. We are different but we complement each other in so many ways – not least by the fact that we share 22 members. Competition between the EU and NATO is not an option" and "by stepping up their efforts on defence, and by doing so together, the Member States of the Union will strengthen the ties that bind the Allies within NATO"* (Juncker 2017)³¹. Statements that build upon Council Conclusions on the implementation of the EUGS that set the intention: *"The Council is committed to strengthening the Union's ability to act as a security provider and to enhance the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as an essential part of the Union's external action. This will enhance its global strategic role and its capacity to act autonomously when and where necessary*

²⁷ C.f. *"Protecting the Union and its citizens covers the contribution that EU and its Member States can make from a security and defence perspective, notably through CSDP in line with the Treaty, to tackle challenges and threats that have an impact on the security of the Union and its citizens, along the nexus of internal and external security. This priority will be pursued in cooperation with Freedom, Security and Justice (FSJ) actors. While CSDP missions and operations are deployed outside the Union, the EU can contribute from a security and defence perspective to strengthening the protection and resilience of its networks and critical infrastructure; the security of its external borders as well as building partners' capacities to manage their borders; civil protection and disaster response; ensuring stable access to and use of the global commons, including the high seas and space; countering hybrid threats; cyber security; preventing and countering terrorism and radicalisation; combatting people smuggling and trafficking; building capacities to manage irregular migration flows; promoting compliance with non-proliferation regimes and countering arms trafficking and organised crime"*. Implementation Plan on Security and Defence. (2016). Council doc. 14392/16 14 November 2016. P.3. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_implementation_plan_st14392.en16_0.pdf [10-09-2017]

²⁸ C.f. *"We will engage responsibly across Europe and the surrounding regions to the east and south. We will act globally to address the root causes of conflict and poverty, and to promote human rights."* Op. Cit. European Global Strategy. (2016). P.8.

²⁹ C.f. *"The EU will contribute to global maritime security, building on its experience in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean, and exploring possibilities in the Gulf of Guinea, the South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca"*. Ibid. P.41.

³⁰ C.f. *"How can this insistence on cooperation and complementarity be reconciled with the aspiration towards strategic autonomy?"* Op. Cit. Howorth (2017) P.1f.

³¹ Op. Cit. Speech at the Defence and Security Conference Prague: In defence of Europe (2017).

*and with partners wherever possible*³². Both organisations agree that the enhancement of the capabilities of the EU will reinforce NATO and vice versa³³, and approved in Warsaw a set of priority areas where urgent cooperation is necessary (see annex). The first annual report on the implementation of the EUGS takes stock of the advances made³⁴, demonstrating that cooperation is productive and focuses in areas that improve EU SA.

7.3. Is strategic autonomy affordable?

If we consider the Commission scenarios (Figure 1), we can deduct that doing less or the same will not offer SA, and that there are only two fit-for-purpose scenarios: doing more altogether, or doing more just a group of willing MS. This means more and better capabilities adapted to the new priorities, a solid EU Defence Industry capable of producing them and more funds to finance them. So, can we afford doing more?

7.3.1. The EU Defence and Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB).

A set of full spectrum of high-end capabilities is the critical enabler for the EU SA, a reality behind the weight that the EUGS gives to the achievement of a solid EU defence industry³⁵. Without it, the EU would not be capable of closing the gap and would remain dependant on others. The industrial policy responsibility lies in the EU Commission that approved the EDAP to foster stronger cooperation between MS and promote greater pooling of national resources.

³² Op. Cit. Implementation Plan on Security and Defence. (2016). P. 10.

³³ C.f. *"A stronger NATO and a stronger EU are mutually reinforcing. Together they can better provide security in Europe and beyond"*. Op. Cit. Joint declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2017).

³⁴ C.f. *"Stemming from the Warsaw Declaration, the EU and NATO are jointly implementing at full speed the 42 action points agreed in December 2016. A new European Centre for Countering Hybrid Threats was established in Helsinki, and joint work is ongoing on situational awareness, strategic communications, maritime operations in the Mediterranean, preparation for the first parallel and coordinated exercise in fall 2017, and capacity building of partner countries with Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Tunisia selected as pilot cases. In terms of defence capabilities, work is ongoing also to ensure output coherence between the NATO Defence Planning Process and the Capability Development Plan."* From Shared Vision to Common Action: Implementing the EU Global Strategy Year 1. (2017). <https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/vision-action> P.24.

³⁵ C.f. *"To guarantee our collective security, we must invest in the common development of technologies and equipment of strategic importance – from land, air, sea and space capabilities to cyber security. It requires more cooperation between Member States and greater pooling of national resources. If Europe does not take care of its own security, nobody else will do it for us. A strong, competitive and innovative defence industrial base is what will give us strategic autonomy"*. Juncker, J-C. (2016). EU Commission Press release "European Defence Action Plan: Towards a European Defence Fund Brussels", 30 November 2016. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-4088_en.htm

7.3.2. Can we fund it?

Since 1989 European countries have benefited from the peace dividends, and cut defence budgets, decline that the crisis exacerbated. The following figure shows it:




Figure 3 EU 27 Defence Expenditure. Own production. Source EDA.

BREXIT will further deteriorate the budgetary scenario. Augmentation of Defence budgets collide with other policies and the EU austerity objectives, so reaching a 2% of GNP would take a long time (EU-28 budget increase of 760 billion € approx.), even as a collective objective.




Figure 4 2016 EU 28 and main powers defence expenditure (percentage GNP).³⁶

³⁶ Figure created by the author. Data Source World bank. <https://data.worldbank.org/> [20-11-2017]

The previous figure shows the fragmentation of EU Defence budgets. It also reflects in the left down corner the atomization for lower GNPs that expend less than 2%. Therefore, increasing budgets within existing fragmentation would worsen the situation³⁷. Full specialization could be an option, but would not be logical for the countries that represent the lion's share of expenditure (France, Germany, Italy and Spain), and are the main contributors to military operations and missions.

Lack of cooperation costs are estimated up to 100 billion €³⁸, therefore pooling, sharing and some specialization could offer quick wins, but will not cover the whole gap. Understandably, the Commission saw the necessity to foster cooperation through financing and austerity advantages. The EDF will help foster cooperation in R&D and joint capability developments, with emphasis on strategic technologies and capabilities.




Figure 5 EDAP. European Defence Fund scope³⁹

³⁷ C.f. "Because of fragmentation and duplication, defence expenditure, even as in some countries it is rising, does not yield enough employable capability. Meanwhile the key capability shortfalls remain unaddressed". Op. Cit. Biscop, S. (2016)

³⁸ C.f. "From a purely economic point of view, pooling our military resources is clearly justified. The lack of cooperation in defence matters costs Europe between €20 billion and €100 billion per year, depending on the areas concerned." Juncker, J-C. (2016). Juncker, J-C. (2016) State of the Union Speech 2016 by the President of the European Commission. <https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/c9ff4ff6-9a81-11e6-9bca-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-30945725> [20-11-2017]

³⁹ Commission. (2016). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. European Defence Action Plan. COM (2016) 950 final of 30.11.2016. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/com_2016_950_f1_communication_from_commission_to_in_st_en_v5_p1_869631.pdf [18-11-2017]

7.3.3. Can we reduce fragmentation? The limits of the arms market.

Defence procurement produces benefits by return of investments, which make the MS eager to retain them. They impose that EDTIB improvement has to contribute to jobs and growth, and that innovation across the EU has to be inclusive, with equal opportunities for defence industry, balanced and in full compliance with EU law⁴⁰. To understand the implications let us take one of the most fragmented markets, the land arms. Figure 6 shows that six MS have performant markets, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Sweden while the rest have limited markets or directly depend on imports. We can also appreciate the balance of payments benefits from the EU Defence market; therefore, changes should at least guarantee them. Subsequently the most promising method could be the concentration of enterprises in multinational consortia, like AIRBUS or MBDA⁴¹, a process that the EDF could turn more attractive, especially for strategic sectors. This could even contribute to eliminate deficits in the smaller national markets.

Complex military capabilities pose additional challenges like the protracted life cycle or the multiplication of models, including ex-soviet equipment with security of supply concerns. The case of Main Battle Tanks (MBTs)⁴², a capability critical to the defence of EU, serves to understand the situation.

⁴⁰ C.f. “the Council reiterates the need to enhance the effectiveness of CSDP and the development and maintenance of Member States’ capabilities, supported by a more integrated, sustainable, innovative and competitive European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), which also contributes to jobs, growth and innovation across the EU..... The Council recalls that these efforts should be inclusive, with equal opportunities for defence industry in the EU, balanced and in full compliance with EU law”. Op. Cit. Council conclusions on implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of Security and Defence (2016). P.3.

⁴¹ C.f. MBDA History. <http://www.mbda-systems.com/about-us/history/> [3-12-2017]

⁴² C.f. “The number of MBTs in EU Member States has regularly decreased, from 15.000 in the year 2000 to just 5.000 today. Modernisation plans for existing main battle tank assets are limited, with no substantial increase of European MBT capabilities to be expected in the short or medium term. Traditionally, most EU countries use European or Soviet legacy equipment. Since the dependency on Soviet legacy technology raises a number of concerns it can be anticipated that next-generation MBTs should be more procured from sources that can guarantee security of supply in the longer term. EDA (2017). Optimizing Europe’s Main Battle Tank Capabilities. European Defence Matters Issue 14. <https://www.eda.europa.eu/webzine/issue14>. [1-12-2017]

	Exports			Imports			Trade balance (exports- imports)		
	Armoured Vehicles	Artillery	Total Arms	Armoured Vehicles	Artillery	Total Arms	Armoured Vehicles	Artillery	Total Arms
Belgium	153	17	715	121	0	511	32	17	204
Bulgaria	65	11	96	5	0	488	60	11	-392
Czech Republic	56	15	198	20	0	790	36	15	-592
Denmark	0	0	54	142	0	583	-142	0	-529
Germany	3,924	413	15,113	55	3	1,008	3,869	410	14,105
Estonia	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	11	9	124	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Ireland	0	0	5	8	3	55	-8	-3	-50
Greece	36	0	36	1,545	123	5,328	-1,509	-123	-5,292
Spain	5	15	3,661	1,052	3	1,926	-1,047	12	1,735
France	113	88	10,492	13	11	336	100	77	10,156
Italy	256	181	3,518	25	160	1,426	231	21	2,092
Cyprus	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0	12	58	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Latvia	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	3	0	138	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Lithuania	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	12	3	196	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Luxembourg	0	0	0	8	0	10	-8	0	-10
Hungary	88	0	88	7	0	508	81	0	-420
Malta	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0	0	18	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Netherlands	315	19	4,674	237	141	949	78	-122	3,725
Austria	102	0	239	10	0	884	92	0	-645
Poland	541	0	598	135	0	2,423	406	0	-1,825
Portugal	0	0	133	125	1	1,958	-125	-1	-1,825
Romania	2	1	46	31	3	876	-29	-2	-830
Slovenia	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	16	1	87	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Slovakia	0	15	33	1	0	18	-1	15	15
Finland	150	7	295	88	21	607	62	-14	-312
Sweden	527	27	2,978	31	0	391	496	27	2,587
United Kingdom	51	748	5,970	306	0	2,544	-255	748	3,426
Total EU- 15	5,632	1,515	47,883	3,766	466	18,516	1,866	1,049	29,367
Total EU- 12	752	42	1,059	241	28	5,724	511	14	-4,665
Total EU-27	6,384	1,557	48,942	4,007	494	24,240	2,377	1,063	24,702

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. <http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php>
 Figures are SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) expressed in US\$ m. at constant (1990) prices.
 Figures may not add up due to the conventions of rounding.
 Exports and Trade Balance Data for EU-12 and EU-27 do not include Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta or Slovenia.

Figure 6 Arms trade in EU between 2005 and 2010 in US \$.⁴³

8. Discussion of Results and Personal Conclusions

Population concerns originate increasingly from security issues, like migration and terrorism, and demand more security at home and in the borders of the EU. This requires S&D instruments a bigger effort to face threats and risks to our interests, security and stability within the EU and beyond borders. The strategic focus has shifted from promotion of values abroad to the protection of the EU. A change that requires more hard power in the S&D mix, in areas like autonomous capacity to decide, military contribution to internal and border's security (i.e. intelligence, counterterrorism, fight against illegal traffic), security of access to the global commons (i.e. maritime security, cybersecurity, spatial capabilities) or autonomous peace enforcement in our neighbourhood.

For this endeavour the EU can no longer free ride in the wake of the US, and should be able to contribute to its level or to act autonomously if necessary, as President Obama claimed regarding the Libya crisis⁴⁴.

⁴³ Source: IKEI (2012). Study on the Perspectives of the European Land Armament Sector. Final Report (ref. E3779 v_03) 14th November 2012. P.45. http://www.industrial-europe.eu/sectors/defence/2012/INFF_E3779_Final%20Report_v03-EN.pdf [25-11-2017]

⁴⁴ C.f. "Sometimes we're going to get what we want precisely because we are sharing in the agenda. The irony is that it was precisely in order to prevent the Europeans and the Arab states from holding our coats while we did all the fighting that we, by design, insisted" that they lead during the

Therefore, the EU Strategic Autonomy to act and decide is a proper, necessary and legitimate ambition, our main partners and population so demand.

High expectations are double edged. Political will has to remain when decisions are put to action, as failing to deliver would turn SA into another pompous but useless buzzword. For the moment, political will keeps the path and PESCO inclusiveness has gathered an ample majority of MS (23 out of 27).

However, we should not be naïve, as there remain different political, strategic and cultural visions on the way to ensure European protection. Despite the institutional respect to NATO's role for the common defence of its members, several still wield the argument of duplication. On the contrary, recent joint EU NATO meetings and declarations aim at a more coordinated and collaborative modus-operandi in the political, operational and capability development fields. Agreed harmonisation of activities, investments and developments spheres will aim at enhancing both the NATO and the EU to act in concert or autonomously when and where necessary, and will have several positive spills over for EU SA.

In the operational aspect, the NATO could keep leading to the east, where reassurance and conventional deterrence apply, while the EU could deepen its involvement in the Mediterranean and southern neighbourhood, where less conventional instruments like maritime security tasks or capability development of partners are necessary, while preparing for more demanding conflicts and crisis.

The EU would also concentrate its investments in the improvement of specific defence capabilities; respecting the single set of forces concept as EU MS are mostly NATO members (22 out of 28). Otherwise, scarce available resources would be misused and the phantom of duplication will erode cohesion. Furthermore, EU armies and national arms markets suffer structural fragmentation by nature, and present dimensional disparities that further reduce that margin. Disparity of legacy equipment and extended life cycles of complex military capability systems are additional limiting factors.

To complicate the problem, EU Defence budgets are far from being capable to finance the required capabilities, and leave little margin of manoeuvre. Despite promises, we cannot take augmentation of investment

mission to remove Muammar Qaddafi from power in Libya. "It was part of the anti-free rider campaign... So what I said at that point was, we should act as part of an international coalition. But because this is not at the core of our interests, we need to get a UN mandate; we need Europeans and Gulf countries to be actively involved in the coalition; we will apply the military capabilities that are unique to us, but we expect others to carry their weight." Goldberg, J. (2016) Obama Unhappy with Allies, Upset at Free Riders. www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/obama-unhappy-with-allies-upset-at-free-riders [2-12-2017]

in defence for granted, as it would have to compete with other policies and overcome austerity criteria. Furthermore, isolated and uncoordinated increases to achieve the NATO 2% objective would increase segregation and further deteriorate the situation. Sovereignty is another obstacle, defence market and arms procurement have traditionally been public monopolies, what reduces their flexibility and adaptability. EU law introduces some more conditionings, it has to create jobs, growth, and innovation, and what is more demanding, it has to be inclusive, balanced and with equal opportunities for defence industry across the EU.

In this scenario, the achievement of an EDTIB, capable of providing a full set of hi-end capabilities to grant SA, will not be an easy task. The scale disparity among MS defence sectors demands breathe of vision to the most capable, openness to the rest, and solidarity overall.

PESCO has put some rationality, and has set both individual and collective benchmark to foster a more collaborative effort, the only way to optimize existing and new resources. The EDF has also added incentives for collaborative R&D and joint projects. Specialization, pooling and sharing are three concepts that can help overcoming some of the limitations. Even if they aim to a collective goal, measures apply to individual MS what makes effectiveness dependent on its defence sector. Specialization fits better to the smaller ones, but could be counterproductive when applied to the bigger ones as they have capabilities covering most of the military spectrum and sustain the bulk of EU military operations and missions. On the other hand, pooling and sharing is highly suitable to expensive hi-end strategic enablers, where the more capable would have to put flesh to the bone.

As a conclusion, I believe that EU SA requires a “revolution of military affairs” in Europe that will have deep military implications, a process that can only be achievable in the long term if the political will and the required resources are maintained throughout.

Word count: 3849 words + 209 words corresponding to literal citations.

9. Annexes

9.1. List of Abbreviations.

COM	EU Commission
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
EDAP	European Defence Action Plan
EDF	European Defence Fund
EDTIB	European Defence Technological and Industrial Base
EU	European Union
EUGS	European Global Strategy
HR/VP	High Representative / Vice President
MBTs	Main Battle Tanks
MPCC	Military Planning and Conduct Capability

MS	Member State(s)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
pMS	Participating Member State
R&D	Research and Development
SA	Strategic Autonomy
S&D	Security and Defence
TEU	Treaty of the European Union
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States of America

9.2. List of Figures.

Figure 1 EU Foreign Policy and Defence evolution scenarios for 2025.

Figure 2 Main concerns at European level: trend.

Figure 3 EU 27 Defence Expenditure. Own production. Source EDA.

Figure 4 2016 EU 28 and main powers defence expenditure (percentage GNP).

Figure 5 EDAP. European Defence Fund scope.

Figure 6 Arms trade in EU between 2005 and 2010 in US \$.

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9.4. Joint EU-NATO priorities for cooperation⁴⁵.

“In fulfilling the objectives above, we believe there is an urgent need to:

- *Boost our ability to counter hybrid threats, including by bolstering resilience, working together on analysis, prevention, and early detection, through timely information sharing and, to the extent possible, intelligence sharing between staffs; and cooperating on strategic communication and response. The development of coordinated procedures through our respective playbooks will substantially contribute to implementing our efforts.*

- *Broaden and adapt our operational cooperation including at sea, and on migration, through increased sharing of maritime situational awareness as well as better coordination and mutual reinforcement of our activities in the Mediterranean and elsewhere.*

- *Expand our coordination on cyber security and defence including in the context of our missions and operations, exercises and on education and training.*

- *Develop coherent, complementary and interoperable defence capabilities of EU Member States and NATO Allies, as well as multilateral projects.*

- *Facilitate a stronger defence industry and greater defence research and industrial cooperation within Europe and across the Atlantic.*

- *Step up our coordination on exercises, including on hybrid, by developing as the first step parallel and coordinated exercises for 2017 and 2018.*

- *Build the defence and security capacity and foster the resilience of our partners in the East and South in a complementary way through specific projects in a variety of areas for individual recipient countries, including by strengthening maritime capacity.*

Cooperation in these areas is a strategic priority. Speedy implementation is essential.”

⁴⁵ Op. Cit. Joint declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of 8 July 2016.

RESULTS OF THE ESSAY PRESENTATIONS

Name (country)	Final score 1 st +2 nd round	Place
Matthias Kern (AT)	183,03	1
Nikola Savic (AT)	182,33	2
Yannick Van Bogaert (BE)	179,07	3
Christian Kurz (AT)	176,93	4
Kacper Kasprzak (PL)	176,73	5
Karlotta Weck (DE)	174,23	6
Florian Berger (AT)	171,32	7
Jakub Nyéki (SK)	167,70	8
Robin Kinnunen (EE)	166,60	9
Santiago Cuartero (ES)	164,67	10



WINNER OF THE ESSAY PRESENTATION COMPETITION

Officer Cadet MATTHIAS KERN

TMA - Austria

TEAM KNOWLEDGE COMPETITION

CADET TEAMS

for the Team Knowledge Competition

4th CSDP Olympiad

<i>TEAM 1</i>	<i>TEAM 2</i>	<i>TEAM 3</i>	<i>TEAM 4</i>	<i>TEAM 5</i>	<i>TEAM 6</i>
Florian Berger (AT)	Matthias Kern (AT)	Christian Kurz (AT)	Nikola Savic (AT)	Marcel Terci (RO)	Karlotta Weck (DE)
Krzysztof Rokicki (PL)	Remigiusz Trybus (PL)	Patrycjusz Kwartnik (PL)	Kacper Kasprzak (PL)	Michalis Erotokritou (CY)	Jakub Nyéki (SK)
Ruxandra Bică (RO)	Michaela Zátureczká (SK)	Anamaria Zugravu (RO)	Marek Krištof (SK)	Robin Kinnunen (EE)	Uku Paul Viira (EE)
Remigio Loris Principe (IT)	Annamária Simon (HU)	Raffaele Dell'Isola (IT)	Nóra Peter (HU)	Assunta Fusco (IT)	Salvatore La Mura (IT)
Loukas Karousios (CY)	Stiliyan Slavchev (BG)	Dimitar Stoykov (BG)	Nikolaos Trigkas (GR)	Gonzalo Echevarria Moreno (ES)	Quentin Rosenbruch (BE)
Yannick Van Bogaert (BE)	Mauricio Ortega Muñoz (ES)	Santiago Cuartero (ES)	Loic Claesen (BE)		Andreea-Mihaela Tirlescu (RO)
	Luís Ferreira (PO)		Daniel Tolea (RO)		



Evaluation team

Cadet teams



Results from the Team Knowledge Competition

Team 1	Team 2	Team 3	Team 4	Team 5	Team 6
60	28	60	66	32	28

WINNER OF THE TEAM KNOWLEDGE COMPETITION –

TEAM 4:

- Nikola Savic (AT)
- Kacper Kasprzak (PL)
- Marek Krištof (SK)
- Nóra Peter (HU)
- Nikolaos Trigkas (GR)
- Loic Claesen (BE)
- Daniel Tolea (RO)

INDIVIDUAL KNOWLEDGE COMPETITION



Results from the Individual Knowledge Competition

Name	CLAESEN (BE)	KASPRZAK (PL)	KERN (AT)	KRISTOF (SK)	PETER (HU)	SAVIC (AT)	TRIGKAS (GR)
Score	30	44	38	34	32	10	20

WINNER OF THE 4th CSDP OLYMPIAD

Cadet KACPER KASPRZAK

**Military University of Technology,
Warsaw, Poland**



COVER PAGE DESIGN COMPETITION



Winner of the Cover Page Design Competition

Officer Cadet Nikola SAVIĆ

TMA - Austria

AWARD AND CLOSING CEREMONY



TEAM 4 - Winner of the Team Knowledge Competition



WINNER of 4th CSDP OLYMPIAD – Cdt KACPER KASPRZAK and the Rector of Vasil Levski NMU – Brigadier General PLAMEN BOGDANOV, PhD

**WINNER of the Essay
Competition -
Cdt MATTHIAS KERN**



**WINNER of the
Cover Page Design
Competition -
Cdt NIKOLA SAVIĆ**

**Cadets - participants in the
4th CSDP OLYMPIAD**






From the left: Maj. Symeon Zambas, LtCol Dirk Dubois, Cdt Kacper Kasprzak, Cdt Matthias Kern, Cdt Nikola Savić, Col. Harald Gell, Col. Nevena Atanasova- Krasteva, Col. Veselin Madanski



International participants in the 4th CSDP OLYMPIAD

**ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THE RESIDENTIAL PHASE OF
THE 4th CSDP OLYMPIAD
FROM 14 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND 27 MILITARY
ACADEMIES, UNIVERSITIES AND INSTITUTIONS**



**VELIKO TARNOVO, BULGARIA
21- 25 MAY 2018**

MESSAGES

THE WORDS OF THE WINNER OF THE 4th CSDP OLYMPIAD

The 4th CSDP Olympiad in Veliko Tarnovo, Bulgaria

It is a great honour for me to tell you about my 4th CSDP Olympiad experience on behalf of all my colleagues who participated in this event. The Olympiad was a wonderful experience which I am privileged to share.

When in March 2017 I heard about the CSDP Olympiad, I have already known that I was going to apply to participate in the event. Although I barely knew what Common Security and Defence Policy is, I have perceived the participation in the Olympiad as a unique opportunity to increase my understanding of European military cooperation.

And I was not mistaken. The Olympiad indeed proved to be a truly enriching experience. Firstly, the e-learning units introduced the history and key objectives of Common Foreign and Security Policy. Those were firm basics, but even with them, our individual task proved to be challenging. 3,500 word essay written in line with specific and strict rules was not an “easy cake”. Research, writing, and translating took me a lot of time but, by any means, it was not the wasted time.

For me, the most important part of the Olympiad was meeting fellow cadets from all over Europe. Such a multinational and multicultural spirit of the Olympiad's residential phase was the characteristic which truly distinguished this competition. Friendly discussions during the ice-breaker and later throughout the week truly showed me the European military cooperation in action. I think that because of talking to all those cadets, who had so different backgrounds, it was the first time that I fully realized what the European Security and Defence Culture is about.



The competition itself, however, was not as pleasurable as hanging out with other cadets. Essay presentations held in English, within a limited time frame, proved not to be easy. As for me, it was my first public appearance in front of such a wide audience and I have to admit that the appearance was almost overwhelming. I must notice though that all the presentations of my colleagues were remarkable and in a truly interesting way showed me how cadets from different countries feel about biggest challenges for European security.

The part of the Olympiad's competition I liked most was the knowledge competition. In particular, it is a team competition. The discussions which my team held over each tricky question showed me that no one was here by a mistake. All of my colleagues had excellent knowledge, and I truly enjoyed cooperating in a team of such competent participants. In fact, the thing which I will remember from the knowledge test was not the competition but the cooperation. And being the best of all those amazing people, as it later occurred, made me extremely proud.

But, as mentioned earlier, the Olympiad was not only about competition. After all those demanding days of making use of our knowledge, there was a time to feel the spirit of the beautiful Bulgarian city of Veliko Tarnovo. Stunning architecture and landmarks were almost as good advertisement of Bulgaria as our Bulgarian colleagues who served as guides during our sightseeing.

From the 4th CSDP Olympiad, I brought home something more valuable than a winner trophy. Those are the memories of the Olympiad, people who I met there and things which I saw there. And of course, a thick phonebook filled with phone numbers of my new friends.

Cadet Kacper Kasprzak
Military University of Technology, Warsaw, Poland

THE WORDS OF THE WINNER OF THE PAPER COMPETITION

The experience of participating in the CSDP Olympiad is certainly something completely different compared to other academic competitions. Even though the 4th CSDP Olympiad was a competition, where students from all over Europe competed against each other, there is a certain reason why it is called an Olympiad.

As an officer Cadet of the Theresian Military Academy, I get confronted with the structures and the procedures of the European Union very often. Participating in the CSDP Olympiad was a great opportunity to meet young officers from all over Europe, to get to know their mindset and to connect with each other. Through the 4th CSDP Olympiad, and by participating in other Common Modules of the European Initiative for the Exchange of Military Young Officers, I was able to widen my military network all over Europe.

My journey to the 4th CSDP Olympiad began in summer 2017 when I was selected to be part of the Austrian delegation.

The first step on our way to the residential phase in Bulgaria was an online study which showed me personally how wide ranging CSDP is. The second step was to choose one out of ten topics for the CSDP Paper Essay competition.

After our papers were evaluated and the presentations were ready it was time to go to the Vasil Levski Military Academy, in Veliko Tarnovo, for the residential phase of the 4th CSDP Olympiad.

Wonderful Bulgarian hospitality awaited all of us from the moment on we stepped out of the plane in Sofia.

It was a big honor for me to share my ideas on the role of CSDP in border protection to the audience and I was amazed how similar the views of young military officers can be, even though they are from different corners of Europe.



I am really proud of being the winner of the CSDP Paper Essay Competition. It means a lot to me that I was able to share my views on the European Union's future in the fields of border security and migration.

Overall, being part of the 4th CSDP Olympiad was a great way to experience the Bulgarian culture and the wonderful city of Veliko Tarnovo at day and at night.

For the opportunity the 4th CSDP Olympiad offered to all participants I would like to thank everyone who was involved in organizing this unique event of exchange of ideas. I would especially like to recognize the efforts of the Director of the 4th CSDP Olympiad Colonel Assoc. Prof. Nevena Atanasova Krasteva and the Chairman of the Implementation Group Colonel Assoc. Prof. GELL Harald.

Officer Cadet Matthias Kern
Theresian Military Academy, Wiener Neustadt, Austria

THE WORDS OF THE WINNER OF THE COVER PAGE COMPETITION

Dear readers,


As a cadet in the second year of study at the Theresian Military Academy, it is an honour for me to be able to convey some of my thoughts on the fourth CSDP-Olympiad in Veliko Tarnovo, Bulgaria, that I participated in.

When I signed up for this event nearly half a year before it started, I did not have too much knowledge about what would await me in the near future. It was during the work on my essay and also on the cover page, that I gradually realised how significant and important the efforts of the European Union are to connect its members by means of numerous efforts.

Shortly after arriving in Bulgaria, the joy was already great on my side because of the realisation that my design was used to give the whole competition a face. And with hours and days passing by, this joy was further exceeded because of the excellent hospitality of our hosts. Pleasant conversations with other participants and a challenging but fair competition only added to this wonderful experience.

I am not only proud of the performance of my fellow Austrian colleagues, but of all participants who did the best they could and I am thankful to the organisational team that made this brilliant competition possible.

To conclude my thoughts, I can say that the participation in the fourth CSDP-Olympiad in Veliko Tarnovo was a great experience which enhanced my knowledge regarding the European Union and gave me a wonderful opportunity to connect with other participants from all over the continent. Therefore, I hope that this event will be sustained and will continue to grow, just to give as many cadets as possible the opportunity for the same or an even better experience!



Officer Cadet Nikola Savić
Theresian Military Academy, Wiener Neustadt, Austria

Participation of the international cadets and Bulgarian mentors in the official 24 May procession honouring the Day of the Bulgarian Enlightenment and Culture and the Slavic Alphabet

Centre of the town of Veliko Tarnovo –
the historical and culture capital of Bulgaria





SUPPORT

The 4th CSDP Olympiad
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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA
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**WE WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS OUR
GRATITUDE TO EVERYONE FOR THEIR SUPPORT AND CONTRIBUTION
FOR MAKING THIS EVENT A BIG SUCCESS!**

ANNEXES

Annex 1:

TOPICS FOR THE 4th CSDP OLYMPIAD



1. Comment on the evolution of CSDP in light of the EU-NATO joint declaration.
2. Comment on the rationale behind the EU's CSDP engagement in the Sahel.
3. In what ways is the CSDP becoming more supranational in nature? What are the consequences?
4. The EU Global Strategy introduces “protecting Europe” as a priority and the concept of “strategic autonomy”: What could be the military implications?
5. Cyberspace as new dimension of European security.
6. The role of the European Union in maritime security.
7. The current state of the European energy security supply.
8. The role of CSDP in the EU's integrated approach.
9. The role of CSDP in border protection.
10. CSDP public relations: How to promote CSDP to the European citizens?

Annex 2:

COUNTRIES AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE 4th CSDP OLYMPIAD

COUNTRY	TOWN/CITY	INSTITUTION
AUSTRIA	Wiener Neustadt	Theresian Military Academy
POLAND	Wrocław	The General Tadeusz Kosciuszko Military Academy of Land Forces
	Dęblin	Air Force Academy
	Warsaw	Military University of Technology
	Warsaw	Ministry of Defence
SLOVAK REPUBLIC	Liptovský Mikuláš	The Armed Forces Academy of General M. R. Štefánik
SPAIN	Zaragoza	Academia General Militar
	Murcia	Spanish Air Force Adademy
	Maran	Spanish Naval Academy
ROMANIA	Brasov	"Henri Coanda" Air Force Academy
	Bucharest	"Alexandru Ioan Cuza" Police Academy
	Sibiu	"Nicolae Balcescu" Land Forces Academy
HUNGARY	Budapest	National University of Public Service
GERMANY	Hamburg	University of the Armed Forces (Helmut Schmidt University)
ITALY	Torino	Education and Training Command and School of Applied Military Studies; Italian Army
	Pozzuoli (Naples)	Italian Air Force Academy
GREECE	Varinas / Athens	Hellenic Military(Army)Academy SSE

COUNTRY	TOWN/CITY	INSTITUTION
	Athens	Hellenic Air Force Academy
	Piraeus	Hellenic Naval Academy
FRANCE	Salon de Provence	French Air Force Academy
ESTONIA	Tartu	Estonian National Defence College Officer School
CYPRUS	Athens	Hellenic Air Force Academy/CY
	Athens	Hellenic Military(Army)Academy
		Hellenic Naval Academy
BULGARIA	Varna	Nikola Vaptsarov Naval Academy
	Veliko Tarnovo	Vasil Levski National Military University
BELGIUM	Brussels	Royal Military Academy
	Brussels	European Security and Defence College



Participants and official guests in the 4th CSDP OLYMPIAD Opening Ceremony -
 the parade ground in front of Vasil Levski Monument
 in Vasil Levski National Military University, Veliko Tarnovo, Bulgaria
 22 May 2018

Annex 3:

THE WEBSITE OF THE 4th CSDP OLYMPIAD

http://www.emilyo.eu/olympiad_csdp



THE 4th COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY OLYMPIAD

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